Taxation of Equine Sales and Exchanges by McMahon, Martin J., Jr.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 75 | Issue 2 Article 3
1986
Taxation of Equine Sales and Exchanges
Martin J. McMahon Jr.
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Animal Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
McMahon, Martin J. Jr. (1986) "Taxation of Equine Sales and Exchanges," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 75 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol75/iss2/3
Taxation of Equine Sales and
Exchanges*
By MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR.**
Table of Contents***
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 208
I. RECOGNITION OF GAJN OR Loss ON TBE SALE OR
EXCHANGE OF HORSES ............................. 212
A. Determining the Amount Realized on the Sale
or Exchange .............................. 212
1. Receipt of Cash or Property ........... 212
2. Sale for Deferred Payment ............. 213
B. Computation of Basis ...................... 215
1. General Principles .................... 215
a. Purchase Price Basis .............. 215
b. Other Methods of Acquisition ..... 216
c. Horses Raised by Owner .......... 217
d. Miscellaneous Additions to Basis ... 219
2. Purchase of Mare in Foal .............. 219
3. Adjustments to Basis .................. 223
a. Adjustments That Increase Basis ... 223
b. Adjustments That Decrease Basis... 224
C. Character of Gain or Loss ................. 225
1. General Principles .................... 225
2. Distinguishing Horses Primarily for Sale
to Customers From Horses Held for
Breeding and Racing Purposes ......... 228
3. Special Problems in Qualifying for Section
1231 Treatment ....................... 236
* Copyright 1986 by Martin J. McMahon, Jr.
** Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1971, Rutgers
College; J.D. 1974, Boston College; L.L.M. 1979 Boston University.
*** EDITOR'S NoTE: At the insistence of the Author, the citation format used in
this Article differs from the citation format normally employed by the Kentucky Law
Journal.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL[
a. Section 1231(b)(3) Twenty Four
Month Holding Period Requirement
For Horses Held For Breeding, Draft,
Or Sporting Purposes ............. 236
b. Identifying Horses Held For Breed-
ing Or Racing Purposes Under The
Regulations ...................... 238
c. Sale of Mares in Foal ............. 245
4. Sale of Syndicate Shares ............... 247
a. Is a Syndicate Undivided Ownership
or a Partnership? ................. 247
b. Character of Gain on Nonpartner-
ship Syndicate Shares ............. 249
c. Sale of Shares in a Syndicate That is
a Partnership .................... 252
D. Installment Sales .......................... 255
1. General Principles of Deferred Recogni-
tion Rules ............................ 255
a. Treatment of Sale of Horses Subject
to Liens ......................... 257
b. Disallowance of Installment Report-
ing of Recapture Income .......... 258
2. Installment Reporting of Contingent Price
Sales ................................ 259
3. Determining What Constitutes a
"'Payment" . ........................ 260
4. Premature Dispositions of Installment
Obligations ........................... 261
5. Installment Sales to Related Persons .... 262
6. Election Not to Report on Installment
M ethod .............................. 264
7. Accrual Basis Dealers Maintaining
Inventories ........................... 265
8. Sale of Syndicate Shares and Equine Part-
nership Interests ...................... 266
a. Generally ........................ 266
b. Interrelationship of Installment Re-
porting and the Collapsible Partner-
ship Rules ....................... 267
9. Unstated Interest ..................... 269
[VOL. 75
EQUINE TAXATION
10. Tax Finance Benefits of Installment Sales 274
E. Transfer to a Partnership or Syndicate ....... 275
1. General Principles .................... 275
2. Formation of Partnership With Services
Partner .............................. 277
a. Subchapter K and the "Common
Law" Approach .................. 277
b. Section 83 Approach .............. 279
3. Receipt of Cash by Transferor to Partner-
ship or Syndicate ..................... 281
II. LIKE KIND EXCHANGES OF HORSES ................. 282
A. General Principles ......................... 282
1. Nonrecognition of Gain and Substituted
Basis ................................ 282
2. Eligibility for Nonrecognition .......... 284
B. Identifying Horses of Like Kind ............ 286
1. Same Sex Requirement ................ 286
2. Relevance of Purpose for Which Horses
of the Same Sex Are Held ............. 286
3. Horses of Different Breeds ............. 290
4. Mares in Foal ........................ 291
5. Partnership Interests and Syndicate
Shares ............................... 293
a. Partnerships ..................... 293
b. Syndicate Shares ................. 294
c. Exchange of Syndicate Share For A
H orse ........................... 295
C. Receipt of Boot ........................... 296
1. Cash Boot ........................... 296
2. Exchanges of Encumbered Property ..... 297
3. Receipt of Both Qualified and Nonquali-
fied Property in the Exchange .......... 299
4. Coordination With Installment Reporting
of Gain .............................. 299
D. Multiparty Exchanges ...................... 300
E. Special Rules for Deferred Exchanges ........ 301
F. Determining the Desirability of a Like Kind
Exchange ................................. 303
III. INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS ........................ 307
A. Introduction ............................... 307
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
1. Elective Nonrecognition of Gain and Basis
Rules ................................ 307
2. Characterization of Recognized Gain .... 309
3. Meaning of Involuntary Conversion ..... 310
4. Property Similar or Related in Service or
Use ................................. 311
B. Identifying Involuntary Conversions ......... 312
1. Collection of Foal Insurance ........... 313
2. Accident, Disease or Sickness Rendering a
Horse Unfit for Racing or Breeding ..... 315
a. Accident ......................... 315
b. Sickness or Disease ............... 319
c. Fertility Insurance Proceeds ........ 320
C. Identifying Horses Similar or Related in Service
or Use to the Coverted Horses .............. 321
1. Owner-Users and the "Functional Use"
Test ................................. 322
a. Replacement With Animals of Dif-
ferent Sex ....................... 322
b. Replacement With a Horse Held For
Different Purpose ................ 323
c. Replacements Involving Mares in
Foal .......................... 326
2. Investors and the "Similar Economic Re-
lationship" Test ...................... 331
D. Special Problems of Syndicates ............. 333
1. Syndicate Treated as a Partnership ...... 333
2. Syndicate That is Co-Ownership of Un-
divided Shares ........................ 336
E. Determining the Desirability of a Section 1033
Election .................................. 337
CONCLUSION ................................... 338
INTRODUCTION
Thoroughbred horse breeding and racing is big business, in-
volving big money. Furthermore, the industry has an important,
relatively unique aspect other than the legal gambling associated
with horse racing. Its major tangible product and productive asset,
the horse, is subject to rapid and phenomenal appreciation. Spend
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a Buck, winner of the 1985 Kentucky Derby, was purchased as a
yearling in March of 1983 for $12,500.1 In late 1985, after a great
racing season, an undivided one half interest in Spend a Buck sold
for a reported $7,000,000.2 Devil's Bag, an early season favorite
to win the 1984 Kentucky Derby, was syndicated for $36,000,000
while still racing as a two year old in late 1983. 3 As a yearling, he
had been purchased for $350,000. 4 Triple Crown winner Seattle
Slew, purchased for $17,500 as a yearling in 1976, was syndicated
for $12,000,000 in 1978 with a single share selling for $300,000. 5
Following the victory of Seattle Slew's son, Swale, in the 1984
Kentucky Derby, a Seattle Slew share reportedly sold for
$3,000,000;6 and in November of that year a single breeding season
sold for $710,000. 7 A lifetime breeding right to Alydar sold for
$1,995,000 in November of 1985.1
Fillies and mares, like the stallions above, can also sell for
huge sums of money. The record price paid at auction for a horse
in training for racing is $4,500,000, which was paid for Estrapade,
a five year old filly, in November of 1985. 9 That same month
Miss Oceana brought $7,000,000 at the dispersal sale of the breed-
ing stock of Newstead Farm Trust.'0 That price was a new record;
the previous record was $6,000,000, paid for Princes Fame, in foal
to Alydar."
Even unraced horses, if well bred, may bring extraordinary
prices. At the Keeneland Select Yearling Sales in July 1985, a
I Mooney, Conditioning Spend a Buck, 219 THOROUGHBRED REc. 4242, 4242
(Aug. 31, 1985).
1 Mooney, Horse of the Year-Spend a Buck, 220 THOROUGHBRED REc. 962, 963
(Feb. 15, 1986).
Heckerman, The Big Buyers, 219 THOROUGHBRED Rac. 3322, 3328 (July 13,
1985).
Id.
Id.
Heckerman, Lightning in a Bottle, 218 THOROUGHBRED REC. 5820, 5824 (Nov.
7, 1984); Record Review, 219 THOROUGHBRED REc. 4549, 4549 (Sept. 14, 1985).
7 Record Review, 218 THOROUGHBRED REC. 6037, 6037 (Nov. 14, 1984).
Record Review, 219 THOROUGHBRED REc. 5892, 5893 (Nov. 16, 1985).
Capps, Estrapade Sold at Keeneland, 219 THOROUGHBRED REC. 5889, 5889 (Nov.
16, 1985).
11 Heckerman, Newstead Farm Trust Dispersal, 219 THOROUGHBRED REc. 5886,
5886-87 (Nov. 16, 1985).
" Id. at 5886.
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yearling colt sired by Nijinsky II sold for $13,100,000.12 The
average price paid for the 258 yearlings sold at that sale was
$537,384.Y1 From 1976, when the sale of a yearling for $1,000,000
was first recorded, through July 1985, one hundred and fifteen
yearlings sold for $1,000,000 or more.14
Although these numbers are impressive, they are somewhat
misleading. Only a very small percentage of thoroughbred horses
ever attain the stratospheric prices described in the preceding par-
agraphs. Nevertheless, the value of many "ordinary" thorough-
breds is significant. At the November 1985 Keeneland September
yearling sales, the largest yearling sale in the country, 1,861 year-
lings sold for an average price of $33,3331s At the less prestigious
Fasig-Tipton Kentucky yearling sale in October of that year, how-
ever, the average price for the 204 thoroughbred yearlings was
only $4,804.16 At numerous other sales around the country, similar
average sales prices are recorded.17 Every day across the country
many thoroughbred horses are entered in claiming races in which
they may be claimed for $10,000 or less.
The economic gains realized on the sale or exchange of thor-
oughbred horses can be significant. Thus, the taxes due on those
gains may be correspondingly significant. Prior to the general rate
reduction and the repeal of the preferential taxation of capital
gains in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,18 the taxes imposed on gain
from the sale of a horse were much greater if the horse was not
classified as a capital asset or section 1231 property than they were
if the horse was so classified. With the repeal of the capital gains
preference, the tax dollars at stake based on the characterization
of the horse are not as substantial. Nevertheless, the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 continues to make all of the technical
12 Heckerman, Keeneland Select Sale, 219 THOROUGHBRED Rc. 3620, 3620 (July
27, 1985).
13 Id. at 3621.
14 Million Dollar Report, 219 THOROUGHBRED REc. 3460, 3460 (July 20, 1985).
1 Keeneland September Sale, 219 THOROUGHBRED REc. 4643, 4644 (Sept. 21, 1985).
16 Record Review, 219 THOROUGHBRED R~c. 5561, 5564 (Nov. 2, 1985).
17 E.g., A Tough Sale to Figure, 219 THOROUGHBRED REC. 5872, 5872 (Nov. 16,
1985) (Fasig Tipton Kentucky Fall Mixed Sale); Breeders Without Buyers, 219 THOR-
OUGHBRED REC. 5151, 5151 (Oct. 19, 1985) (Ocala Mixed Sales); Record Review, supra
note 16, at 5561 (Fasig Tipton Belmont October Sale).
"1 Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 301, 311, 100 Stat. 2085, 2217-19.
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distinctions between capital assets, section 1231 property, and
ordinary income property that were made under prior law.
This Article explores the characterization of gains realized on
the sale or exchange of horses and examines the applicability of
various provisions for deferring gain, such as installment sale
reporting, like kind exchanges, and elective deferral of gain realized
on the involuntary conversion of property. Although a few special
provisions apply unique rules to horses, most issues within this
topic arise because of the nature of the industry and the nature
of horses. Because horses are reproducing animals and breeding is
a large part of the industry, "a horse" is not simply "a horse":
gender may make a difference. Futhermore, many owners are
involved in all phases of the breeding and racing industry, and
therefore determining the purpose for which a particular horse is
held often is difficult. These factors give rise to many uncertainties
in applying the general rules governing the characterization of gain
and deferral of recognition-rules that may be more easily applied
in other contexts.
This Article discusses tax treatment of operating expenses only
to the extent that it impacts on determining the amount of gain
or loss realized on a sale or exchange. Thus, problems such as the
applicability of the "hobby loss" rules, partnership basis rules,
the "at risk" rules, and passive loss rules limiting loss deductions
to investors in horses are not discussed. Losses realized on a sale
or exchange are not discussed extensively either. Because the cost
of raising a horse generally is deductible and because purchased
horses are subject to rapid depreciation under the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (ACRS),19 taxable gains on the sale or exchange
of horses are encountered more frequently than losses. Even if a
horse's sale price is much less than the purchase price, the trans-
action results in a gain for tax purposes unless the horse's value
declines quite rapidly and the horse sells within a relatively short
time after purchase.
" See I.R.C. § 168. All citations to the Internal Revenue Code in this Article refer
to both the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
except citations to §§ of the 1954 Code repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and
§§ of the 1986 Code added by the Act.
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I. RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS ON Tl= SALE OR EXCHANGE
OF HORSES
For the purpose of computing federal income taxes, the seller
must recognize and include in gross income gains realized on the
sale of a horse.20 A loss realized on the sale of a horse may be
deducted if the horse was owned by a corporation, but if it was
owned by an individual (including a partnership) the loss may be
deducted only if the horse was held in connection with the tax-
payer's trade or business or was acquired and sold in a transaction
entered into for profit that was not connected with a trade or
business. 2' This latter condition allows the deduction of losses
incurred with respect to horses acquired for investment purposes.
Losses incurred with respect to horses that are held primarily for
pleasure may not be deducted except to the extent allowed under
section 183 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).?
Gain is the excess of the amount realized upon the disposition
of the horse over its adjusted basis.Y If the amount realized on
disposition is less than the adjusted basis, the seller realizes a loss.
Both "amount realized" and "adjusted basis" are terms of art
that must be carefully defined.
A. Determining the Amount Realized on a Sale or Exchange
1. Receipt of Cash or Property
The amount realized on a sale or other disposition is the sum
of the money received plus the fair market value of any other
10 I.R.C. § 61(a)(2)-(3) (gross income includes business income and gains from
dealings in property). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4 (1972) (gross income of farmers).
2. I.R.C. § 165(a), (c)(l)-(2).
22 I.R.C. § 183 deals with so-called "hobby losses" and allows the deduction of
expenses incurred in an activity that is not conducted for a profit only to the extent of
the gross income derived from the activity. See I.R.C. § 183(b)(2). The application of
I.R.C. § 183 to horse breeding, racing and showing has been considered elsewhere, and
this Article does not explore the issue. For discussion of the application of I.R.C. § 183
to equine activities, see, e.g., Kersten, How To Prove a Profit Motive in Horse Breeding,
5 J. AGiuc. TAX & L. 331 (1984); Patrick, Business Versus Hobby: Determination of
Whether a Horse Activity is Engaged in for Profit, 70 Ky. L.J. 971 (1981-82).
Although the owner of a pleasure horse may not deduct a loss on the sale of the
horse, he may be able to claim a casualty loss on the death of the horse by accident,
fire or other casualty. See I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h).
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (computation of gain or loss).
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property received by the seller.24 In a cash sale this amount is easy
to determine. In an exchange or deferred payment sale, however,
the computation of the amount realized can be substantially more
difficult.
If the taxpayer disposes of a horse by exchanging it for other
property (including another horse), the amount realized is the fair
market value of the property received in the exchangeY "Fair
market value" is defined generally as "the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." 26 Fair market
value of property received generally should be determined by a
competent appraisal. If the property received cannot be valued, it
is presumed to be of a value equal to the property surrendered in
the exchange, assuming the surrendered property can be valued.27
If the property received in exchange for a horse is another
horse "of like kind," the gain realized on the exchange is not
currently recognized? 8 Instead, the gain is deferred, and the horse
received in the exchange takes a basis generally equal to the basis
of the property surrendered. Part II of this Article discusses like
kind exchanges of horses. 9
2. Sale for Deferred Payment
If the seller receives a promissory note from the horse's buyer,
the amount realized depends on the interrelationship of several
factors. The three most significant factors are the interest rate on
the note, whether the seller elects not to report the recognition of
income on the installment method under section 453, and whether
the seller reports his taxes on the cash or the accrual method. 0
24 I.R.C. § 1001(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1984).
- See I.R.C. § 1001(b).
2' Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958). Although this definition appears in an estate
tax regulation, it is generally accepted to apply for purposes of the income tax as well.
2' See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct.
Cl. 1954).
23 See I.R.C. § 1031.
2' See notes 331408 infra and accompanying text.
-1 Under the cash method of accounting "all items which constitute gross income
(whether in the form of cash, property or services) are to be included for the taxable
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If the seller does not elect out of the installment method of
reporting and the note bears adequate interest as determined under
sections 483 and 1272 through 1278,31 the stated principal amount
of the promissory note, plus any cash and the fair market value
year in which actually or constructively received," and "[e]xpenditures are to be deducted
for the taxable year in which actually made." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1984).
Taxpayers using the accrual method of accounting include items in income "when all
the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount
thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1978).
Accrual method taxpayers claim deductions in the "year in which all the events have
occurred which determine the fact of the liability and the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy," Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1967), subject to the
economic performance limitations imposed on the deductions by I.R.C. § 461(h).
Most farmers elect to use the cash method of accounting. Simplicity is the primary
advantage of this method, but it also may defer tixes because a farmer on the cash
method of accounting is not required to maintain inventories of livestock (or crops)
raised by him and may deduct as a current expense all of the expenses connected with
the livestock. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.61-4; 1.162-12(a) (1972); 1.47-(b)(a). Section 263A,
enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, requires the capitalization of the expenses of
raising any livestock with a preproductive period in excess of two years. I.R.C. §
263A(d)(1)(A). This requirement does not apply, however, to certain farmers electing to
recover the cost of all depreciable property placed in service in the farm business during
the year under the alternative depreciation system of I.R.C. § 168(g)(2) rather than
under ACRS. I.R.C. § 263A(d)(3), (e)(2). A farmer may elect to use inventories even if
he is not required to do so. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(a) (1960). Even if the farmer uses the
cash method and does not use inventories, the cost of purchased livestock may not be
deducted, but must be capitalized, regardless of whether the livestock is held for resale,
breeding or sporting purposes. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.61-4(a)(2); 1.162-12(a); Alexander
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 234, 238-241 (1954) (acq.). See also Hanisch, Tax: Accounting
and Inventory Valuation Methods for Farmers, 22 WAsHBuRN L.J. 513 (1983); Vogel,
A Primer In The Taxation of Agricultural Transactions, 3 TAx L.J. 61, 64-74 (1985).
Corporations engaged in farming, however, generally are limited to the accrual
method. I.R.C. § 447(a). Farming syndicates using either the accrual or the cash method
may not deduct feed and other supplies until they are actually consumed. I.R.C. §
464(a). This provision may apply to any breeding or racing syndicate interests which
have been registered for sale with either the S.E.C. or any state agency administering a
"blue sky" law. See I.R.C. § 464(c). See also Vogel supra at 88-92.
There is no single concise definition of "farm," "farming," or "farmer" for
purposes of taxation. Different regulations and cases apply a variety of definitions. See
Cox, Farming and Ranching-Tax Accounting, 413 T.M., A-l-A-2 (1980). Raising horses
for breeding and racing, including the training of horses, fits within the parameters of
the broad definition of farming. See I.R.C. § 464(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(d); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 6302119340A (Feb. 11, 1963) ("The fact that the breeding activity is conducted
on farms operated by others would not adversely affect the taxpayer's status as a farmer
within the meaning of the 1954 Code and regulations thereunder provided she meets the
other qualifications thereof as, for example, operation of the breeding activity for gain
or profit.").
1' See text accompanying notes 277-90 infra.
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of other property received is the amount realized on the sale. 2
Even when the seller elects not to report on the installment method,
if the seller is on the accrual method, the amount realized is not
affected.3 3 If, however, the seller is on the cash method and elects
out of the installment method, the amount realized is the fair
market value of the promissory note rather than the principal
amount.3 This is determined with reference to all of the relevant
facts. " Treating the fair market value of the note as the amount
realized does not reduce the amount of income ultimately recog-
nized; it merely defers the recognition of the excess of the stated
principal over the fair market value at the time of receipt. For
years during which the capital gain preference was in effect, how-
ever, the price of this deferral was conversion of the deferred
income into ordinary income. 6
If the promissory note does not bear adequate interest under
section 483 and the Original Issue Discount Rules of sections 1272
through 1278, then the sales price is recomputed to reflect adequate
interest. This reduces the amount realized to something less than
the stated principal of the promissory note and converts potential
capital gains to certain ordinary income. The problem of unstated
interest is explored more thoroughly later in this Article.
37
B. Computation of Basis
1. General Principles
a. Purchase Price Basis
Gain and loss are computed with respect to the "adjusted
basis" of the property sold." Cost basis under section 1012 is
.2 See Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(2) (1984).
" See Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(2)(i); Castner v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1061,
1069-71 (1958); First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 474, 484-487
(1963).
11 See Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(2)(i); Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24-
25 (5th Cir. 1961); Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 793-94 (9th Cir.
1975).
See text accompanying notes 253-60 infra.
See text accompanying notes 258-59 infra.
See text accompanying notes 277-90 infra.
See I.R.C. §§ 1001(a); 1011(a).
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generally the starting point for the determining adjusted basis. The
cost of purchasing a horse for breeding or sporting (racing) must
be capitalized and the basis recovered through ACRS depreciation
deductions.39 The cost of horses purchased for resale may not be
deducted until the year in which the animal is sold, even by a
farmer who elects the cash method of reporting farm income.40
The horse's cost is the amount of money paid for it, including,
if the stated interest is adequate, the stated principal of a prom-
issory note given in payment of the purchase price. If the interest
on the promissory note is inadequate under the unstated interest
rules of the I.R.C.,4' then the buyer's purchase price is reduced in
the same manner as the amount realized was reduced for the seller
of the horse.42 If the horse was acquired in exchange for other
property (including another horse, other than in a like kind ex-
change subject to the rules of section 1031), the purchase price is
the fair market value of the horse received in the exchange.43 If
the horse was acquired in a like kind exchange, its basis is generally
equal to the basis of the horse surrendered in the exchange. 44
b. Other Methods of Acquisition
If the horse was acquired by a method other than purchase,
the unadjusted basis must be determined under the relevant pro-
vision. For example, under section 1015, the basis of property
acquired by gift generally is equal to the donor's basis. 45 Section
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a). See Duggar v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 147, 154-55
(1978) (costs associated with weaning calves must be capitalized). Alternatively, the taxpayer
may elect to include purchased livestock in inventory. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a).
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(a); Alexander, 22 T.C. at 239-41. See also Rev. Rul. 80-102,
1980-1 C.B. 108 (transportation costs involved in purchasing livestock are only deductible
when livestock sold). See note 30 supra for a discussion of farm accounting methods.
41 I.R.C. §§ 483; § 1274.
42 See notes 277-90 infra and accompanying text.
41 See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct.
CI. 1954).
" I.R.C. § 1031(d). For a discussion of the rules for computing the basis of property
received in a like kind exchange, see text accompanying notes 331-39, 357-61 infra; 2 B.
BITTER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GaTs 'J 44.2.5 (1981).
-5 I.R.C. § 1015(a). If the fair market value of the horse at the time of the gift was
less than the donor's adjusted basis, the donee's basis for loss purposes is limited to the
fair market value. Id. The donee's basis can be increased, subject to the above limitation,
by a portion of the gift tax, if any, incurred by the donor as a result of the gift. Id. at
(d).
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1014 provides that the basis of property acquired by inheritance
is the fair market value of the property on the date of the
decedent's death. 46
The basis of a horse acquired by a partnership in exchange
for a partnership interest is equal to the transferor's basis. 47 A
horse acquired by a corporation in a transaction in which gain or
loss was not recognized under section 351 likewise has a basis in
the hands of the corporation equal to the transferor's basis. 4s
c. Horses Raised By Owner
Prior to the enactment of section 263A in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, if a horse was raised by the owner, the horse in most
instances had an unadjusted basis of zero. No purchase price was
paid for a horse foaled by an owner's broodmare that was not in
foal when purchased. The stud fee paid was currently deductible, 49
so it could not have been included in basis.5 0 If, however, the
owner of the mare elected to capitalize the stud fee, that amount
was the unadjusted basis of the foal."' The cost of feeding and
boarding both the broodmare and the foal was deducted currently
regardless of whether the taxpayer used the cash or accrual
method,5 2 and those expenses likewise did not increase the basis
of the foal. With respect to the foal, the owner could have elected
not to deduct the expenses currently. If no current deduction was
I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 723.
I.R.C. § 362. The corporation's basis is increased by any gain recognized to the
transferor under I.R.C. § 356 or § 357 as a result of the transfer.
1" See Ellis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 991, 1002 (1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
6302119340 A (Feb. 11, 1963) (stud fees are deductible even though the fee is refundable
if the mare does not produce a live foal). But see Rev. Rul. 79-176, 1979-1 C.B. 123; Rev.
Rul. 78-411, 1978-2 C.B. 112 (both requiring capitalization of breeding and other fees
where taxpayer did not have benefits and burdens of ownership of breeding stock and
ownership at time expenses were incurred).
- See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a); Ellis, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1002 (disallowing addition
to dead foal's basis of a portion of previously expensed feed for broodmare in computing
loss deduction); Bicha v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 522 (1969) (vendor of cattle
could not include in basis cost of grain previously expensed in raising cattle).
51 See Welder v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 739, 751-53 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per
curiam, 461 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 allows cash
basis farmers the option of deducting or capitalizing such expenses).
'" See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a); Rev. Rul. 74-527, 1974-2 C.B. 42, 43; Ellis, 47
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1002.
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claimed, the feed and board expenses should have been capitalized
into the horse's basis.13
Section 263A, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, requires
the comprehensive capitalization of the costs of producing inven-
tory and the preproductive costs of producing property to be used
in the taxpayer's trade or business.- This rule does not apply,
however, to "any animal which is produced by the taxpayer in a
farming business and which as a preproductive period of two years
or less, if the taxpayer uses the cash receipts and disbursements
method of reporting income." 55 The legislative history indicates
that the preproductive period commences at the beginning of
gestation and ends when the animal is ready to perform its in-
tended function.5 6 Thus, because the period between the beginning
of gestation and the sale of a yearling exceeds two years, horse
breeders apparently will be required to capitalize all breeding fees,
as well as the cost of raising the foals until they are sold as
yearlings.57 Similarly, because a horse generally does not enter
training for racing or begin breeding within two years of the
beginning of gestation, breeding fees and other expenses incurred
to raise a horse for use as breeding stock or in racing must also
be capitaized. 8
In the case of horses held for breeding or racing rather than
resale, a taxpayer other than a corporation, partnership, or tax
shelter required to use the accrual method of accounting may elect
not to capitalize these costs. 59 If such an election is made, however,
the taxpayer must forgo the benefits of ACRS deductions for all
property used by the taxpayer in the farming business that was
placed in service in that year. Instead, the cost of all such property
is recoverable under the less advantageous alternative depreciation
system of section 168(g)(2).6
1 See Welder, 329 F. Supp. at 751-53; Ellis, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 991, 996.
1' Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 803, 100 Stat. 2085, 2350-58.
55 I.R.C. § 263A(d)(1).
IH.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 628 (1985).
- See I.R.C. § 263A(e)(3)(A)(ii).
See I.R.C. § 263A(e)(3)(A)(i).
59 I.R.C. § 263A(d)(3).
- I.R.C. § 263A(e)(2). This rule also applies to the taxpayer if any related person,
as defined in I.R.C. § 263A(e)(2)(B), has elected under I.R.C. § 263A(d)(3) not to capitalize
preproductive period expenses.
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In addition to requiring capitalization of stud fees and other
cash expenses of raising horses, section 263A disallows a deduction
for a portion of the interest expense incurred by the taxpayer
during the preproduction period and requires the addition of that
interest expense to the basis of the horse.61 This rule requires not
only the capitalization of interest on debt directly attributable to
production period expenses, but also the capitalization, under the
avoided cost method, of interest on debt actually incurred for
other purposes. 62 Some portion of the depreciation on barns and
equipment and other general expenses and overhead of the farming
activity conducted by the taxpayer also is subject to capitalization
under section 263A. Although the legislative history provides some
guidance, specific rules have not yet been developed. In general,
however, section 263A, at the very least, requires the capitalization
of all expenses that are inventory costs under the principles of full
absorbtion inventory accounting. 63
d. Miscellaneous Additions to Basis
The normal rules for capitalization of acquisition expenses are
applicable to purchased horses. Therefore, expenses such as attor-
ney's fees and broker's fees, payable by the purchaser in connec-
.tion with the acquisition of a horse, must be capitalized as part
of the horse's basis.64 This rule also extends to expenses such as
the transportation of a horse from the point of delivery by the
seller to the buyer's farm or stable. 65 Similar expenses incurred
with respect to the sale of the horse are added to basis in com-
puting the gain realized on the sale, rather than deducted in
computing taxable income.
2. Purchase of Mare in Foal
The purchase of a mare in foal raises the difficult question of
whether the purchase price should be apportioned between the
I.R.C. § 263A(f).
I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(ii). See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1986);
H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 626 (1985).
" The legislative history directs the Treasury to pattern the regulations under I.R.C.
§ 263A after those governing long-term contracts under Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3. S. REP.
No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1986).
" See, e.g., Briarcliff Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1269, 1270-71 (1934)
(real estate commissions paid by purchaser must be capitalized).
1 Rev. Rul. 72-113, 1972-1 C.B. 99.
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mare and the foal. In Gamble v. Commissioner,66 the Tax Court
held that such an apportionment was proper, and the seller was
permitted to allocate to the foal, which was sold when it was
sixteen months old, a portion of the purchase price for the mare. 67
This case stands in apparent contrast to Metz v. United States,3
in which the taxpayer successfully argued that no part of the
amount realized upon the sale of a mare in foal should be allocated
to the foal. The government's position was that a portion of the
sales price was attributable to the foal, and that the gain attrib-
utable to that portion of the amount realized was ordinary income,
not eligible for section 1231 treatment.69 Upon instructions to the
jury, a special verdict was returned finding that no part of the
mare's purchase price was attributable to the unborn foal.70 Thus,
any apparent irreconcilability of these decisions is illusory. Op-
posite results were reached in these cases because the taxpayer in
Gamble was able to persuade the trier of fact that he paid more
for the mare in foal than he would have paid had she not been
in foal. The taxpayer in Metz, however, was able to carry the
burden of proof that no part of the purchase price was attributable
to the unborn foal.
This issue is clearly a question of fact to be determined on a
case by case basis. In order to allocate a portion of the purchase
price to the foal, however, the enhanced price of the mare in foal
must be attributable to the foal, not merely to the demonstration
that the mare was fertile. In Gamble the court found that the
taxpayer paid an increased price due to the prospect of obtaining
the foal .7 The instructions to the jury in Metz stated that if the
increased value of the mare was "attributable merely to the fact
that the mare in foal was an indication that she was a breeding
mare and would be bred again, and that was the interesting point
68 T.C. 800 (1977)(acq.).
67 Id. at 820-21.
- 62-1 U.S.T.C. 9500 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
69 Id. at 84,474-75. The mare was I.R.C. § 1231 property and the gain attributable
to the mare would be eligible for conversion to long term capital gains. The foal on the
other hand had an insufficient holding period to qualify for I.R.C. § 1231 treatment, if
treated as separate property. See text accompanying notes 138-48 infra regarding the
necessary holding period to obtain § 1231 treatment on the sale of a horse.
70 See id. at 84,476-77.
11 68 T.C. at 821.
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that the buyer was concerned with," then the jury was to return
a verdict that no portion of the price was attributable to the foal.72
Nevertheless, where a stud fee of any substance was paid and the
buyer obtains foal insurance, some portion of the purchase price
probably will be attributed to the foal. The stud fee and the
amount of the foal insurance is highly probative evidence of the
portion of the purchase price that should be allocated to the foal.73
If the taxpayer may apportion the purchase price of a mare
in foal between the mare and the foal, how is that apportionment
to be made? Gamble again provides guidance. Although the actual
amount apportioned to the foal will be based on all facts and
circumstances, in Gamble the Tax Court placed the greatest weight
on the amount of foal insurance obtained by the taxpayer, finding
the fair market value of the foal to equal the amount of the
insurance. 74 Although the stud fees for the stallion that sired the
foal are relevant, they do not necessarily translate dollar for dollar
into basis allocated to the foal. Furthermore, if the price of the
mare in foal is less than the stud fees plus the fair market value
of the mare were she not in foal, Gamble suggests that the
"discount" should be equitably apportioned between the basis
allocated to the mare and the basis allocated to the foal.75 The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), however, recently has taken the
position that the proper method of allocation is to subtract from
the price of the mare in foal the amount that would have been
her fair market value if she were not in foal.76 Although this might
be determined by an appraisal, all of the foregoing factors might
nevertheless influence such an appraisal. Thus, in practice, the
apportionment method remains unclear because even the IRS "for-
mula" requires the use of an assumed fact that is contrary to
reality.
The question of whether the apportionment of basis to the
foal should be made at the time of purchase or at the time of
birth may be relevant when a foal is stillborn, in computing a loss
deduction or, if the owner had foal insurance, in computing gain
72 62-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,475.
73 See Gamble, 68 T.C. at 821.
7 Id.
7s Id.71 A.O.D. 1986-024.
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realized. Under the Gamble logic, it should be permissible to
allocate a portion of the mare's purchase price to the dead foal.
This conclusion, however, is by no means certain. In Greer v.
United States77 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
holding period of a foal does not begin until its birth for purposes
of determining if it is section 1231 property at the time of its
subsequent sale.78 If the holding period does not begin until birth,
it is difficult to see how any portion of the purchase price of the
mare can be allocated to the foal prior to its birth.
Logic, however, is on the side of allocating the purchase price
between the mare and the unborn foal immediately upon purchase.
The mare will most likely be depreciable property in the pur-
chaser's hands.79 Immediate apportionment of the purchase price
avoids numerous computational difficulties that arise by waiting
until the foal's birth to apportion. If the apportionment is delayed,
the mare's unadjusted basis for purposes of computing ACRS
deductions very likely will be greater in the first year than in later
years. As a result, cumulative ACRS deductions will be overstated;
the sum of the aggregate ACRS deductions on the Mare and the
basis allocated to the foal will exceed the purchase price of the
mare in foal. Complex adjustments to the ACRS formula would
be necessary to avoid this result.80 Furthermore, equity also is on
7 408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969).
71 Id. at 636-37.
79 See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
10 Under I.R.C. § 168 ACRS deductions are computed over the recovery period
under the 200 percent declining balance method, switching to the straight line method
in the first year in which the straight line method produces a larger deduction. Except
as provided in I.R.C. § 168(e)(3) (treating any racehorse that is more than two years
old when placed in service and any horse that is more than twelve years old when placed
in service as 3 year property), horses are 7 year recovery property. For years prior to
1987, horses that were not assigned a 3 year recovery period were 5 year property. See
Prop. Reg. § 1.168-3(c)(2) (1984).
The problem noted in the text can be demonstrated as follows using the ACRS
system in effect before the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Assume that in 1986 the taxpayer
purchases a five year old broodmare in foal for $50,000; $20,000 of which is allocated
to the foal that will be born in 1987. If the allocation is deferred until the birth of the
foal, the ACRS allowance for the broodmare in 1986 will be $50,000 x .15, or $7,500.
See I.R.C. § 168(b)(1) as in effect prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In 1987, after
the foal is born, $20,000 of basis would be allocated to the foal, reducing the unadjusted
basis of the broodmare to $30,000. Applying the percentages specified in I.R.C. §
168(b)(1) for years 2 through 5 to an unadjusted basis of $30,000 results in additional
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the side of an immediate apportionment. Failure to apportion part
of the mare's purchase price to the foal prior to birth may result
in an unjustifiable acceleration of the ACRS deductions on the
mare because of her overstated unadjusted basis in the first year.
Finally, if a portion of the purchase price is attributable to the
foal, failing to allow any apportionment prior to the live birth of
the foal unjustly denies the owner a deserved casualty loss (or
overstates gain if the owner has foal insurance) upon the abortion
or still birth of the foal.
3. Adjustments to Basis
The adjusted basis under section 1011, used in the computation
of gain or loss on the sale or exchange of a horse, is the unadjusted
basis, determined as discussed in the immediately preceding sec-
tion, increased or decreased as provided in section 1016.
a. Adjustments That Increase Basis
All expenditures incurred with respect to a horse that are
properly chargeable to a capital account should be capitalized as
part of the horse's basis.8' One of numerous expenditures in this
category 2 is particularly significant with respect to horses. Ex-
penses incurred in training a horse in preparation for a racing
career are not currently deductible but must be capitalized as part
of the horse's basis.,3 These expenditures are recovered through
ACRS deductions when the horse begins its racing career. Only
expenses actually incurred may be added to basis. If the taxpayer
cumulative ACRS deductions of $25,500. Total ACRS deductions will be $33,000, $3,000
more than the portion of the purchase price allocable to the broodmare. The easiest
solution would be to disallow the excess deductions in the last year, but would still result
in an unjustifiable acceleration of the ACRS deductions.
I.R.C. § 1016(a) (1984).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (1960) (examples of expenditures).
Journal Box Serv. Corp. v. United States, 9 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 798, 817 (S.D.
Ind. 1962). For years after 1986, § 263A should compel this result. But see Internal
Revenue Manual 45(11)1 (1976) ("Consistent treatment of stud fees and training expenses
[of 'raising' horses] should be accepted."). Expenses of continuing training of a horse
during its racing career are currently deductible. Hill v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH)
1287, 1288-89 (1967).
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personally trains a horse, the fair market value of the taxpayer's
services may not be added to the horse's basis. 84
Expenses to feed and care for horses held for sale, breeding
or racing may be deducted currently rather than added to basis as
long as the taxpayer is a "farmer" for purposes of the I.R.C., 5
unless the taxpayer elects the inventory method of accounting for
the cost of raising livestock .6 This same rule applies to the cost
of feeding and caring for a mare in foal, regardless of whether
the mare was purchased in foal.Y
b. Adjustments That Decrease Basis
The most significant adjustment that decreases the horse's basis
is the reduction of basis by the amount of the ACRS depreciation
deductions allowable with respect to the horse.18 ACRS deductions
are allowed with respect to horses held for racing (also referred
to as "sporting purposes" by the I.R.C.) and breeding, but ACRS
deductions are not allowed on horses held as inventory,8 9 stock in
trade, or primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business.10
,4Miller v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 37 (1975) (disallowing capitalization
of imputed expense of value of owner's services in training standardbred for computing
casualty loss deduction upon horse's death).
81 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a); Duggar, 71 T.C. at 154-55.
16 See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.61-4(a), 1.162-12(a).
17 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a); Ellis, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1002.
" See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(a) (1986); Sullivan v. Commis-
sioner, 17 T.C. 1420, 1425 (1952), aff'd, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954).
11 Horses held for breeding and racing are clearly property used in a trade or
business subject to an allowance for depreciation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a), unless
the taxpayer uses the accrual method of accounting and elects to inventory livestock
used for breeding purposes as permitted under Treas. Regs. §§ 1.61-4(a) and 1.162-12(a).
Inventoried livestock is not depreciable, Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-(6)(b) (1960), and, there-
fore, no ACRS deductions are allowable with respect to such livestock.
Under I.R.C. § 163(e)(3) (I.R.C. § 168(h)(1) for years prior to 1987) any racehorse
that is more than two years old when placed in service and any horse that is more than
twelve years old when placed in service are 3 year recovery property. All other horses
are 5 year recovery property. Prop. Reg. § 1.168-3(c)(2) (1984). All other horses placed
in service after 1986 are 7 year recovery property.
90 See 1 B. BITTER, FEDERAL TAxAnoN OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiRrs 23.2.1
(1981). Cf. Riordan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 839, 841 (1978) (farmer who
erroneously claimed depreciation deduction on livestock sold during the year was allowed
to claim same amount as cost of goods sold when depreciation deduction was disallowed).
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Another less common basis adjustment is the reduction re-
quired when a horse owner receives insurance proceeds due to the
horse's disability to continue either a racing or breeding career.
To the extent that such insurance proceeds are not reimbursement
for otherwise deductible expenses (such as veterinarian expenses)
and are excluded from gross income, the horse's basis must be
reduced by the amount of insurance proceeds. 9 If the insurance
proceeds exceed the adjusted basis of the horse, the excess must
be included in gross income, 2 unless the event constitutes an
involuntary conversion and the owner elects under I.R.C. section
1033 not to recognize the gain. 93 Basis is also reduced by the
amount of any unreimbursed casualty loss deduction claimed in a
horse.94 To the extent that a loss is reimbursed by insurance,
however, the loss deduction is disallowed. 9 The exclusion of the
insurance proceeds from gross income nevertheless requires a con-
comitant reduction in the horse's basis.
C. Character of Gain or Loss
1. General Principles
The character of the gain or loss recognized upon the sale
or exchange of a horse depends upon the purpose for which the
taxpayer held the horse. The three primary purposes for holding
a horse in the breeding and racing industry are resale, racing,
and breeding. 96 In some instances, a horse may be held for an
1 See C. G. Willis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 468, 474 (1964), aff'd per
curiain, 342 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1965) (receipt of insurance proceeds attributable to partial
destruction of ship by casualty).
- See I.R.C. §§ 1033(a)(2), 1231(a)(3)(A); Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 417 U.S. 673, 676 (1974) (gain on receipt of insurance proceeds in excess of basis
of building destroyed by fire).
See Part III infra.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 71-161, 1971-1 C.B. 76, 77.
I.R.C. § 165(a).
A decreasing number of horses are held for draft purposes. Among the other
uses of horses are rental for pleasure riding, see Campbell v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M.
(CCH) 825, 838 (1961); advertising, see, e.g., the Budwiser Clydesdales; and entertain-
ment, see, e.g., Mr. Ed.
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investment purpose that does not fit into the above categories, 97
but that generally will not be true. Horses held for resale vir-
tually always will be categorized as stock in trade, inventory, or
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of a trade or business, and thus are excluded from the
definition of capital asset. 98 Accordingly, all gain or loss recog-
nized on the sale of such horses is taxed as ordinary income. A
horse held for investment purposes is a capital asset. 99
For years prior to 1987, the gain recognized on the sale of
a capital asset may have received the advantageous treatment
accorded to long term capital gains if it had been held for more
than six months. Any loss recognized, however, suffered the
disadvantageous treatment accorded to capital losses. 1'0 The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 repealed the preferential treatment of long
term capital gains recognized after December 31, 1986.101 Even
97 This would most likely be true with respect to pleasure horses and horses held
for use in activities that are subject to the limitations in I.R.C. § 183. In such a case it
is probable that an attempt to deduct a capital loss would be denied by the Commissioner
even though it is clear that gains recognized on the sale of such horses must be included
in taxable income.
- I.R.C. § 1221(1). See Nowland v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 368, 375-
76 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 244 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1957); Jewel v. Commissioner, 25
T.C. 109, 109, 117-18 (1955). But see Black v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 90, 96 (1960)
(taxpayer held real estate "primarily for sale" and thus could not avail herself of
nonrecognition under I.R.C. § 1031 on exchange of real estate, but gain was capital
gain because property was not held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business").
See I.R.C. § 1222.
100 For years prior to 1987, I.R.C. § 1202(a) allowed individuals a deduction equal
to sixty percent of the excess of long term capital gains over all capital losses recognized
for the year. In effect this reduced the rate of tax on 100% of the gain to 40% of the
rate of tax applied to ordinary income. Corporations were allowed preferential rates on
long term capital gains under I.R.C. § 1201. Both of these preferences were repealed by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
I.R.C. § 1211(b) limits indidual taxpayer's deduction for capital losses to capital
gains plus an amount not to exceed $3,000, determined by formula. Under I.R.C. §
1211(a) corporations may deduct capital losses only to the extent of capital gains.
Disallowed losses are carried over under I.R.C. § 1212. These limitations on the de-
ductibility of capital losses have been continued notwithstanding the repeal of the capital
gains preference.
101 Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 301, 311, 100 Stat. 2085, 2217-19. For 1987 there is a
limited capital gains preference for taxpayers in a marginal tax rate bracket above 28%.
Section 1(j) limits the maximum rate of tax on net long term capital gains to 28%. This
limitation is not effective, however, with respect to the 5% surtax imposed on certain
taxpayers under I.R.C. § l(g) for years after 1987.
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though the preferential treatment of capital gains has been elim-
inated, section 1211 continues to limit to $3,000 per year the
amount of capital losses that may be deducted against ordinary
income. Thus, the characterization of both gain and loss as
ordinary or capital continues to be relevant, although of dimin-
ished significance.
Horses held for breeding and racing purposes are depreciable
property used in a trade or business, 102 and as such are excluded
from the ambit of capital assets. 10 3 For the same reason that
they are excluded from the definition of capital asset, however,
such horses are "section 1231 property" if held for more than
twenty four months. 4 Thus, the gains and losses recognized on
the sale of horses used for breeding and racing may enter into
the section 1231 hotchpot, with the resultant possibility that
gains may be treated as long term capital gains and losses may
be treated as ordinary losses, depending on whether the taxpayer
recognized an overall gain or loss on the sale of section 1231
property during the year.1 5 Section 1231 gains, however, are
subject to a major limitation. Under section 1245 any gains
realized on the sale are treated as ordinary income to the extent
that the seller claimed ACRS (or depreciation) deductions with
respect to the horse. 16 Only gains in excess of "depreciation
"'2 See I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). See also Kirk v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 177, 187
(1966).
10 I.R.C. § 1221(2); Gamble v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 800, 810 (1977) (acq.).
'c ' I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). This rule stands in stark contrast to the six month
holding period that is generally required to attain the status of I.R.C. § 1231 property.
For the possibility that a horse held for less than twenty four months may nevertheless
be I.R.C. § 1231 property, see Gamble, 68 T.C. 800, discussed at notes 157-73 infra.
10" A discussion of the mechanics of the operation of the I.R.C. § 1231 hotchpot
is beyond the scope of this Article. For a detailed explanation, see 2 B. Brr=R, supra
note 44, at 54.1-54.2 (1981).
I", Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-3(a)(4), provides that I.R.C. § 1245 (1981) property "in-
eludes livestock ... with respect to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1969....
[T]he term 'livestock' includes horses ... irrespective of the ... purpose for which they
are held." The amount of gain subject to depreciation recapture is not limited to the
depreciation previously claimed by the taxpayer if his basis is determined with reference
to his transferor's basis. In such a case all of the depreciation claimed by the taxpayer
and his transferor is taken into account in measuring the amount of the gain subject to
recapture under § 1245. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.1245-2(a)(4), -2(c)(2), -4(c)(1)-(2). See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c)(4) (1965) regarding depreciation recapture on property acquired
in an exchange subject to I.R.C. § 1031.
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recapture" under section 1245 are treated as section 1231 gains.
Because different treatment is accorded gains and losses on
a sale depending on the purpose for which the horse was held,
it is crucial to determine whether a horse was held primarily for
"sale to customers in the ordinary course of business" or for
breeding or racing. On occasion, it may be necessary to deter-
mine if the horse was held for some other purpose, which may
result in both gains and losses being treated as capital gains and
losses. If the horse was held for use in the taxpayer's trade or
business but not for resale, racing or breeding, the holding
period prerequisite for section 1231 treatment is reduced to six
months. 0 7 Unfortunately, due to the nature of the industry,
categorizing the purpose for which a horse was held is frequently
a difficult task.
2. Distinguishing Horses Held Primarily for Sale to
Customers From Horses Held for Breeding and Racing
Purposes
Whether a horse is held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business or for use in the taxpayer's trade
or business is a question of fact. 10 A horse is not held primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, how-
ever, unless that purpose predominates over all other purposes.' 9
This standard frequently helps taxpayers engaged in the breeding
and racing industry to establish that a horse that has been sold
was not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business because frequently a single horse may be held
for racing, breeding, or sale, based on whichever course of action
appears at the time to be most profitable. Vendors of horses do
not, however, have a blank check to claim that all of the horses
that they have sold were held for multiple purposes and therefore
See Gamble, 68 T.C. at 816-17.
108 See, e.g., Gotfredson v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955) (cattle); McDonald v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 341, 342 (2d
Cir. 1954) (cattle); Jewell, 25 T.C. at 115.
109 See Kirk, 47 T.C. at 193. This principle is not unique to the horse industry; it
is merely a specific application of the general principle applicable to all types of property
announced by the Supreme Court in Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966).
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not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business.
Many sellers are undeniably in the trade or business of
breeding or buying horses for resale. Although there is authority
for the proposition that each sale by a taxpayer generally in the
business of selling horses must be separately examined to deter-
mine the purpose for which the horse was held, 110 a taxpayer
that maintains a farm breeding horses and customarily selling
all of them as yearlings or weanlings probably will be found to
hold all of his yearlings and weanlings primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business."' This does not
prevent the taxpayer, however, from establishing that other horses
sold by him were held for either breeding or racing," 2 although
it may be more difficult for such a taxpayer to carry the burden
of proof than it would be for a taxpayer that did not generally
sell horses in the ordinary course of business. Advertising horses
for sale in the ordinary course of business through public media,
trade journals or sales catalogues generally assures treatment of
gains as profits realized from sales to customers in the ordinary
course of business."' Furthermore, even if the taxpayer can
establish that the horse was held for breeding or racing purposes
rather than for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
'o See Jewell, 25 T.C. at 117; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6302119340A (Feb. 11, 1963).
" See Nowland, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) at 372 (taxpayer annually sold entire yearling
crop at auction, buying back those he wished to keep by reserved bid or through a straw
bidder). But see Bradshaw v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 9364 (E.D. Ky. 1971)
(taxpayer who sold 857o of colts foaled on his farm was found by jury to have recognized
§ 1231 gain, not ordinary income, on the sale of certain horses).
See Jewell, 25 T.C. at 117.
" See Clark v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1006, 1007-10 (1957) (taxpayer extensively
advertised cattle for sale, had substantial volume of sales, and was willing to sell any
cattle on farm, not just selected head); Nowland, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) at 372 (taxpayer
advertised horses in trade journals and sales catalogues). See also Campbell, 20 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 838 (1961) (hackney horse held for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business despite the lack of advertising and that all sales were by word of mouth
because the only manner in which taxpayer could earn a profit from breeding, training
and showing hackney horses was by sale). But see Estate of Collings v. United States,
138 F. Supp. 837, 839, 841 (W.D. Ky. 1955) (broodmares sold by taxpayer were § 1231
property; although taxpayer advertised his stable generally and the amount of the horse's
winnings advertisements did not offer particular horses for sale or state prices) and
compare with Kirk, 47 T.C. at 193 (taxpayer's failure to advertise horses for sale at
general auction was a factor in finding that they were not held for sale to customers).
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business, any gain recognized is still ordinary income unless the
horse was held for the twenty four month period necessary to
qualify for section 1231 treatment.114
The amendment of section 1231(b)(3) in 1969, extended from
twelve to twenty four months the holding period required for
cattle and horses held for draft, breeding or dairy purposes to
qualify as section 1231 assets, and added horses held for sporting
purposes to the category of livestock subject to the extended
holding period requirement.11 5 Prior to the amendment, a num-
ber of cases arose in which the issue was whether taxpayers who
regularly culled animals from their breeding herds and racing
stables realized section 1231 gain or loss on such sales or whether
they realized ordinary gain or loss from the sale of livestock in
the ordinary course of business. Horsemen who maintained
established breeding and racing operations and cattlemen who
maintained breeding operations generally were found to have
realized section 1231 gain or loss.116 Most of those cases involved
animals held for less than twenty four months. Therefore, the
issue should arise less frequently under the current statute.
Nevertheless, there may be instances in which these cases are
important.
It is difficult to apply these cases to clearly determine the
purpose for Which a horse is held. This difficulty arises from
the courts' conclusion that the actual use of the horses or cattle
prior to sale was not determinative of the purpose for which the
taxpayer held the animals. The taxpayer's motive was what was
important; therefore, a horse that never was bred or raced
nevertheless might be held for breeding or racing purposes." 7
114 See I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(a)(1)(i) (1986); McCarthy v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 129, 137 (1963) (sale of racehorse under pre-1969
version of I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7410240190A (Oct. 24, 1974) (sale of
racehorse under current I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)).
'" Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 212(b), 83 Stat. 487, 571
(1969).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951); Albright
v. United States, 173 F.2d 339, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1949)(cattle); Kirk, 47 T.C. at 187;
McCarthy, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 137; Fowler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1124, 1134
(1962); Journal Box Serv. Corp. v. United States, 9 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 798, 817 (S.D.
Ind. 1962); Jackson v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 939, 940-41 (1952).
"I See, e.g., McDonald v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d at 343; Kirk, 47 T.C. at 192-
93. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(b).
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Generally, the key factor in establishing that animals were held
primarily for breeding or racing was the taxpayer's practice of
holding the animals until he could determine whether they were
desirable for that purpose. A consistent practice of selling only
those animals that were, according to the taxpayer's standards,
undesirable for either breeding or racing would result in treat-
ment of the gains and losses as section 1231 losses." 8 This would
be true even if a particular animal was too young at the time of
sale for actual use in the intended purpose as long as the animal
already exhibited characteristics that rendered it undesirable for
that purpose." 9
In Jewell v. Commissioner,20 a taxpayer who sold most, but
not all, of the horses bred on his farm was found to be in the
business of selling horses to customers in the ordinary course of
business, even though he retained some horses to enhance the
quality of his breeding stock. The court was influenced by the
historical operation of the taxpayer's farm and by the fact that
over a five year span he sold all but one of the colts foaled on
the farm-most as yearlings. Although the court found that all
of the horses foaled were to be added to the breeding herd if
they were good enough, most of the horses that the taxpayer
asserted were culls were found by the court to have been held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.
In determining the purpose for which the horses were held,
the Jewell court dealt very specifically with the factual circum-
stances surrounding the sale of each horse. Examining the par-
ticular defect asserted by the taxpayer to render each unfit for
breeding or racing, the court concluded that those horses not
sold within a reasonable time period after the defect first ap-
peared were held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business.' 2' Although they originally might have been
11 See, e.g., Kirk, 47 T.C. at 192-93; McCarthy, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 137; Jackson,
11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 940-41.
,I, See note 118 supra.
12. 25 T.C. 109 (1955).
121 Id. at 115-18. Compare McCarthy, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 129, in which the fact
that the taxpayer retained some horses for a period of time after discovery of a
characteristic that rendered the horse unfit for breeding or racing was not even considered
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held for breeding purposes, continuing to hold them after it was
apparent that they were not suitable for breeding effected a
change in the purpose for which they were held. On the other
hand, those horses that initially appeared to be desirable for
breeding, but were sold shortly after the discovery of an unde-
sirable trait, were found to have been held for use in breeding
and the gains recognized from the sales of those horses were
accorded section 1231 treatment.'2
In contrast to the taxpayer in Jewell, who raced only one
horse (which was not one of those sold) during the tax years in
question, taxpayers that actively train and race a very high
percentage of their horses have been more successful in claiming
all of the horses they sold were not held for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business. 123 Here again, however, courts
generally examine the particular facts upon which the taxpayer
bases his claim that the horse in question has been culled from
a breeding or racing stable.'2 In Kirk v. Commissioner-5 the
Tax Court closely examined both the training procedures fol-
lowed by the taxpayer, a successful harness racing owner, and
the defects asserted by the taxpayer causing the horse to be
culled from his stable. Many of the horses sold during the years
in question were raced by the taxpayer. Others were trained, but
never raced. None were used for breeding purposes. All of the
culled horses were sold at general auction as soon as feasible
and without advertising.
The Tax Court rejected both of the Commissioner's argu-
ments and concluded that the taxpayer was in the business of
by the court as a factor in determining whether the gains realized on the sale of culls
were I.R.C. § 1231 gains or gains from the sale of horses held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business.
" 25 T.C. at 117-18.
3 See Kirk, 47 T.C. at 192-93; McCarthy, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 137; Jackson, 11
T.C.M. (CCH) at 940-41.
124 See Estate of Collings, 138 F. Supp. at 841 (finding that broodmares sold by
taxpayer in the business of breeding, training and selling saddle horses were property
used in the taxpayer's trade or business, not property held primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business); Gamble, 68 T.C. at 801-02 (culls from racing stable);
Kirk, 47 T.C. at 193 (culls from racing stable); Campbell, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 857
(according different treatment by grouping to hackney horses and horses held for rental
as riding horses); Jackson, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) at 940 (culls from racing stable).
-- 47 T.C. 177 (1966).
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racing horses. The Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's
purpose in racing the horses was merely to increase their sale
value and that the taxpayer was engaged not only in the business
of racing horses, but also in the business of selling horses that
were not suitable for use in racing.126 The first argument was
quickly rejected on the facts; the taxpayer was in the business
of racing horses, not selling them. The second argument was
rejected because the sales were "a necessary incident" to the
taxpayer's principal business. The taxpayer sold only those horses
that were not suitable for racing. The mere fact that he knew
from the time the horses were foaled that many of them would
not be suitable for racing did not mean that the horses that were
sold were held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business. 127 His intent in holding the horses was deter-
' Id. at 192-93.
127 It does not appear that the Commissioner argued or that the Tax Court ever
considered the possibility that the sales of horses could have been ordinary income under
the Corn Products doctrine. See Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46
(1955), reh'g denied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956), which was applied to I.R.C. § 1231 property
in Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 848 (1970). In apparent reference to the Corn Products doctrine, the trial court
in Bradshaw v. United States, 72-1 U.S.T.C. 9364 (E.D. Ky. 1971), in framing its
,instructions to the jury, took a somewhat different view of the significance of sales
being "a necessary incident" of the conduct of the taxpayer's business than the Kirk
court did. Bradshaw was engaged in the business of breeding, training and showing
saddle horses. The court instructed the jury that even if it found that the horses in
question were not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business
that it was to return a verdict for the government if it concluded that the sale of the
horses was "an integral part of [the taxpayer's] business. By 'integral part of' it is meant
that the sales were necessary for the conduct of his business." Id. at 84,260. Based on
this instuction, the jury nevertheless returned a verdict for the taxpayer. Id. at 84,261.
In Clark v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 1006, 1014 (1957), the Tax Court, attempting
to draw the line between cattle held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business and cattle held for breeding purposes, noted the admonition of the Supreme
Court in Corn Products that the scope of capital assets was to be narrowly construed,
but apparently had no thoughts of directly applying Corn Products.
The better view is that, given the congressional purpose behind I.R.C. § 1231
(whether or not one agrees with that policy), the Corn Products doctrine should not
override I.R.C. § 1231. See Deltide Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. United States, 279
F. Supp. 661, 665-66 (E.D. La. 1968). In Guggenheim v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 559,
569-70 (1966), the Commissioner specifically argued that the Corn Products doctrine
overrode I.R.C. § 1231 on the sale of syndicate shares in a stallion by the taxpayer,
who prior to the syndication owned the entire interest in the stallion and used him for
breeding purposes. The Tax Court quickly rejected the argument, concluding that the
taxpayer was merely liquidating part of his interest in I.R.C. § 1231 property. Id. at
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minative, and on the facts, the taxpayer did not decide to sell
any particular horse until it was shown that the horse was not
a desirable racehorse. Accordingly, all of the taxpayer's gains
were treated as section 1231 gains.
In reaching its decision in Kirk, the Tax Court cited its earlier
memorandum decision in McCarthy v. Commissioner'2 as a case
"in which the facts were very similar." 29 Although this is gen-
erally true, there were some differences in both facts and ap-
proach. Unlike Kirk, yet like Jewell, the taxpayer in McCarthy
continued to hold some of the horses in training for a period
following discovery of a characteristic rendering them unfit for
racing. Nevertheless, the Tax Court distinguished Jewell as a
case dealing with a seller who, on all facts, was primarily en-
gaged in raising horses for ultimate sale rather than for racing
or breeding. McCarthy, on the other hand, did not continuously
sell horses as yearlings. He kept the majority of his horses for
more than a year, training them and selling only those horses
that proved to be unfit or too slow for racing, while also showing
a profit from his racing activitiesY.3 0 These facts indicated that
the horses "were not trained and raced as part of a horse selling
business but as a part of the integral, indivisible business of the
[taxpayer] of owning, training, racing, and breeding race-
horses."' 3 1 The court concluded, without a detailed examination
of the circumstances surrounding the decision to sell each horse,
that the gains realized on the sale of the horses held for more
than six months were eligible for capital gains treatment under
570.
On the other hand, there is some authority for the proposition that property may
simultaneously be I.R.C. § 1231 property and property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. See International Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 491 F.2d 157, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974). An argument that the
gain on the sales of culls was ordinary income based on this precedent should also fail.
The sale of horses determined to be unfit for racing or breeding is analogous to the sale
of equipment at the end of its useful life to the taxpayer, a situation that concededly
produces I.R.C. § 1231 gains, not ordinary income. See, e.g., Philber Equip. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956).
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 129 (1963).
47 T.C. at 109 n.5.
McCarthy, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 133.
"3 Id. at 137. See note 127 supra.
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section 1170) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of section
123 1.132
The factors cited by the Tax Court in McCarthy for identi-
fying horse owners that are not generally in the business of
selling horses to customers in the ordinary course of business
are clearly the mainstream criteria. The failure of the McCarthy
court to examine individually the circumstances surrounding the
sale of each horse, however, does not appear to be in the
mainstream. Perhaps this reflects sub silentio reasoning in
McCarthy that taxpayers who generally do not hold horses for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business do not do
so with respect to specific horses, while it is much more likely
that taxpayers who hold horses for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business might not hold a particular horse
for that purpose.'33 It also may simply reflect the fact that in
most cases the volume of horses sold by the taxpayer is sufficient
to raise the possibility of dual businesses-one of breeding,
training and racing horses and another of selling horses to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of business. Courts have examined
closely the facts of each sale to determine whether the sales were
part of a second business or merely incidents of the breeding,
training and racing business. This appears to be the reason
behind the detailed factual analysis in Kirk. Perhaps McCarthy
may be reconciled as a case in which the factors discussed above
established so clearly that the taxpayer was not in the business
of selling horses to customers in the ordinary course of business
that there was no need to examine further the circumstances of
each sale.
If the taxpayer is not actively engaged in racing, it may be
more difficult to establish that culls are not held primarily for
2 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 135-37.
" Compare Kirk, 47 T.C. at 191 ("The fact that petitioner [who was found to be
engaged in the business of breeding, training and racing horses] knew in advance that a
good number of the horses would never develop into good racehorses and that he would
have to sell them does not mean that the horses sold were necessarily held primarily for
sale.") with Jewell, 25 T.C. at 115-18 (taxpayer who kept only I out of 23 colts foaled
during 5 year span, selling 19 as yearlings, was in the business of selling horses to
customers in the ordinary course of business, but sales of certain colts and fillies bred
for use as breeding stock but never used as such because of unsuitability were treated
as sales of property held for use in the taxpayer's business).
1986-871
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. 134 This will
be particularly true with respect to colts. Before a horse com-
mences a breeding career, he generally must first prove his value
on the track. 13 5 It is unlikely that a breeder would retain all of
the colts foaled on his farm for use in breeding operations even
aside from the need to first prove them on the track. Not only
does a breeding operation require fewer stallions than it does
broodmares, but retention of the colts for future use as stallions
would lead to undesirable inbreeding. 136 Furthermore, unless the
taxpayer is engaged in racing, his activities probably will not
produce a profit other than through the sale of horses bred by
him.137 If the sale of horses is the only source of profit, then
the gains would arise from property held for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of business and therefore would be or-
dinary income. The taxpayer could demonstrate, however, as in
Jewell, that a particular horse was held for use as breeding stock
and thereby have those gains accorded section 1231 treatment.
3. Special Problems in Qualifying for Section 1231 Treatment
a. Section 1231(b)(3) Twenty Four Month Holding Period
Requirement For Horses Held For Breeding, Draft, Or
Sporting Purposes
As noted in the previous section, to be considered section
1231 property, a horse held for draft, breeding or sporting
14 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(c)(1)(iii) ("A horse which has neither been raced at
a public track nor trained for racing shall not, except in rare and unusual circumstances,
be considered as held for racing purposes."); Jewell, 25 T.C. at 115-18 (1955). Cf.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(b)(2), Example (2) (A taxpayer who is in the business of raising
horses for sale to others for use as draft horses does not hold the horses for use as
draft horses merely because he uses them on his farm as draft horses for the purpose
of training them; his use of the horses for draft purposes is incidental to the sale of the
horses.).
"I See Guggenheim, 46 T.C. at 561; Fowler, 37 T.C. at 1127-29.
136 See Jewell, 25 T.C. at 118 (that seller knew colts foaled on farm were related
to fillies foaled on farm negated argument that colts were held for breeding). Cf. Kirk,
47 T.C. 177 (filly sold by taxpayer because she was product of accidental inbreeding).
'" See Campbell, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 825 (taxpayer who bred and showed hackney
horses realized ordinary income from sales of horses because, although he won substan-
tial prize money at shows, the only way in which the activity could show a profit was
through the sale of horses whose value had been enhanced by good show records). But
see Hancock v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 752, 757-58 (1959) (taxpayer that maintained
only a breeding herd and sold only culls was allowed I.R.C. § 1231 treatment on all
cattle sold).
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purposes (including racing) must be held for more than twenty
four months. 13s A horse held for use in the taxpayer's trade or
business other than for draft, breeding or sporting purposes,
however, must be held for only six months in order to be section
1231 property. 3 9 The 24 month holding period requirement largely
moots the question of whether horses that the taxpayer claims
were culled from potential breeding stock or from the racing
stable were in fact held for those uses rather than for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. All gains and losses
realized on the resale of horses within two years of purchase or
on the sale of horses foaled by the taxpayer within two years of
birth will be ordinary income or loss,140 unless the taxpayer can
show that the horse was held for a purpose other than breeding,
sporting or sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
Thus, the number of instances in which the IRS and the courts
must grapple with ambiguous facts to make fine distinctions, as
illustrated in the cases discussed in the prior section, is signifi-
cantly reduced.
The extended holding period provided in section 1231(b)(3)
was enacted specifically because Congress recognized that the
purpose for which young horses and cattle are held frequently
may be ambiguous.1 41 The one year holding period requirement
previously in force was considered to be an insufficient time
period for the taxpayer to determine whether cattle were suitable
for breeding stock and horses were suitable for racing or breed-
ing stock or whether the animals were held for sale. Congress
also was concerned that the shorter holding period, combined
with the ability of investors to utilize farm accounting methods
See I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2.
"' See Gamble, 68 T.C. at 820. See also Campbell, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 855-56;
J. O'BvmRa & C. DAVENPORT, FARM INCOME TAx MANuAL, § 325 (6th ed. 1982).
1' See Rev. Rul. 76-70, 1976-1 C.B. 225; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7410240190A (Oct. 24,
1974). See also Greer v. U.S., 408 F.2d 631, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1969) (casualty gain
recognized on receipt of insurance proceeds paid upon death of five day old colt was
ordinary income and did not go into I.R.C. § 1231 hotchpot); McCarthy, 22 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 137 (gain on sale of racehorses held less than six months was ordinary income
under pre-1969 version of I.R.C. § 1231(b)).
"I See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3
C.B. 423, 488; H.R. REP. No. 413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1969), reprinted
in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 244.
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to currently deduct expenses, 142 gave rise to a large number of
transactions with the solely tax motivated purpose of converting
ordinary income into capital gains. Extending the holding period
necessary to obtain capital gains treatment through section 1231
solved both problems.
In extending the section 1231 holding period, Congress im-
plicitly rejected the idea from earlier cases that the taxpayer's
motive in holding the animal, rather than the taxpayer's actual
use of the animal, determines whether it was held for breeding. 43
This is manifested in the legislative history 4 The House version
of the amendment would not have extended the one year holding
period, but would have provided that the holding period would
not begin until the animal reached the age at which it normally
first would be used for breeding or racing purposes. 4 - The
Senate believed, however, that the flexible commencement date
of the holding period would present administrative difficulties
and, therefore, substituted the arbitrary twenty four month hold-
ing period."46 Because cattle normally reach breeding age within
two years of birth' 47 and horses generally commence training for
racing within two years,"48 the purpose of the Senate amendment
evidently was no different than the purpose of the House ver-
sion.
b. Identifying Horses Held For Breeding Or Racing Purposes
Under The Regulations
The Treasury Regulations promulgated under section
1231(b)(3) evidence a tightening of the test for determining
142 See note 141 supra. For a brief discussion of the peculiarities of farm tax
accounting methods giving rise to the problem, see note 30 supra.
-, See cases cited in note 117 supra.
-4 See notes 145-46 infra.
14 See H.R. RP. No. 413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 70 (1969), reprinted in
1969-3 C.B. 200, 244.
"4 See S. RP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3
C.B. 423, 488; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 298 (1969), reprinted in
1969-3 C.B. 644, 656.
147 See McDonald, 214 F.2d at 343-44; Fox v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 854, 856
(1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1952).
148 See Gamble, 68 T.C. at 802 (thoroughbreds); Kirk, 47 T.C. at 180 (stan-
dardbreds).
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whether a horse is held for breeding or racing purposes .149 Al-
though the regulations provide that whether or not livestock is
held for breeding or racing "depends upon all the facts and
circumstances in each case," they also state that the "purpose
for which the animal is held is ordinarily shown by the taxpayer's
actual use of the animal." Actual use is not necessary, however,
to show that a horse was held for breeding or racing purposes
if the "animal is disposed of within a reasonable time after its
intended use for such purpose is prevented or made undesirable
by reason of accident, disease, drought, unfitness of the animal
for such purpose, or a similar factual circumstance." Thus, the
regulations allow some of the flexibility evidenced in prior case
law. The regulations, however, do contain the admonishment
that an animal is not held for breeding or racing purposes
"merely because it is suitable for such purposes or merely be-
cause it is held by the taxpayer for sale to other persons for use
by them for such purposes." 150
The regulations go on to provide very specific rules to de-
termine whether a horse is held for racing purposes.' A horse
that actually was raced at a public track is considered to be held
for racing purposes, "except in rare and unusual circumstan-
ces. ' 152 Conversely, a horse that neither was raced at a public
track nor trained for racing is not considered to be held for
racing purposes "except in rare and unusual circumstances."'5 3
No authority provides examples of "rare and unusual circum-
stances" in either context.
If a horse was not raced at a public track, but was trained
to race, the horse may be found to be held for racing purposes
if "other facts and circumstances in the particular case also
indicate that the horse was held for this purpose."'' 5 4 This vague
standard is clarified by the further statement that if the taxpayer
"maintains a written training record on all horses he keeps in
training status, which shows that a particular horse does not
"4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(b)(1).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(c).
01 Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(c)(1)(i).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(c)(1)(iii).
1-4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2(c)(1)(ii).
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meet objective standards (including, but not limited to, such
considerations as failure to achieve predetermined standards of
performance during training, or the existence of a physical or
other defect) established by the taxpayer for determining the
fitness and quality of horses to be retained in his racing stable,
... [and] the taxpayer disposes of the horse within a reasonable
time after he determined that it did not meet his objective
standards for retention, the horse shall be considered as held for
racing purposes."' 15 5 These criteria strongly resemble the factual
circumstances cited by the Tax Court in Kirk and other similar
cases used to establish that the taxpayer was in the business of
training and racing horses, not selling horses, and that the par-
ticular horse in question was held for use in racing. 15 6 Thus, the
earlier cases continue to be important precedent under the sub-
sequently applicable regulations, although the section 1231 hold-
ing period currently is longer.
A difficult continuing issue under the regulations involves
the sale of a filly or maiden mare that has not been trained for
racing and has been held for more than two years by a taxpayer
generally in the business of breeding and selling horses. If the
animal was not actually used for breeding, apparently the horse
is not treated as section 1231 property unless the taxpayer estab-
lishes both that the particular horse was held for breeding pur-
poses (rather than for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business) and that the horse was sold within a reasonable
time after discovery that she was not suitable for breeding. This
often may be a difficult or impossible burden to carry. The Tax
Court's decision in Gamble v. Commissioner,57 however, offers
another possibility.
Gamble, who was found to be in the thoroughbred racing
business and not in the business of selling thoroughbreds, pur-
chased a mare in foal on December 20, 1969. The foal, a colt,
was born on April 12, 1970. The foal neither was raced at a
public track nor trained for racing, but it "was handled in a
manner entirely consistent with a plan to train and race it when
155 Id.
156 See Kirk, 47 T.C. at 193; McCarthy, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) at 137; Jackson, 11
T.C.M. (CCH) at 940-41.
.,7 68 T.C. 800 (1977) (acq.).
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it reached the proper age."'' 5 8 In August 1971, as the colt ap-
proached the age at which training would normally begin, Gam-
ble sold the colt at the Saratoga Yearling Sale. Gamble claimed
that the colt was a capital asset. The Commissioner argued that
the colt was property used in Gamble's business subject to
section 1231 and that the twenty four month holding period
requirement was not met.
Based on the evidence, the court concluded that Gamble was
"holding the colt in order to exploit it through whatever course
of action might appear at the time to be most profitable, either
through sale, or to race it himself, or in some other manner
(e.g., by syndication). '" 15 9 Because no single purpose predomi-
nated, the court reasoned that the colt was not held primarily
for sale to customers within the meaning of section 1221(1).
Despite Gamble's argument that his failure to claim depreciation
with respect to the colt established that it was a capital asset, 16°
the court concluded that, because Gamble's business "encom-
passed holding immature foals for possible future use as race
horses," the evidence established that the colt was "unmistaka-
x Id. at 806.
' ' Id. at 812.
Id. at 813. The taxpayer's failure to depreciate the colt was consistent with
treating the colt as I.R.C. § 1231 property. Immature animals held for future use in
draft, breeding or dairy puposes are not considered to be placed in service until they
reach maturity, "the age at which they can be worked, milked, or bred." U.S. TREAS.
DEPT., PuB. No. 225, FARMER's TAX GuimE 16 (1981 ed.). See also Rev. Rul. 60-60,
1960-1 C.B. 190. But see Rudolph Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 573,
578 (1972) (taxpayer was allowed to depreciate yearling heifers, despite immaturity for
breeding, because they became part of the breeding herd at that age). No depreciation
may be claimed until the animal is placed in service. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10(b) (1960).
See, e.g., Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 739 (1985) (supermarket
equipment), aff'd, 803 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1986). If breeding stock may not be
depreciated prior to the year it reaches the age at which it may be bred, by analogy, no
depreciation should be allowable with respect to a racehorse prior to the year in which
it enters training. Nevertheless, property that will be subject to an allowance for depre-
ciation after it is placed in service by the taxpayer is not excluded from the ambit of
I.R.C. § 1231 because the taxpayer is unable to claim depreciation deductions on the
property not yet placed in service. See Alamo Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 15
T.C. 534 (1950). Therefore, it was entirely proper to claim no depreciation on the colt
even if it was property subject to an allowance for depreciation held for use in the
taxpayer's business and not a capital asset. But see Talbot & Fehrenbach, Thoroughbred
Breeding-Tax Considerations, 49 C.P.A. J. 11, 13 (July 1979) (table of useful lives of
thoroughbred racehorses shows useful life for horse that is 1 year old when placed in
service).
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bly" depreciable property held in connection with Gamble's
business described in sections 1221(2) and 1231(b).'' After find-
ing the colt to be section 1231 property, rather than a capital
asset, the court turned to the question of what holding period
to apply, the six month holding period of section 1231(b)(1) or
the twenty four month holding period of section 1231(b)(3).
At this juncture, the Gamble case takes a strange twist.
Because the colt neither was raced nor trained for racing, the
Commissioner agreed with Gamble's contention that section
1231(b)(3), with its twenty four month holding period, was in-
applicable. 162 That being so, Gamble argued that the horse was
nevertheless section 1231 property meeting the section 1231(b)(1)
six month holding period requirement. The government, how-
ever, argued that horses could be treated as section 1231 property
only under subsection (b)(3) and that if subsection (b)(3) was
inapplicable the horse could not qualify under subsection (b)(1).
With what at first blush appears to be well reasoned logic, the
Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's argument and allowed
Gamble to treat the gain recognized as capital gain on the sale
of a section 1231(b)(1) asset.
First, the court noted that subsection (b)(3) provides that the
term "property used in the trade or business ... includes' 1 63
horses held for draft, breeding and sporting purposes. Section
7701(b) specifically provides that the word "includes" does not
exclude things other than the specified examples if they are
independently within the meaning of the defined term. Prior to
the 1969 amendment to subsection (b)(3), it was established that
animals held for purposes other than those specified in subsec-
tion (b)(3) could qualify as section 1231 property under subsec-
tion (b)(1). 16 4 Furthermore, adopting the Commissioner's
argument would not only exclude from section 1231 property
horses held for breeding or racing that were not held for twenty
four months, but would also exclude horses held for any purpose
161 68 T.C. at 812 (emphasis in original).
162 Id. at 817.
"6 Id. at 818 (emphasis in original).
I' See, e.g., McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974)(acq.) (racehorses were
I.R.C. § 1231 property under I.R.C. § 1231(b)(1) prior to addition of "sporting"
purposes to subsection (b)(3) in 1969); Fowler, 37 T.C. 1124 (same).
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not stated in subsection (b)(3), such as horses used for advertis-
ing, entertainment, or by riding stables, regardless of the holding
period. 165 Finally, the court could not find adequate support in
the legislative history of the 1969 amendment to conclude that
Congress intended the amendment to restrict section 1231 treat-
ment to horses that both had been held for twenty four months
and held for one of the specified purposes. Although there was
some language in the Senate Committee Report supporting the
Commissioner's argument, 166 other language in that report and
in the Conference Report indicated that the purpose was only
to extend the holding period applicable to animals held for the
specified purposes. 67 The general tenor of the legislative history,
reciting the problems and abuses encountered with respect to the
character of gain recognized on the sale of animals that were
alleged to have been held for the specified purposes, supported
this analysis.' 61
It is difficult to fault this logic. But the result is unsettling,
and there is language in the Gamble opinion that hints that the
result may have disturbed the court. After reaching its conclu-
sion, the court noted:
We recognize that the regulations as they now exist... might
in some cases effectively shield from the 24-month holding
period requirement horses which arguably should be subjected
to it. However, that problem is not presented in this case,
because the Government has taken the position that the chest-
"' 68 T.C. at 814. See also Campbell, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) at 885-56 (pleasure-riding
horses held for rental were I.R.C. § 1231 property).
15 See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3
C.B. 423, 488, quoted in 68 T.C. at 818-19 n.16 ("Thus, cattle and horses are not to
qualify for long-term capital gains treatment unless the animal is held by the taxpayer
for at least two years for one of the specified purposes.").
1" Id., quoted in 68 T.C. at 819, n. 17 ("The committee amendments extend the
present one-year holding period for cattle and horses, which are held for draft, breeding,
dairy or sporting purposes, to two years." (emphasis added by Tax Court)); H.R. CoNF.
RP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 644, 656,
quoted in Gamble, 68 T.C. at 819 n.17 ("The Senate amendment provides that in order
for any gain on the sale of horses or cattle to result in capital gain where the animals
are held for draft, dairy, breeding, or sporting purposes, the horses or cattle must have
been held for at least two years." (emphasis added by Tax Court)).
- See 68 T.C. at 819. See also S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01
(1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 488.
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nut colt was property used in the petitioner's trade or business
and that it was not held for sporting purposes. 169
The court was correct in noting the flaw in the regulations. Its
assertion that the problem was not presented in Gamble, how-
ever, was correct only in the narrowest sense.
In fact, Gamble involved the exact fact pattern that the 1969
amendment was intended to reach. The legislative history of the
amendment specifically states that the changes were necessary
because of the problems encountered when "the purpose for
which animals are held is ambiguous.' 1 70 The remedy was to
remove horses that might be held for racing in the future or
might be held for sale from the ambit of section 1231. Yet
Gamble was able to use his ambiguous purpose as a sword to
gain section 1231 treatment. Moreover, the facts of the case
reveal not only that the taxpayer sold either a colt or filly at
about the age when training would begin in each of the preceding
three years, but also that the colt in question was particularly
well bred and desirable.17 1 Similar facts in other cases involving
sales of greater numbers of animals annually have resulted in
ordinary income treatment. 72 How then, did the taxpayer prevail
in Gamble?
The easy answer is that the Commissioner largely stipulated
away his case. Because Gamble did maintain a number of horses
that actively raced, his sales activities were not of the level
generally necessary to find that he was holding animals for sale
169 68 T.C. at 820 (emphasis in original).
170 S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
423, 488; H.R. REP. No. 413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1969), reprinted in 1969-
3 C.B. 200, 244.
71 68 T.C. at 801-09.
'1 See Rice v. United States, 75-1 U.S.T.C. 9207 (D. Mont. 1975) (sale of high
quality, undiseased heifers rather than inferior animals demontrated a predetermined
effort to hold well bred animals for sale rather than culling from breeding herd); Bandes
v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 243 (1982) (over the course of several years taxpayer
serially sold groups of 13 month old pregnant gilts; applying Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-
2(b)(1), the court concluded that, contrary to taxpayer's testimony that he intended to
hold the hogs for breeding, the facts established that he held the hogs for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business); Kline v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 998
(1950) (taxpayer, who purchased cows in the fall, bred them and resold the cows in the
spring after calving, realized ordinary income because he never intended to hold them
for breeding beyond the first year).
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to customers. 173 On the facts, that portion of the Commissioner's
argument was unsound, and it should have been recognized as
such. Similarly, the Commissioner's argument that to be section
1231 property a horse had to fall within subsection (b)(3) was
very clearly destined to lose. Thus, the Commissioner lost by
agreeing that the colt was not held for sporting purposes. In
light of the regulations, however, the Commissioner's agreement
on this point does not appear to be unreasonable. The colt was
neither raced nor trained, and the regulations provide that in
such a case a horse "shall not, except in rare and unusual
circumstances, be considered as held for racing purposes." The
regulations, therefore, led to a result contrary to the Congress's
intent in enacting the 1969 amendments to section 1231(b)(3).
Although holding "immature colts for possible future use as
race horses" brings the animals within the meaning of property
held for use in the taxpayer's business, it does not amount to a
"sporting purpose." Consequently, unless the regulations are
amended, the same result likely would be reached if another
case similar to Gamble arises. It is doubtful that the Gamble
facts present the "rare and unusual circumstances" necessary to
find that a horse that neither was raced nor trained is held for
racing purposes.
c. Sale of Mares in Foal
The sale of a mare in foal raises the question of whether the
amount realized should be apportioned between the mare and
the unborn foal. If the amount realized is so apportioned, only
the gain attributable to the mare will be eligible for section 1231
treatment, assuming that the requirements of section 1231 are
otherwise satisfied, because an embryonic foal cannot satisfy the
holding period requirement of either section 1231(b)(3) or sub-
section (b)(1).174
In Metz v. United States, 75 the Commissioner unsuccessfully
argued that part of the amount realized upon the sale of a mare
,71 Compare Jewell, discussed at notes 120-22 supra, with Kirk and McCarthy,
discussed at notes 123-33 supra.
114 See Greer, 408 F.2d 631 (holding period of foal begins at birth).
17' 62-1 U.S.T.C. 9500 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
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in foal should be allocated to the foal and that the gain attrib-
utable to the foal, which would be the entire amount realized
because the seller had no cost basis in the foal, should be taxed
as ordinary income. The government contended that an amount
equal to the stud fees paid with respect to each of two mares
involved in the case should be treated, as the amount realized on
the sale of the unborn foal. This argument was based on the
earlier Tax Court decision in Gamble,17 6 which held that the
buyer of a mare in foal was entitled to allocate a portion of the
purchase price to the foal for purposes of computing the gain
realized upon the subsequent sale of the foal. The court in
Gamble, however, considered the stud fees as only one factor
in determining the portion of the purchase price allocable to the
foal.
The Metz court apparently accepted the government's theory
that a portion of the amount realized could be attributable to
the unborn foal. It submitted special interrogatories to the jury,
asking first, whether the " 'purchase price was enhanced by
reason of the fact that the mare was thought by the parties to
the transaction to be then carrying an unborn foal, and that any
part of such enhancement in price, if any, was due to a value
attributed or attributable to the unborn foal,' "'177 and second,
if the answer to the first interrogatory was "yes," the percentage
of the amount realized attributable to the foal.17 8 Although on
the evidence the jury answered the first interrogatory in the
negative for both foals, if the jury had answered the first inter-
rogatory in the affirmative, whatever portion of the amount
realized was allocated by the jury to the foal presumably would
have been held by the court to be ordinary income. Otherwise,
there was no need to submit the issues to the jury.
Thus a careful comparison of Gamble and Metz leads to the
conclusion that whether a portion of the amount realized on the
sale of a mare in foal is properly attributable to the unborn foal
is clearly a question of fact, to be determined on a case by case
basis. The same considerations that govern the allocation of a
68 T.C. 800 (1977) (acq.).
Metz, 62-1 U.S.T.C. at 84,475 (quoting the first interrogatory).
178 Id.
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portion of the purchase price to the buyer's basis in the foal
should apply in determining whether the seller must allocate a
portion of the amount realized to the unborn foal. To the extent
that a portion of the amount realized is attributed to the foal,
the seller generally realizes ordinary income of an equal amount,
assuming that the stud fee was previously deducted. If, on the
other hand, the seller elected to capitalize the stud fee or was
required by section 263A to capitalize all the costs of raising the
foal, including the stud fee, that would be his basis in the foal
for computing ordinary gain or loss realized with reference to
the allocable amount realized. 179 In the unusual instance that the
seller can establish that he held the unborn foal neither for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business nor for future
breeding or racing and if the mare was in foal for more than
six months, the seller might have an argument, based on Gamble,
that he was entitled to section 1231 treatment on the gain attrib-
utable to the foal. This is, however, a tenuous argument at best,
and is contrary to the decision in Greer v. United States,80
deciding that the holding period of a foal does not begin until
its birth.
4. Sales of Syndicate Shares
a. Is a Syndicate Undivided Ownership or a Partnership?
Syndicated ownership of horses occurs in racing syndicates,
broodmare syndicates, and stallion syndicates. 8 ' Racing syndi-
cates and broodmare syndicates should be treated as partnerships
for federal income tax purposes,182 and the sale of a share in
' See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969) .
o' See generally Campbell, Racing Syndicates as Securities, 74 Ky. L.J. 691 (1985-
86); Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 KY. L.J. 1131 (1981-82); Kropp,
Flannagan & Kahle, Choosing the Equine Business Form, 70 Ky. L.J. 940, 945-58 (1981-
82).
Io2 In determining whether the syndicate is a partnership, the standards developed
under I.R.C. §§ 761 and 7701(a)(2) should be determinative, not the state law determi-
nation. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949) (ranching partner-
ship); Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883 (1978) (real estate development
partnership). But see M.H.S. Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 733 (1976),
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such a syndicate should be taxed under the rules governing the
sale of partnership interests. 83 A stallion syndicate, however,
may or may not be a partnership for income tax purposes,
depending on its organization. The rules governing taxation of
the sale of a share in a stallion syndicate differ depending on
how the syndicate is organized.
Reduced to its most basic elements, a stallion syndicate en-
tails multiple ownership of a stallion in which an ownership
interest (commonly termed "share") entitles the owner to certain
annual breeding rights (commonly termed "nominations" or
"seasons") and obligates the owner to share in the stallion's
maintenance expenses. In thoroughbred syndicates each share
owner typically has the right to breed one mare to the stallion
annually. The syndicate manager is responsible for the daily care
of the stallion and the supervision of breeding activities. He
maintains records of the syndicate's activities and bills the share
owners for their proportionate share of the syndicate's expenses.
In some syndicates the syndicate manager may be responsible
for promoting the horse through advertising, obtaining insurance
on the horse, assisting share owners in selling their breeding
rights, or selling extra breeding rights on behalf of the syndicate
and applying the proceeds against expenses or dividing the prof-
its between the share owners.
A syndicate structured as merely an expense sharing arrange-
ment should not be categorized as a partnership for federal
income tax purposes. 8 4 It is merely the co-ownership of property
used by each of the co-owners in his separate business and lacks
aff'd, 575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978) (applying state law, but noting that same result is
reached under federal law).
I.R.C. § 761(a) provides that "the term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by means of which
any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the
meaning of this title, a corporation, trust or estate." Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a), in relevant
part, provides that "[t]enants in common ... may be partners if they actively carry on
a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof." In
McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974) (acq.), the court found that co-owners
of a horse held for racing and future use as a stud were partners. See text accompanying
notes 186-87 infra. See also Trower, Davis & Geske, Taxation of Equine Partnerships,
70 Ky. L.J. 1021, 1038 n.51 (1981-82).
,81 See text accompanying notes 196-208 infra.
114 See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a).
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the joint profit motive necessary for a partnership. 85 But if the
syndicate actively carries on a business or a venture with the
object of making and dividing profits among the syndicate mem-
bers, a joint profit motive exists and the syndicate is a partner-
ship for tax purposes. 8 6 Thus, if the syndicate manager is
empowered to sell seasons on behalf of the syndicate and to
apply the proceeds to reduce the expenses charged to the share
owners or to divide the profits among the share owners, the
syndicate should be treated as a partnership for federal income
tax purposes. The sale of seasons by the syndicate, as opposed
to sale of seasons by individual shareholders, should be viewed
as the conduct of a business regardless of whether the proceeds
are used solely to offset expenses or are divided among the share
owners.
8 7
b. Character of Gain on Nonpartnerhip Syndicate Shares
If a stallion syndicate share is merely an undivided interest
in the horse and not an interest in a partnership, gains and losses
realized upon the sale of the share should be categorized as
ordinary or section 1231 gains or losses by each individual share
owner, using the same standards applicable to sales of wholly
owned horses. Generally, this results in section 1231 treatment
as long as the holding period requirement is met. Because each
share owner characterizes the purpose for which he holds the
share by looking at his own activities, 88 the holding period for
section 1231 purposes normally commences when the share owner
acquires his share, not when the syndicate acquired the stallion,
if that occurred at an earlier date. Thus, section 1231 treatment
"I See McKEE, NELSON & ,VifnwRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERsmPs AND
PARTNERS 3.03[5] (1977, 1985).
"I Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a). See McKEE, NELSON & WHmmIRE, supra note 185;
Trower, Davis & Geske, supra note 182, at 1038 n.51.
1 See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1979), aff'd, 633
F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980) (electric utility companies jointly operating nuclear power plant
and distributing power in kind rather than jointly selling power to third parties were
nevertheless partners); Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 780 (1979), aff'd, 634
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980) (co-owners of commercial building were partners).
- If the syndicate were classified as a partnership, the character of the gain on
the horses would be determined with respect to the partnership's activities and purpose
for holding the horse. I.R.C. § 702(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (1985).
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is not available until the share owner has held the share for
more than twenty-four months.189 The availability of section 1231
gains, of course, is limited by section 1245. If the share owner
is not a partner, but an owner of an undivided interest in the
stallion, he will have claimed ACRS deductions with respect to
the stallion. These deductions result in gain realized upon the
sale of the share being ordinary income under section 1245 to
the extent of ACRS deductions previously claimed by the share
owner.' 90
The similarity of the rights of a syndicate share owner and
the rights of a mere lifetime season owner led the Commissioner
to assert in Guggenheim v. Commissioner'9' that gain realized
on the initial sale of syndicate shares by the promoter was
ordinary income. The Commissioner argued that the purported
sale of undivided interests in the stallion was, in substance, only
the sale of lifetime seasons. Focusing on the rights acquired by
the purchasers, rather than the rights surrendered by the pro-
moter, the court concluded, however, that the purchasers indeed
acquired undivided ownership interests in the stallion. Unlike an
owner of a lifetime season, the share owners were required to
contribute to the stallion's expenses, were entitled to share in
any profits from the sale of excess seasons, had the right to vote
on a successor syndicate manager, and had a right of first refusal
to purchase the interest of any share owner who wished to sell
his share. These rights, combined with the form of the transac-
tion, were sufficient basis to respect its form.
Alternatively, the Commissioner argued that, even if the
form of the transaction was respected, the seller could not treat
the transaction as a sale of section 1231 property under Com-
missioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 92 Corn Products Co. v. Commis-
sioner,'93 and Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Co. 94 All three
of these cases were found to be inapplicable, however, and the
-89 I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-2.
190 See text accompanying note 106 supra.
-'- 46 T.C. 559 (1966). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 6302014720 (Aug. 9, 1966) (technical
advice memorandum issued with respect to Guggenheim during audit).
192 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
193 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
,94 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
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taxpayer was permitted to treat his gains as section 1231 gains.
The taxpayer in Guggenheim clearly had transferred the invest-
ment risks associated with three-sevenths of the stallion to the
purchasers of the fifteen shares. This readily distinguished the
case from P.G. Lake, which the Tax Court concluded involved
a disguised sale of future ordinary income because the purchasers
of the oil rights in that case had not really acquired any sub-
stantial investment risks or benefits. The seller in P.G. Lake
bore the same investment risks after the transaction that he bore
before the transaction. The Commissioner's attempted applica-
tion of Gillette Motor Co. was rejected for the same reasons.
Corn Products was found by the court to be inapposite
because the Commissioner's application of the case was based
on his already rejected argument that Guggenheim in substance
sold breeding rights, not undivided shares in the stallion. The
sale of undivided interests in the stallion was a partial liquidation
of the taxpayer's interest in a horse held for breeding purposes,
not a transaction to further the taxpayer's business of breeding
horses.
Guggenheim, decided almost thirty years ago, is the last word
from either the courts or the IRS on the character of gain
realized on the sale of syndicate shares. It is reasonable to
conclude that the issue is settled, at least as far as traditional
syndication agreements are concerned. Care must be exercised
in the application of Guggenheim, however, because the Tax
Court opinion dealt only with the character of the gain realized
by Guggenheim upon sale of the undivided shares of the stallion
in the syndication. Careful analysis of the facts leads to the
conclusion that the syndicate, once established, should have been
treated as a partnership because the syndicate manager had the
power to sell excess seasons and either apply the proceeds against
syndicate expenses or divide them among the share owners.
Thus, any subsequent sales of shares by either Guggenheim, the
promoter, out of his twenty reserved shares, or by any of the
purchasers of the fifteen shares originally sold by Guggenheim,
should have been analyzed as a sale of a partnership interest.
This leads to the question of whether the transaction actually at
issue in Guggenheim should have been analyzed as the formation
of a partnership rather than a sale of undivided interests in the
1986-87]
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stallion. This issue is explored later in this Article. 195
c. Sale of Shares in a Syndicate That is a Partnership
If, under the standards discussed previously, a syndicate is
treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes, the
rules determining the character of the gain or loss realized upon
the sale of a syndicate share are quite different. Sales of interests
in partnerships owning horses, whether the horses are held by
the partnership for breeding, racing or sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business, are governed by the same provisions
of Subchapter K that govern the sale of interests in partnerships
holding any other type of section 1231 assets or property held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. Al-
though a thorough discussion of the mechanics of Subchapter K
provisions relating to the sale of partnership interests is beyond
the scope of this Article, a few basic principles should be con-
sidered.
Section 741 provides that gain or loss recognized on the sale
of a partnership interest is treated as long or short term capital
gain or loss. 196 Except as provided in section 751, the character
of the underlying assets owned by the partnership does not affect
the characterization of gain or loss realized on the sale of a
partnership interest.197 Thus, for example, the gain recognized
on the sale of a partnership interest is capital gain even if the
entire gain is attributable to appreciated assets owned by the
partnership that would produce section 1231 gain upon sale.
Section 751, however, stands as a guardian to prevent recogni-
tion of capital gains on the sale of the partnership interest if the
partnership assets reflect significant ordinary income potential,
including depreciation recapture under I.R.C. section 1245.191
Therefore, because every syndicate will have claimed ACRS de-
ductions on most, if not all, of the horses held, some portion
-9 See Part I.E. infra.
196 See Treas. Reg. § 1.741-1 (1985).
I" Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 751 (1954) the courts, on occasion, looked
through the partnership to characterize gain on the sale of a partnership interest with
reference to the underlying assets. This was the exception, however, rather than the rule.
See McKEE, NELSON & Wmniuc, supra note 185, at 15.03.
193 I.R.C. § 751(a)(1), (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(c)(4) (1985).
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of the gain realized on the sale of a share in a syndicate,
classified as a partnership, is treated as ordinary income. On the
other hand, none of the gain or loss realized on the sale of a
partnership is characterized as ordinary gain or loss under the
Corn Products199 doctrine or on the theory that the taxpayer is
a dealer in partnership interests. 20
In computing gain or loss on the sale of a partnership
interest, the seller uses his basis determined under sections 705
and 742. This reflects prior contributions to and withdrawals
from the partnership, as well as the cumulative effect of his
allocable share of partnership income and losses.2 1 In addition,
a partner's basis includes his share of partnership liabilities,
determined under Treasury Regulation 1.751-1(e). Consonantly,
the amount realized on the sale of the interest includes not only
the cash and fair market value of other property received but
also the selling partner's share of the partnership liabilities. 202
The greatest pitfall in properly characterizing the gain real-
ized on the sale of a partnership interest lies in the application
of section 751. This section overrides section 741 and character-
izes the gain attributable to unrealized receivables and substan-
tially appreciated inventory held by the partnership as ordinary
income.203 Not only are the computations complex, but section
751 may require the recognition of ordinary gain even if the
overall transaction resulted in a sale of the partnership interest
at a loss.204 When this occurs, the capital loss attributed to the
sale of the partnership interest is increased by an amount equal
L, See Pollack v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 142, 147 n.7 (1977) (holding that I.R.C.
§ 741 requires capital gains treatment on the sale of partnership interest independent of
I.R.C. § 1221 definition of capital asset; Corn Products is an exception to I.R.C. §
1221). The Pollack decision has been subject to scholarly criticism. See Note, The Corn
Products Doctrine and Its Application to Partnership Interests, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 341
(1979); Note, Section 741 and Corn Products: A Logical Extention?, 31 U. FLA. L. REv.
90 (1978).
!-' See 3 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INcOME, ESTATES AND Giats 87.1.3
(1981).
! For a general discussion of the computation of the basis of a partnership interest,
see McKEE, NELSON & Wsmu, supra note 185, at 6.01 - 6.05.
I.R.C. § 752(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d) (1985).
See I.R.C. § 751(a), (c), (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a), (c), (d).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(g), Example (1).
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to the ordinary gain; the net loss will be correctly stated, but
the character is altered.
Depreciation recapture is within the definition of "unrealized
receivables" for purposes of section 751. 201 Thus, whenever a
syndicate taxed as a partnership holds any horses that have been
depreciated and which have a fair market value in excess of their
adjusted basis, the seller of a share must recognize as ordinary
income his share of the potential section 1245 recapture income.
In a very simplified context, this may be illustrated as follows.
Assume that T owns one share in a stallion syndicate taxed as
a partnership. For the sake of simplicity, assume the partnership
has only ten shares. T's basis in his share is $2,100. The sole
asset of the syndicate is a single stallion with an adjusted basis
of $21,000. The recomputed basis of the stallion is $100,000,
and his fair market value is $200,000. The syndicate has no
liabilities. As the owner of a one tenth partnership interest, T
sells his interest for $20,000. He must recognize an overall gain
of $17,900, of which $7,900 will be treated as ordinary income
under section 751 and the remaining $10,000 will be capital gain
under section 741.206
It is important to note that section 751 is a one-way swinging
door. If the. partnership holds horses that have depreciated in
value, and that depreciation is reflected in the price received for
the partnership interest, section 751 does not operate to rechar-
acterize as ordinary loss any part of the capital gain or loss on
the sale of the partnership interest that is attributable to such
horses. Furthermore, if the partnership both holds horses subject
to section 1245 recapture, triggering ordinary income under sec-
tion 751, and horses that would result in recognition of net
section 1231 ordinary losses, the losses may not be netted out
against the depreciation recapture in computing the portion of
the overall gain that will be ordinary gain under section 751.
The losses remain part of the computation subject to section
741,207 decreasing the capital gain or increasing the capital loss.
201 I.R.C. § 751(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(c)(4)(i); -1(c)(5).
For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of apportioning the gain realized
on the sale of a partnership between ordinary income under I.R.C. § 751 and capital
gains under I.R.C. § 741, see McKEE, NEmsoN & WMMIa, supra note 185, at 16.02.
" See id. at J 16.03[3][a]; S. Horvitz, Depreciation Recapture-Partnership Trans-
actions, 289 T.M. A-55-A-58.
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It is also important to remember that, although the above
rules apply equally to sales of syndicate shares to new syndicate
members or to other syndicate members, they do not apply to
a sale of shares back to the syndicate itself. Such a transaction
is described as a "liquidation" of a partnership interest and is
subject to the rules governing distributions from partnerships,
as modified by section 736. Because it is very rare for a syndicate
to buy back a share, any discussion of liquidation of partnership
interests is beyond the scope of this Article. A cautionary note
is in order, however, because section 751 also reaches certain
partnership distributions, 03 particularly those in which a part-
ner's entire interest is liquidated by a cash payment (whether or
not deferred), again transmuting what would otherwise be capital
gain into ordinary income.
D. Installment Sales
1. General Principles of Deferred Recognition Rules
Gains realized on the sale of a horse for deferred payments
may be reported on the installment method regardless of whether
the seller uses the cash or accrual method of tax accounting or
whether the horse is property used in the seller's business (e.g.,
a stallion, broodmare or racehorse) or property held for sale to
customers (e.g., yearlings sold by a breeder). The installment
method may also be used to report gain realized on the sale of
a partnership interest or a syndicate share. Different provisions,
however, govern sales of horses held for sale to customers by
accrual method taxpayers who maintain inventories, than govern
other deferred payment sales.
Section 453 governs installment sales of horses used in the
seller's business, sales of horses held for sale to customers by
cash method farmers not required to maintain inventories, and
sales of partnership interests and syndicate shares.209 This section
I.R.C. § 751(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(b).
I.R.C. § 453(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(a) (1981); Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-0(a); -
l(b)(4) (1981); Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(4) specifically provides that "a farmer who is
not required under his method of accounting to maintain inventories may report the
gain on the installment method under section 453." A cash method farmer is not required
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applies whenever at least one payment is to be received in a
taxable year after the close of the taxable year in which the sale
occurs .210 It requires deferred reporting of the gain unless the
seller affirmatively elects to recognize the entire gain in the year
of the sale.211 A loss is always recognized in the year of the
sale.212 Under the installment method of reporting gain, in each
year in which a payment is received the seller includes in income
an amount which bears the same proportion to the total gain
realized on the transaction as the payments received during the
year bear to the "contract price", which is defined as the total
amount of payments to be received. 213 For this purpose, the
assumption of a lien indebtedness by the purchaser is not con-
sidered a payment, unless the debt exceeds the seller's basis. 21 4
In that case, gain equal to the amount by which the debt exceeds
the basis must be recognized in the year of the sale, and subse-
quent payments will be fully includable as gain.2 15 The buyer's
promissory note given to evidence the debt generally is not
considered to be a payment. 21 6
For example, assume that the taxpayer sold a stallion with
a basis of $100,000 for $250,000, of which $100,000 was paid
in cash. The balance of $150,000 was represented by a promis-
sory note calling for payment of $50,000 of principal on each
of the next three anniversary dates of the note, with adequate
interest. Assume further (for reasons that will soon be explained)
that none of the realized gain of $150,000 is subject to section
1245 recapture because the horse was sold in the same taxable
year in which it was acquired, but that the gain is ordinary
income because the horse was held for less than one year. The
contract price is $250,000. Therefore sixty percent of each prin-
cipal payment will be recognized as gain in the year received;
to maintain inventories. See note 30 supra. See Rev. Rul. 75-323, 1975-2 C.B. 346
(applying I.R.C. § 453 to the sale of a partnership interest; particular ruling now
overridden by I.R.C. § 453(i)).
210 I.R.C. § 453(b)(1).
211 I.R.C. § 453(d); Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d).
211 Martin v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1932); Rev. Rul. 70-430, 1970-2
C.B. 51.
213 I.R.C. § 453(c); Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(2).
214 Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3)(i), (b)(5), Example (2).
215 See Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(5), Example (3).
2.6 I.R.C. § 453(f)(3), (4); Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3)(i).
[VOL. 75
EQUINE TAXATION
$60,000 of gain is recognized in the year of the sale and $30,000
of gain is recognized in each of the next three succeeding years
as payments are received. All of the gain is ordinary because
gain is characterized based on the holding period at the time of
the sale, not at the time payment is received.
Section 453C, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, restricts
the use of the installment method of reporting gains by dealers
of real and personal property who have outstanding indebtedness
in any year in which they receive an installment obligation on
the sale of inventory or property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. Certain lessors of
property are also subject to this provision. The mechanical rules
of section 453C that determine the extent to which installment
reporting of the gain on a particular sale is disallowed are
extraordinarily complex. Fortunately for taxpayers selling horses,
these rules do not apply to the disposition of "any property
used or produced in the trade or business of farming (within the
meaning of section 2032A(e)(4) or (5)). ' '217 Raising horses clearly
is farming within this definition. Therefore, section 453C does
not apply to sales by a taxpayer in the business of raising horses
for sale. Whether this rule will be applied to dispositions of
horses by subsequent owners is unclear. It very likely may not. 218
In any event, because as far as we are concerned with it here,
section 453C applies only to sales by dealers of property held
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and
horses leased by the taxpayer,219 the installment method is avail-
able without restriction for reporting gains from the sale of
horses held for breeding or racing purposes. This is so even if
the taxpayer is a dealer. A taxpayer who sells a horse that has
been leased to another taxpayer, however, may be subject to
section 453C if the sales price of the horse exceeds $150,000.220
a. Treatment of Sales of Horses Subject to Liens
The treatment of a lien indebtedness assumed by the pur-
chaser can be illustrated by varying the facts slightly. Assume
217 I.R.C. § 453C(e)(1)(B)(ii).
2,' See H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 298 (1986) ("... the proportionate
disallowance rule does not apply.., to installment obligations arising from the sale of
crops or livestock held for slaughter.").
211 See I.R.C. § 453C(e)(1)(A)(i).
- I.R.C. § 453C(e)(1)(A)(i)(III).
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that the sale price was increased to $300,000 because the horse
was subject to a $50,000 debt, which the purchaser assumed or
to which he took subject. In all other details the transaction was
identical. The realized gain increases to $200,000, but the con-
tract price remains $250,000, because the loan assumption is not
treated as a payment. Therefore, eighty percent of each payment
will be recognized as gain; $80,000 will be recognized in the year
of sale and $40,000 will be recognized in each of the next three
years.
b. Disallowance of Installment Reporting of Recapture
Income
Most installment sales are not as simple as that in the pre-
ceding examples. If the horse was held for more than one taxable
year (which may be less than twelve months if the horse was
purchased during the year and held on the last day of the year)
the seller probably has claimed ACRS deductions with respect
to the horse. 221 Therefore, a portion of the gain realized on the
sale is recharacterized as ordinary income under section 1245.
This complicates the installment method of reporting gains be-
cause section 1245 recapture income is not eligible for installment
reporting.' All of the recapture income must be recognized in
the year of the sale, even if the amount of recapture income
exceeds the payments received in that year, even if no payments
are received in that year. As a result of the recognition of
recapture income without regard to the receipt of a payment,
for purposes of determining the gain recognized on the receipt
of payments, the seller's basis in the horse that was sold is
increased by the amount of recapture income.223
This interaction of recapture and the installment method is
illustrated as follows. Assume that the horse sold in the initial
example above was originally purchased for $150,000 and that
the seller had claimed ACRS deductions of $50,000, reducing
the adjusted basis to $100,000. Assume further that the horse
2' See text accompanying note 88 supra.
= I.R.C. § 453(i).
See S. REP. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 466 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1008-09 (1984).
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had been held for more than twenty-four months prior to sale.
In all other respects the transaction is identical to the first
example. The gain realized on the transaction is $150,000, of
which $50,000 is section 1245 recapture income and $100,000 is
section 1231 income. The $50,000 of recapture income is rec-
ognized as ordinary income in the year of the sale. For purposes
of determining the portion of each payment that is section 1231
gain, the seller's basis, which was $100,000, is increased to
$150,000 by adding the recapture income to it. Using the in-
creased basis, the amount of gain is only $100,000, and since
the contract price is $250,000, forty percent of each payment
will be recognized as section 1231 gain. In the first year the
seller must recognize $40,000 of section 1231 gain in addition to
the $50,000 of section 1245 gain. In each of the next three years
he must recognize $20,000 of section 1231 gain.
Similar computations must be made if the taxpayer sells a
syndicate share that is treated as undivided ownership and the
seller previously claimed ACRS deductions on the horse. Such
computations must also be made if the taxpayer sells a partner-
ship interest and part of the gain is characterized as ordinary
income under section 751 because there is depreciation recapture
inherent in the underlying assets of the partnership. 24
2. Installment Reporting of Contingent Price Sales
The Treasury Regulations provide detailed rules for comput-
ing the portion of each payment that must be treated as gain in
the case of installment sales at an indefinite price.22 These rules
apply, for example, if the sales price of a horse is contingent on
future racing purses or stud fees earned by the horse. If there
is a stated maximum price, the gross profit ratio will be com-
puted on the assumption that it will be paid. If less than the
maximum price is paid, unless one of the specific rules permitting
the seller to recompute the maximum selling price applies, the
seller is allowed a loss in the final year equal to the excessive
STAFF OF TBE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENE.L EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAx REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 334 (1984). See text accom-
panying notes 271-74 infra.
Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c).
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gain previously included in income. 226 If the price is open-ended,
but payments are due only for a specified period, the seller's
basis is recovered ratably over the period for which payments
are received. 227 Finally, if both the purchase price and payment
period are indefinite, the seller's basis is recovered ratably over
fifteen years, unless the seller can demonstrate that recovery
over fifteen years would "substantially and inappropriately defer
recovery of the taxpayer's basis." 22 In order to meet this burden,
the seller must demonstrate that the alternative method he pro-
poses is reasonable and that under his method he will recover
basis at least twice as quickly as under the normal method. 2 9
Because of the limited useful life of horses, it may be possible
to meet these requirements in many instances, but an advance
ruling from the IRS is always necessary. 20
3. Determining What Constitutes a "Payment"
For installment method reporting of gains, some debt instru-
ments of the buyer delivered to the seller are treated as payments
in the year of delivery rather than the year of payment. Section
453 specifically provides that a bond or other evidence of in-
debtedness, payable on demand or issued by a corporation or
government and readily tradeable, is treated as a payment.21
The mere ability of the seller to discount the buyer's obligation,
however, should not result in the promissory note being deemed
a payment. 2 2 Similarly, a third party guarantee of the buyer's
obligation does not cause delivery of the buyer's note to be
deemed a payment. 233 If, however, the obligation is secured
directly or indirectly by cash or a cash equivalent, such as a
bank certificate of deposit or a treasury note, the obligation is
treated as a payment.24 A nonnegotiable, nontransferable standby
22 Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(2)(i)(A), (iii), Example (5).
22 Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(3).
Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(4), (7).
Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(7).
2" Id.
31 I.R.C. § 453(0(4). See Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(e).
22 See Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(e)(1)(i), (e)(4).
23 Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3)(i).
2 Id.
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letter of credit that may not be drawn on in the absence of the
buyer's default is treated as a guarantee and not a cash equiv-
alent security. 235 Any other obligation of a third party delivered
to the seller, including a negotiable letter of credit or a letter of
credit that may be drawn upon by the seller without the buyer's
default, is treated as a payment. 236
4. Premature Dispositions of Installment Obligations
The sale, satisfaction at less than face, or other disposition
of an installment obligation results in the recognition of gain or
loss. 2 7 For this purpose the basis of the installment obligation
is the "excess of the face value of the obligation over an amount
equal to the income which would be returnable were the obli-
gation satisfied in full.'' 2 8 In practical application the basis of
an installment promissory note usually is computed by adding
to the basis of the property for which the obligation was received
the amount of gain previously recognized as a result of receiving
payments on the note. Thus, using the immediately preceding
example of an installment sale in which $90,000 of gain was
realized in the year of sale and the horse sold had a basis of
$100,000, the basis of the note after the first payment is $190,000.
This is the same result as is obtained using the statutory method
under which the deferred gain of $60,000 recognized upon the
future receipt of payments is subtracted from the $250,000 face
value of the note to yield a $190,000 basis. After the second
payment, the basis is increased to $210,000.
The recognition rule has a number of exceptions, but they
are not extensive. If an installment obligation is transferred to
a partnership in a transaction subject to section 721 or to a
corporation in a section 351 transaction, the nonrecognition rules
of those sections apply.2 9 Distributions of installment obligations
by a partnership in liquidation of the partnership or a partner-
Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3)(i), (iii).
' Id.
11 I.R.C. § 453B. See also Emory, Disposition of Installment Obligations: Income
Deferral "Thou Art Lost and Gone Forever", 54 IowA L. R~v. 945 (1969) (examining
former I.R.C. § 453(d), the predecessor of current I.R.C. § 453B).
I.R.C. § 453(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(b).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(c)(3); § 1.721-1(a) (1985).
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ship interest do not trigger recognition under section 453B,24
but there is only a narrow exception for certain installment notes
distributed in corporate liquidations. 241 A transfer incident to a
divorce, subject to section 1041, also is excluded from the rec-
ognition requirements. 2 Transmission upon death does not re-
sult in recognition, 24 3 but a transfer by gift results in recognition
to the transferor. 244 The amount realized in such a case is the
fair market value of the obligation, which may be different than
its face value. 245
A seller reporting gain on the installment method also is
required to recognize gain upon the buyer's default if the seller
repossesses the property. 246 The gain recognized is the excess of
the fair market value of the property over the basis of the
installment obligation. This computation does not merely restore
the status quo ante and simply tax as gain all payments previ-
ously treated as a return of basis; the repossession is treated as
a separate transaction and the reacquired property has a basis
equal to the fair market value used in determining the gain
realized on the installment note as a result of the repossession.
The character of the gain or loss recognized on the sale or
other disposition of the installment obligation is determined with
reference to the character of the asset for which it was re-
ceived. 247 Thus, gain recognized on the sale of a note received
for a broodmare, stallion or racehorse is section 1231 gain, but
if the horse were held for sale to customers the gain is ordinary
income.
5. Installment Sales to Related Persons
Complexities arise when an installment sale is made to a
related person or entity. First, if the horse is depreciable property
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(c)(3).
I.R.C. § 453B(d).
- I.R.C. § 453B(g).
-3 I.R.C. § 453B(c). The deferred income is taxed to the beneficiaries of the
decedent's estate who receive the obligations under I.R.C. 691. If, however, the install-
ment obligation passes to the obligor and is thereby discharged, I.R.C. § 691(a)(5)
requires that the gain be recognized by the deceased seller's estate.
- See I.R.C. § 453(0 (gift to obligor); Rev. Rul. 67-167, 1967-1 C.B. 107 (gift to
nongrantor trust); Rev. Rul. 55-157, 1955-1 C.B. 293 (gift to obligor on note).
-5 I.R.C. § 453(a)(2).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(d).
24 See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(a).
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in the hands of the buyer, as is any racehorse, stallion or
broodmare, the installment method is not available for a sale to
a corporation if the seller owns (after taking into account attri-
bution rules) eighty percent of the value of the stock. Similarly,
it is not available for a sale to a partnership if the seller owns
eighty percent or more of either the capital or profits interest in
the partnership or to any trust of which the seller or the seller's
spouse is a beneficiary.24s Second, if the installment sale is to
any person from whom stock ownership is attributed to the
seller under section 318, the resale or other disposition of the
horse by the related buyer within two years results in the original
seller recognizing all of the deferred gain in the year of the sale
by the related person. 249 Section 318 attribution is quite broad
and includes, among other relationships, spouse, children, grand-
children, parents, corporations of which the taxpayer directly or
indirectly owns fifty percent or more of the stock after taking
into account the attribution rules, trusts of which the taxpayer
or any of his relatives previously mentioned is a beneficiary, and
partnerships in which the taxpayer or any such relative is a
partner.2" An exception to this recognition rule applies if the
taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that
neither the first nor the second disposition had as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax,251 but
there is no guidance regarding the scope of this exception.
If the amount realized during the year by the second seller
is less than the contract price on the first sale, only a portion
of the deferred gain is immediately recognized. The balance
2- I.R.C. § 453(g). This prohibition does not apply, however, if the seller can
establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that one of the principal purposes of
the disposition was not tax avoidance. The Committee Reports indicate that this excep-
tion is available if "no significant tax deferral benefits will be derived from the sale."
S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 494, 503.
Since significant tax benefits almost always result from such a sale, the taxpayer's burden
is difficult to carry.
-1 I.R.C. § 453(e).
2 See I.R.C. § 318 (1985); B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SaREHOLDERS 9.21 (4th ed. 1979).
-1 I.R.C. § 453(e)(7). This exception applies, for example, to an involuntary sale
such as foreclosure under a judicial lien or to a second installment sale on terms
substantially similar to the terms of the first installment sale. S. RPes. No. 1000, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 494, 502.
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continues to be deferred.2 2 This can be illustrated as follows.
Assume that T sells a horse, which has basis of $1,000, to his
son, S, for $10,000, and S pays the entire purchase price by
giving T a promissory note due three years later. One year later
S resells the horse, but does not pay the note. If S realized
$10,000 or more on the sale, then T must recognize his $9,000
gain in the year that S sold the horse. If, however, S realized
only $8,000 on the sale, then T must recognize only $7,000, the
excess of S's amount realized over T's basis, in the year S sold
the horse. T's basis in the note will then be $8,000, and he will
recognize the remaining $2,000 gain when S pays the note. The
computations are substantially more complex if there were pay-
ments made on the note and the first seller recognized a portion
of his gain prior to the resale.
6. Election Not to Report on Installment Method
A seller is not required to use the installment method and
may elect to recognize the entire gain in the year of the sale. 253
This may be desirable, for example, if the seller has net operating
loss carryovers, 25 4 particularly if they are about to expire, or
long term capital losses that will offset the inclusion of net
section 1231 gains as long term capital gains. 25- If the seller does
elect out of installment reporting of the gain, the proper treat-
ment depends on whether he uses the cash or accrual method of
accounting. If the seller is on the accrual method, the amount
realized is the face amount of the obligation, and the entire gain
is recognized. 256 If the seller uses the cash method of reporting,
the amount realized on the sale is the fair market value of the
note,257 which, according to the regulations, never will be less
-2 I.R.C. § 453(e)(1), (4).
21 I.R.C. § 453(d); Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(1). If the sale is by a partnership,
the election must be made by the partnership. I.R.C. § 703(b). The election is binding
on all of the partners; partners may not elect inconsistent treatment.
See I.R.C. § 172.
"I See I.R.C. §§ 1211, 1212.
216 Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(2)(ii)(A), (i)(B), Example (I); First Fed. Say. and
Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 474 (1963); Castner v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1061
(1958).
2" Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(2)(ii)(A), (B), Example (2); Warren Jones Co. v.
Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975); Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20
(5th Cir. 1961).
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than the fair market value of the property sold minus the value
of other consideration received by the seller.258 In this regard,
the regulations, without any apparent support in the legislative
history, attempt to overturn prior case law holding that the fair
market value of the note could be more or less than its face
value, even if the note bore adequate interest.2 9 Apart from the
regulations, if the note bears interest that is higher than the
prevailing rate, its fair market value might be more than face.
It is much more likely, however, that the fair market value, if
different, will be less than face because of the risk of the buyer's
default. In the year of the sale the seller recognizes gain equal
to the fair market value of the note minus his basis in the horse.
The remainder of the gain is recognized as the note is paid.
The gain recognized in the year of the sale that is attributable
to the receipt of the note is categorized by reference to the
character of the horse for which the note was received. The
remainder of the gain, which is recognized when the note is
paid, is ordinary income. 260 Thus, although the deferral obtained
by valuing a note at less than face may look attractive, for years
in which capital gains received preferential treatment its beauty
was marred substantially by the possible conversion of capital
gains into ordinary income. If the term of the note was relatively
brief, the tax detriment of this "reverse conversion" outweighed
the tax benefit of deferral. If the term was longer, however, the
deferral may have been more advantageous. Under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, which taxes capital gains and ordinary
income at the same rate, there generally is no detriment resulting
from this "reverse conversion."
7. Accrual Basis Dealers Maintaining Inventories
An accrual method taxpayer in the business of selling horses
to customers must maintain inventories. 261 The section 453 in-
stallment method rules described in the preceding section do not
- Temp. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(2)(ii)(A).
See B. BTrrsnR, supra note 44, at 43.3.
See Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'g, 35 T.C. 250
(1960). But see Riss v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1966) (taxing gain on
payment by corporate obligor as capital gain under I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1985)).
!" Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(b).
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apply to a sale of a horse by such a taxpayer or to a cash basis
farmer that has elected to use inventories, 262 but installment sale
reporting may be available under section 453A. In general terms,
the primary difference in the sections is that under section 453A
the profit ratio exclusion is not determined on an asset by asset
basis, but rather on a global basis including all credit sales,
although the seller, with the consent of the Commissioner, may
choose among a few alternative methods. 26 1 For this reason,
installment reporting under section 453A must be used consist-
ently once adopted, unlike section 453, which the taxpayer may
elect out of on an asset by asset basis. Installment reporting
under section 453A is available, however, only to "a person
who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property
on the installment plan.''264 Thus, it might not be available to
an accrual method dealer in horses because it is unlikely that a
breeder will "regularly" sell horses on the installment method.
The scant case law, however, interprets "regularly" quite liber-
ally. A few installment sales each year, even if a relatively small
fraction of total sales may suffice to meet the requirement. 265
Neither the Code, the Treasury Regulations nor any Revenue
Rulings, however, provide guidance on the possible application
of section 453A to sales by farmers using one of the inventory
methods available to farmers.
8. Sale of Syndicate Shares and Equine Partnership Interests
a. Generally
Gain realized on the sale of a partnership interest or syndi-
cate share sold for deferred payments may be reported on the
2- I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B). See Rev. Rul. 68-13, 1968-1 C.B. 195 (I.R.C. § 453 is not
available for a bulk sale of inventory by a sole proprietor.).
261 See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2, -7, -8.
I.R.C. § 453A(a)(1).
21S See Greenspon v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 138 (1954) (acq.), rev'd on other
grounds, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956); Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 18 T.C. 39 (1952) (acq.); Marshall Bros. Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 13
B.T.A. 111 (1928), rev'd and remanded without opinion, 51 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1931).
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installment method.266 If a syndicate share is treated as an un-
divided interest in the horse and not as a partnership interest,
the rules discussed previously in connection with the outright
sale of a horse apply. In the case of the sale of a partnership
interest, including a syndicate share that constitutes a partnership
interest, the operation of section 453 must be coordinated with
the rules governing the sale of partnership interests. This is not
an easy task.
b. Interrelationship of Installment Reporting and the
Collapsible Partnership Rules
As long as a partnership does not hold any property that
could not be sold on the installment method if the property were
owned and sold directly by the partner, the gain from a deferred
payment sale of the partnership interest is reportable under the
installment method. On the other hand, if the partnership holds
property, such as inventory, that may not be sold on the install-
ment method under section 453, the analysis is more complex.
Rather than entirely denying installment reporting, it appears
that a proper coordination requires current recognition only of
that portion of the gain attributable to property of the partner-
ship not eligible for installment method reporting if sold by the
partnership. 267 That portion of the gain may or may not corre-
spond to the portion of the gain characterized as ordinary in-
come under section 751; the proper method of fragmentation is
unclear. Nevertheless, there is considerable, but by no means
perfect, overlap between the categories of property ineligible for
installment sale reporting and the definition of section 751 assets.
For example, the sale of inventory may not be reported on the
installment method,268 while section 751 recharacterizes as ordi-
nary income only that portion of the gain realized on the sale
of a partnership interest attributable to substantially appreciated
', See Rev. Rul. 76-483, 1976-2 C.B. 131. See also Rev. Rul. 75-323, 1975-2 C.B.
346; Bailey v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 105 (1929)(nonacq.); James, The Installment
Sale of a Partnership Interest, 43 TEN. L. REv. 306 (1976).
' See McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 185, at 16.05[2],[3].
See Rev. Rul. 68-13, 1968-1 C.B. 195 (prohibition on installment reporting of
sale of inventory extended to bulk sale).
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inventory. 2 9 In this case, the exclusion from section 453 is a bit
broader than the ambit of section 751. As far as the sale of
horses is concerned, a cash basis dealer in horses may report
sales under section 453. Horses held for sale to customers by a
cash basis partnership, however, could be substantially appreci-
ated inventory under section 751 .270 Section 751 recharacterizes
as ordinary income some of the gain realized on the sale of a
partnership interest in a cash basis partnership that is a dealer
in horses, but the gain apparently is eligible for installment
reporting.
Similar problems arise with respect to that portion of the
gain from an installment sale of a partnership interest that is
characterized as ordinary income under section 751 because it
represents potential depreciation recapture attributable to part-
nership property. Any sale of an interest in a breeding or racing
partnership is subject to section 751, except in rare circumstan-
ces, due to prior ACRS deductions claimed with respect to horses
held by the partnership. 271 As previously discussed, recapture
income realized on an asset that is sold directly is not eligible
for installment reporting, but must be recognized in the year of
the sale.27 2 Thus, it appears that the portion of the gain rechar-
acterized as section 751 ordinary income because it is attributable
to depreciation recapture is not eligible for installment sale re-
porting. 273 Although this result is neither clearly compelled by
the statutes involved nor expressly mentioned in the Committee
Reports, it is consistent with the intent of both section 453(i)
- See I.R.C. § 751(a)(2),(d). A partnership has substantially appreciated inventory
if the fair market value of its inventory items exceeds both 120% of the basis of the
inventory items and 100 of the fair market value of all partnership property, other
than money. For this purpose the word "inventory" is expansive and includes not only
inventory in the traditional sense, but all property described in I.R.C. § 1222(1); such
as uninventoried property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business, and any other property that is neither a capital asset nor property described
in I.R.C. § 1231. I.R.C. § 751(d). See generally McKEE, NELSON & WHMn1IRr, supra
note 185, at 16.04.
270 See note 269 supra.
27 See text accompanying notes 205-06 supra.
272 See text accompanying notes 221-24 supra.
"I See Rev. Rul. 75-323, 1975-2 C.B. 346 (applying pre I.R.C. § 461(i) rule of
coordinating I.R.C. § 1245 depreciation recapture and I.R.C. § 453 installment method
reporting to sale of partnership interest).
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and the fragmentation theory of coordinating section 453 and
sections 741 and 751. It is also the position of the Joint Com-
mittee staff regarding this particularly knotty problem. 274
In summary, the gain realized on a deferred payment sale of
an interest in an equine partnership must be fragmented into
three categories:
1. Section 751 gain ineligible for installment reporting under
section 453, such as gain attributable to depreciation recapture
on horses held for use in the partnership's business or invento-
ried horses held primarily for sale to customers;
2. Section 751 gain eligible for installment reporting under
section 453, such as gain on the sale of uninventoried horses by
a cash basis dealer in horses;
3. Section 741 gain eligible for installment sale reporting,
which is the residual gain after subtracting out the section 751
gain.
A fourth category possibly should be added: section 741 gain
ineligible for installment sale reporting, such as gain attributable
to inventory that is not substantially appreciated. 275 Even if this
is theoretically required, however, few equine partnerships will
encounter such gain, 276 and therefore, no significant practical
problem is raised by this possibility.
9. Unstated Interest
Deferred payment sales of horses, like sales of other prop-
erty, are subject to the complex imputed interest rules if any
payments are due more than six months from the date of the
2-4 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMNIn"EE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REvENuE PROVISIONS OF TiE TAX REFoRM ACT OF 1984, 334 (1984). But see McKEE,
NELSON & WmrmmR, supra note 185, at 16.05[2] (asserting that the staff's logic in
reaching this conclusion is "dubious at best").
" But see McKEE, NELSON & Wmmrna, supra note 185, at 16.0512].
This would not necessarily be true with respect to the sale of a partnership
interest in a breeding farm operation. In such a case, the value of the yearlings and
weanlings held for sale very well might not be more than ten percent of the value of all
of the assets of the partnership, excluding cash, depending mainly on the value of the
broodmare band, any stallions owned by the partnership, land, barns, and other equip-
ment.
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sale and the deferred payments do not bear adequate interest. 277
In general terms, the imputed interest rules recharacterize as
"unstated interest," and therefore as ordinary income, a portion
of the sales price if the deferred payments do not bear interest
at the "test rate." The test rate is determined in one of two
ways, depending on the principal amount of the deferred pay-
ments. If the total deferred principal payments do not exceed
$2,800,000, the test rate is the lesser of nine percent, com-
pounded semiannually, or the "applicable federal rate" com-
pounded semiannually. 2 8 For any obligation in excess of
$2,800,000, the applicable federal rate is the test rate. 279
The applicable federal rate, which is determined monthly, is
based on the average annual yield for Treasury obligations with
a maturity comparable to the deferred payment obligation. °0
For obligations due within three years, the short term federal
rate applies; the mid-term federal rate applies to obligations due
more than three years but not more than nine years from date
of issue; and the long term federal rate applies to obligations
with a term of more than nine years.u'
A deferred payment obligation bears inadequate interest if
the discounted present value (using the applicable federal rate as
the discount rate) of all payments due on the obligation, includ-
ing interest, is less than the principal amount of the obligation. 8 2
Thus, assuming that the applicable federal rate is greater than
nine percent, any deferred payment obligation bearing stated
interest of less than 9.2025 percent annually (the equivalent of
nine percent compounded semiannually) bears unstated interest.
On the other hand, any deferred payment obligation of $2,800,000
or less that bears stated interest of at least 9.2025 percent an-
- See I.R.C. §§ 483, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1274A, 1275. See also S. REP. No. 83,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 87, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-17 (1985);
H.R. REP. No. 250, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-18 (1985); STAFF OF THE JOINT Comarr
ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENuE PROVISIONS OF THE TAx REFORm
AcT OF 1984, 89-127 (1984); Blum, Bailey & Rosenberg, Time Value of Money and TRA
'84: Accounting Rules Turned Inside Out, 26 TAX NOTES 933 (1985).
"I I.R.C. §§ 1274(a), (b)(1)-(2), (c)(1)-(2); 1274A(a), (b).
279 I.R.C. § 1274(a), (b)(1)-(2), (c)(1)-(2).
290 I.R.C. § 1274(d).
2,1 I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(A).
- I.R.C. § 1274(c)(2).
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nually, regardless of the rate of principal amortization, does not
bear unstated interest, and no part of the principal is recharac-
terized as interest.
If an obligation does not bear interest at the test rate, it is
said to bear "original issue discount" ,283 and the difference
between the present value of the payments, determined under
the method described above, is recharacterized as interest in-
come.25 The gain or loss on the sale of the property is recom-
puted using the present value of the payments as the amount
realized, and the profit ratio for reporting gain on the installment
method must be recomputed. Although gain recognized under
the installment method and stated interest payable on an original
issue discount obligation is reported under the taxpayer's usual
method of accounting, any original issue discount interest in-
come generally must be reported using the accrual method at
the rate that interest economically accrues. 285 There are two
exceptions to this rule.
First, if the total payments due under the instrument and all
other instruments relating to the same sale do not exceed
$250,000, accrual reporting of the unstated interest is not re-
quired.216 Instead, the unstated interest portion of each payment
is taxable under the seller's normal method of reporting, al-
though the unstated interest accrues economically, not ratably.8 7
The meaning of "payments" must be examined carefully to
determine the availability of this exception. Only deferred pay-
ments are relevant. Both interest and principal fall within its
ambit; 1s payments received at the time of the sale do not.
I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 1272(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 1272(a)(1), (3).
I.R.C. § 1274(c)(3)(C).
I.R.C. § 483. There appears to be a gap in the coordination of the coverage of
LR.C. § 483 and I.R.C. §§ 1272 and 1274. The original issue discount rules apply to
deferred payment sales in which any payment is due more than six months from the
date of the sale, but only if the total deferred payments do not exceed $250,000. I.R.C.
§ 453 applies to any deferrred payment sale with deferred payments of $250,000 or less,
but only if some payments are due more than one year from the date of the sale. Thus,
it appears that no unstated interest rules apply to deferred payment sales with total
deferred payments of $250,000 or less where all of the payments are due within one
year from the date of the sale.
1-1 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE RLv:Ntr PROVISIONS OF =E TAX REFORM AcT OF 1984, 120 (1984).
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Second, if the deferred payments to be received exceed
$250,000, but the stated principal amount of the obligation and
all other obligations relating to the same transaction does not
exceed $2,000,000, the seller may be able to elect to include the
original issue discount on the cash rather than the accrual
method.289 This election is available, however, only for cash
method taxpayers who are not dealers with respect to the prop-
erty sold in the transaction. Any such election must be made
jointly by the seller-lender and buyer-borrower whose timing of
interest deductions is affected by the election.
No useful purpose would be served by numerous examples
of the computation of unstated interest under the various rules.
In planning a sales transaction, the usual objective is to avoid
the application of the unstated interest rules. As stated previ-
ously, that is done easily by requiring stated interest on the
unpaid balance at 9.2025 percent annually or the annual equiv-
alent of the applicable federal rate, compounded semiannually,
whichever is appropriate. Furthermore, except in the simplest
cases, the computations generally require a computer. One sim-
ple example, under section 483, rather than the Original Issue
Discount rules, suffices to illustrate the principle.
Assume that Seller (S) sells a horse held for breeding pur-
poses for more than twenty-four months but on which no ACRS
deductions have been claimed. 290 S's basis in the horse is $20,000
and the sales price is $100,000. S receives no payment at the
time of sale but the buyer delivers a promissory note in the
principal amount of $100,000, with five percent interest per year,
payable in four annual installments of $28,201, the first install-
ment due one year from the date of the sale. Using the nine
percent test rate under I.R.C. section 1274A, the present value
of the four payments would be $90,959. This then is the amount
realized on the sale and S recognizes only $70,959 of section
1231 gain while receiving $21,845 of interest income. If the
transaction was recognized as structured with five percent inter-
est per year, S would recognize $80,000 of I.R.C. section 1231
- I.R.C. § 1274A(c).
See note 160 supra regarding the reasons that a horse might be held for breeding
purposes for two years without claiming ACRS deductions.
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gain and only $12,804 of interest income. As restructured, how-
ever, instead of a profit ratio of .80 percent for purposes of
installment reporting of the gain, the profit ratio is reduced to
.78 percent. Furthermore, because the unstated interest is treated
as accruing economically, the payments are treated as follows
for tax purposes.
Table I
YEAR PAYMENT PRINCI- INTEREST SECTION
PAL 1231 GAIN
1 $28,201 $19,828 $8,373 $15,466
2 28,201 21,653 6,548 16,890
3 28,201 23,647 4,554 18,444
4 28,201 25,825 2,378 20,142
If the transaction could be reported for tax purposes as a sale
at $100,000, with the deferred payments bearing interest at only
five percent, compounded annually, the payments would be re-
ported as follows.
YEAR PAYMENT PRINCI- INTEREST SECTION
PAL 1231 GAIN
1 $28,201 $23,201 $5,000 $18,561
2 28,201 24,361 3,840 19,489
3 28,201 25,579 2,622 20,463
4 28,201 26,858 1,343 21,486
Careful comparison of these tables reveals that the unstated
interest rules not only recharacterize as ordinary income what
would otherwise be I.R.C. section 1231 gain, but also result in
an acceleration of income inclusion. After recharacterization and
economic accrual of the unstated interest, a greater proportion
of the total gross income to be recognized upon receipt of all
of the payments is recognized as the earlier payments are re-
ceived, and a relatively smaller percentage of the later payments
is includable in gross income. This effect, however, is not easily
avoided. In order to restructure the transaction to avoid the
unstated interest rules, the payments would have to be treated
expressly as the unstated interest rules require, unless the buyer
is willing to increase his aggregate payments by actually paying
1986-871
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adequate stated economic interest.
10. Tax Finance Benefits of Installment Sales
It is a mistake to view installment reporting merely as a
method of ameliorating the impact of progressive marginal tax
rates or the perceived hardship of paying taxes on a gain in a
year prior to the year in which the profit is reduced to cash. 291
Deferred payment sales reported on the installment method in-
crease the seller's after tax yield on the reinvestment of the
proceeds from the sale of the property. In this context, the sales
proceeds are viewed economically as received at the time of the
sale and then as reinvested in a debt instrument issued by the
buyer. Deferred reporting of the gain on the sale enables the
seller to make a larger investment and thereby earn more interest
than he could have earned had he not deferred the payment of
taxes attributable to the gain. In short, the investor comes out
ahead by an amount equal to the after tax interest earned during
the period of deferral on the portion of the amount realized
owed for the taxes due on the sale.
This may be illustrated with a simple example. Assume that
Seller (S), a cash basis taxpayer, agrees to sell a horse with a
zero basis to Buyer (B) for a sales price of $100,000. The horse
was previously depreciated by S, and the entire gain will be
ordinary income under section 1245. B offered either to pay the
full $100,000 in cash at the time of the sale or to defer payment
for two years, with interest compounded semiannually at nine
percent, resulting in a single lump sum payment of $119,252 two
years later. If S were in the thirty-three percent marginal tax
bracket and he received the entire payment at the time of the
sale, he would have only $66,667 to invest. If this amount were
invested in an interest bearing obligation, such as a United States
government security, at ten percent per year compounded an-
nually, at the end of two years, after paying taxes on the interest,
291 The purpose of allowing installment reporting of gains from the sale of property
has been viewed as both relief from the burden of paying taxes on the entire gain when
only a small portion is received in cash and avoidance of the complexities of determining
the fair market value of the buyers obligations. See Commissioner v. South Texas
Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 503 (1948); S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. (1926),
reprinted in 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 332, 346.
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S would have $75,857. This reflects a six and two-thirds percent
after tax yield on his investment. On the other hand, if he took
the deferred payment arrangement, after paying taxes on the
payment he would have $79,899.292 The after tax yield on the
investment is increased to 9.475 percent by accepting the deferred
payment terms, even though the interest offered by B was only
9.2025 percent per year and S could obtain ten percent interest
elsewhere.
E. Transfer to a Partnership or Syndicate
1. General Principles
A sale of a horse to a partnership or syndicate of which the
seller is a member or share owner is treated the same as any
other sale. Gain or loss is recognized according to the normal
rules, 293 and installment reporting is allowed. If, however, the
seller has more than a fifty percent interest in either the profits
or capital of the partnership, no loss may be recognized. 294 If
the horse is depreciable in the hands of the partnership and the
seller has an eighty percent or more interest in either the part-
nership profits or capital, installment reporting of any gain is
proscribed. 295 If the seller has more than an eighty percent in-
terest in either capital or profits, all of the gain is recognized as
ordinary income. 296 A transfer of a horse to a partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest, however, generally is a non-
recognition event, but there are some pitfalls.
1,1 Under the terms of this particular deferred payment sale there is no original
issue discount, and because the seller is on the cash basis of reporting, the entire amount,
including interest earned but not payable in earlier years, is reportable in the year
received.
I.R.C. § 707(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(a) (1985).
I.R.C. § 707(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(b)(1). The attribution rules of I.R.C.
§ 267(c), with the exception of subsection (c)(3), are applied to determine ownership of
partnership interests under this prosciption. I.R.C. § 707(b)(3); see Treas. Reg. § 1.707-
1(b)(3).
: I.R.C. § 453(g)(1). See text accompanying note 248 supra.
- I.R.C. § 707(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(b)(2). The attribution rules of I.R.C.
§ 267(c), except subsection (c)(3) apply to determine ownership. I.R.C. § 707(b)(3).
Technically, the rule extends to any property that is not a capital asset in the hands of
the transferee. In the context of this Article it is important only in that it includes
depreciable assets.
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Neither gain nor loss is recognized on the contribution of
property to a partnership solely in exchange for a partnership
interest.2 97 This rule applies even if the contributor has claimed
ACRS deductions and would otherwise recognize depreciation
recapture on the disposition of the horse. 29 As a result of this
nonrecognition, the contributing partner takes a basis in his
partnership interest equal to the adjusted basis of the property
transferred to partnership. 299 The partnership's basis in the prop-
erty is equal to the transferor's adjusted basis immediately prior
to the transfer.3 ° Because the partnership's basis is determined
with reference to the transferor's basis, any depreciation recap-
ture potential in the property at the time of transfer carries over
to the partnership30° The rules for allocating gain or loss among
partners, however, will cause that depreciation recapture to be
allocated to the transferor partner when it ultimately is recog-
nized. 302
If the property transferred to the partnership is encumbered
by a lien in excess of the transferor's basis, the transferor may
be required to recognize gain as a result of the transfer of the
property and the concomitant relief from that portion of the
liability that is allocated to the other partners. The rules for
determining the amount of gain to be recognized are complex
and fact specific and will not be examined in detail. 03 Rather,
a simple example illustrates how these rules are applied to a
particular set of facts.
Assume that A and B desire to form a partnership for the
purpose of breeding horses. A contributes a broodmare with a
basis of $20,000 and a fair market value of $110,000, subject to
a lien of $80,000. The recomputed basis of the mare is $100,000.
If the mare was sold, $80,000 of the gain is section 1245 recap-
29 I.R.C. § 721(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1.
29 I.R.C. § 1245(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-4(c)(1), (2)(vi).
I.R.C. § 722; Treas. Reg. § 1.722-1 (1985).
I.R.C. § 723; Treas. Reg. § 1.723-1 (1985).
I.R.C. § 1245(A)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c)(1), (2)(i), (ii)(b).
I.R.C. § 704(c).
303 See Treas. Reg. § 1.722-1, Example(2). This results from the complex interre-
lationship of I.R.C. §§ 705 (1986), 721, 722, 731 (1986), 733 (1986), 741 (1986), and
752, and Treas. Reg § 1.752-1(e). See generally McKEE, NEisoN & WmVrmE, supra
note 185, at 4.03-.05.
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ture income and the balance is section 1231 gain. B contributes
$30,000; A and B become equal partners. As a result of the
contribution A is relieved of $40,000 of the lien debt on the
horse; B as an equal partner is now reponsible for the other
$40,000. As a result, A must recognize a gain of $20,000, the
amount by which his relief from debt exceeded the basis of the
property contributed to the partnership in exchange for his in-
terest. Furthermore, the regulations provide that this gain is or-
dinary income because there would be $80,000 of section 1245
gain if the horse had been sold. 04 If the contributed property
were not subject to depreciation recapture, the gain would have
been capital gain.',
2. Formation of Partnership With Services Partner
Nonrecognition of gain on the contribution of property to a
partnership in exchange for a partnership interest is not universal.
The Treasury Regulations specifically provide that "[t1o the extent
that any of the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid
his contributions (as distinguished from a share in partnership
profits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services
(or in satisfaction of an obligation), section 721 does not ap-
ply." 3°6 The application of this regulation is illustrated in Mc-
Dougal v. Commissioner 0 7
a. Subchapter K and the "Common Law" Approach
McDougal purchased a racehorse named Iron Card for $10,000,
and promised McClanahan that if the latter would train the horse,
after McDougal had recovered the cost and expenses of acquisi-
tion, he would transfer a one-half interest in the horse to Mc-
Clanahan. In addition, McClanahan would receive a trainer's fee.
7 4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-4(c)(1), (c)(2)(i), (c)(4), Example (3). There is a theoretical
inconsistency between this result and the manner in which the mechanics of the operation
of Subchapter K give rise to the gain, but the issue raised by this problem has been
neither addressed nor resolved. See McKEE, NELSON & XvmmE, supra note 185, at
4.05.
-' I.R.C. §§ 731(a); 741.
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960). Identical language appears in Prop. Reg. §
1.721-1(b)(1) (1971).
- 62 T.C. 720 (1974)(acq.).
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McClanahan trained Iron Card, who proved to be successful on
the track, and nine months later, McDougal transferred a one
half interest in Iron Card to McClanahan. Shortly thereafter,
McDougal and McClanahan entered into an oral partnership to
race Iron Card and later hold him as a stud. They continued to
race Iron Card until he was retired to stud due to injury.
McDougal claimed that the transfer of the one-half interest
in Iron Card was a recognition event and reported a $25,000
section 1231 gain, basing the amount realized on a contempora-
neous third party offer to purchase Iron Card for $60,000.
McDougal also claimed a $30,000 deduction as a result of the
transfer. McClanahan reported the receipt of $30,000 of income,
and the partnership increased its basis in Iron Card to $35,000
(minus depreciation claimed by McDougal for the period prior to
the transfer). The Commissioner argued that the transaction was
a nonrecognition event and that the partnership took McDougal's
basis in Iron Card.
Although the oral partnership was not fimalized at the time,
the Tax Court agreed that for income tax purposes a partnership
had been formed at the time of the transfer s.3 0 The court never-
theless disagreed with the Commissioner's argument and found
the transfer Jo be a recognition event. Citing the regulation quoted
above, the court found that the transfer should be taxed as if
McDougal first transferred an undivided one half of the horse to
McClanahan and they both then contributed their undivided one
halves to form the partnership.309 While the later transfers were
nonrecognition events under section 721, the former transfer was
clearly a recognition event. Under established precedent, Mc-
Dougal properly recognized the gain, 310 and under the regulations,
he properly claimed the deduction.311 Consequently, McClanahan
recognized $30,000 of income, and had a $30,000 basis in his
"I Id. at 724. See text accompanying notes 181-87 supra, regarding the standards
for determining if co-ownership of a horse constitutes a partnership between the co-
owners.
10 Id. at 725 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)).
310 Id. at 726 (citing United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)); Kenan v. Com-
missioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'g, 40 B.T.A. 824 (1939). See also International
Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943).
31 62 T.C. at 728 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(2)). See also International
Freighting Corp., 135 F.2d 310.
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undivided one-half interest. 12 When he transferred that interest
in Iron Card to the partnership, the partnership succeeded to his
basis. 313
b. Section 83 Approach
The Tax Court clearly was correct in all aspects of its Mc-
Dougal decision. Section 83 and the Treasury Regulations imple-
menting it express the principles applied in McDougal even more
clearly than the court did there. 31 4 Under section 83 the fair market
value of property transferred in consideration of services is gross
income to the recipient to the extent that the value of the property
exceeds any purchase price paid by the transferee1.3  Inclusion,
however, may be deferred if the transferee's rights in the property
are restricted by nontransferability or a substantial risk of forfei-
ture.316 Concomitantly, subject to the capitalization rules of sec-
tion 263, in the same year, the transferor is allowed a deduction
equal to the amount included by the transferee. If the transferee
paid no consideration, that amount is the fair market value of
the property.317 The transferor must, however, treat that same
amount as the amount realized on the sale or exchange of the
transferred property and recognize gain or loss accordingly. 3 8 As
a result, the transferor may recognize section 1231 income and
an ordinary deduction. If the transferor has any basis in the
property, the deduction will be larger than the income, even
before taking into account the capital gain preference attaching
to net section 1231 gains. These rules apply to all transfers of
property in consideration for services, whether in the context of
31 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2).
'- I.R.C. § 723.
-'" See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-1 - 1.83-2 (1978); § 1.83-3; § 1.83-8 (1978); Prop. Reg.
§ 1.721-1(b)(1) (1971).
I.R.C. § 83(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1).
I.R.C. § 83(a), (c); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-1(a)(1), -3(b), (c), (d). The recipient may
elect to include currently the fair market value of the property even though it is
nontransferable or subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. § 83(b); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-2.
7 I.R.C. § 83(h); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(a).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(b). See McKEE, NELSON & Vrmml, supra note 185, at
13.03[5].
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the formation of a partnership, an ongoing employment relation-
ship, or the engagement of an independent contractor.3 1 9 It is
worth noting, as held in McDougal, in forming a partnership,
both the gain and deduction should be allocated entirely to the
partner or partners surrendering an interest in the property32° and
should not be allocated under the general partnership provisions
otherwise applicable to income and loss. 321
The principles applied in McDougal, and now expressed in
section 83, are not always applied as in that case. For example,
if the trainer acquired only a right to future profits, such as racing
purses or stud fees rather than a capital interest, the transfer
probably would not be a recognition event for the transferor of
the horse. Although the trainer theoretically may have a recog-
nition event, 2 in all likelihood it would be impossible to value
his profits interest and, therefore, he would not be required to
recognize any gain. 23 On the other hand, if the horse in McDougal
had not commenced its racing career, the training expenses might
have been treated as a capital expense rather than a deductible
item.3 24 In that case, although gain would be recognized on the
first transfer, no deduction would be allowed. 321 The partnership
would presumably capitalize the amount realized as an addition
3,9 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a); Prop. Reg. 1.721-1(b)(1).
32 See I.R.C. § 706(d)(1) (requiring that each partner's share of any item of income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit of the partnership be determined in accordance with his
varying interests if there was any change in any partner's interest during the year);
MCKEE, NELSON & Wtnmrmn, supra note 185, at I 5.03[1][d], [2].
32, See I.R.C. § 704(a), (b); I.R.C. § 704(c).
11 See Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th
Cir. 1974); McKEE, NELsON & WmrTzv, supra note 185, at q 5.05 - .06.
"I See Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974) (receipt of limited
partnership interest in partnership, the sole asset of which was oil and gas rights in then
unproductive, but proven, field, was not currently taxable because value of rights was
speculative; on rehearing the court found no inconsistency with Diamond, supra note
322); St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. 9158 (C.D. Inl. 1983) (applying I.R.C.
§ 83, based on liquidation value of profits interest at time of receipt, the fair market
value of an interest only in future partnership profits was zero). See also Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36,346 (July 25, 1977).
'2 Journal Box Serv. Corp. v. United States, 9 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 798 (S.D. Ind.
1962). Expenses of continuing training of a horse during its racing career are currently
deductible. See Hill v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1287 (1967). See also text
accompanying note 83 supra.
325 See I.R.C. § 707(c); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-6(a)(4), 1.707-1(c). See also Rev. Rul.
75-214, 1975-1 C.B. 185.
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to the horse's cost basis to be recovered through ACRS deduc-
tions. If the horse were transferred in consideration of services
that did not relate to the horse, the amount would be capitalized
or deducted using the same standards that would apply if the
payment for the services were made in cash.
3 26
3. Receipt of Cash by Transferor to Partnership or Syndicate
It should be apparent from MeDougal that proceeds realized
upon syndication of a horse should be treated as an amount
realized upon the sale of the horse, regardless of the form of the
transaction. This conclusion is clear, even without McDougal, if
the syndicate is not a partnership.3 27 If the syndicate is a partner-
ship, MeDougal makes it clear that the form of the transaction
should not govern over substance. Regardless of whether the
syndicator is paid directly by purchasers of shares or whether the
purchasers "contribute" money to the syndicate for a share fol-
lowed shortly by a partnership distribution to the syndicator, the
transaction should be treated as the sale of an undivided interest
in the horse by the syndicator to the shareholder, with the share-
holder then contributing his undivided share to the syndicate-
partnership. Although this analysis may have been called into
question by the decision in Otey v. Commissioner,31S the 1984
amendments to section 707 adding subsection (a)(2)(B) 329 clearly
call for treatment of the transaction as a sale, if not to the
shareholders, then to the partnership. 310 In any event, the syndi-
cator recognizes gain and the syndicate-partnership steps up its
basis in the horse, except with respect to the share attributable to
the syndicator-seller.
,z: See McKEE, NELSON & WnmumE, supra note 185, at 13.03[4].
117 See text accompanying notes 191-95 supra. See text accompanying notes 181-87
supra regarding the standards for determining whether a syndicate is co-ownership or a
partnership for income tax purposes.
11 70 T.C. 312 (1978), aff'd per curiam, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1980).
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 73(a), 98 Stat. 494, 591 (1984).
See S. REP. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-32 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 432,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1216-21 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 859-62
(1984); STAFF OF TIE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENRAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION AcT OF 1984, 223-26, 231-33.
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II. Lncm KIND EXCHANGES OF HORSES
A. General Principles
1. Nonrecognition of Gain and Substituted Basis
Section 1031(a) provides that, "no gain or loss shall be rec-
ognized on the exchange of property held for productive use in a
trade or business or for investment if such property is exchanged
solely for property of like kind which is to be held either for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment." Fur-
thermore, section 1245(b)(4) expressly subordinates depreciation
recapture under section 1245 to nonrecognition under section
1031.
The nonrecognition provided by section 1031, is not perma-
nent; recognition of gain or loss, including depreciation recapture,
merely is deferred. This deferral is implemented by section 1031(d),
which provides that the basis of property received in an exchange
is the same as the basis of the property surrendered. 13 ' The
deferred gain is realized either through gain recognized on the
sale of the property acquired in the exchange or the increase in
future taxable income, effected by the reduced ACRS allowances
claimed on the section 1031(d) substituted basis, rather than a
basis equal to the fair market value of the property received.
Thus, for example, if a horse owner exchanges a horse with a
basis of $10,000 and a fair market value of $100,000 for another
horse of like kind, no gain is recognized. The basis of the horse
received in the transaction, however, is only $10,000. If the second
horse were sold for $100,000, the seller would recognize a gain
of $90,000. In determining the character of the gain, the holding
period of the first horse is tacked onto the holding period of the
second horse. 332 Thus, if the first horse was held for twenty
months prior to the exchange, the horse received in the exchange
need only be held for more than four months prior to sale to
qualify for section 1231 treatment.3 33 The recomputed basis of the
31, See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-1(a) (1986).
3 I.R.C. § 1223(1).
311 See text accompanying notes 138-48 supra.
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second horse, however, includes all ACRS deductions claimed on
the first horse, 334 and to the extent of prior ACRS deductions
claimed on both horses, the gain is recharacterized as ordinary
income.
As a result of the tacked holding period and substituted basis
assigned to the horse received in an exchange, the ACRS cost
recovery period for the horse is merely a continuation of the
recovery period of the horse surrendered, with cost recovery
deductions continuing under the same method over the remaining
recovery period . 3s
Nonrecognition also extends to an exchange in which the
taxpayer surrenders property plus cash in exchange for property
of like kind. In such a case the additional cash payment results
in an increase in the basis of the property received.3 36 Thus, if the
taxpayer exchanges a horse with a basis of $10,000 plus $20,000
in cash for a horse of like kind, the basis of the horse received
in the exchange is $30,000. The value of either horse is not
relevant.
When section 1031 applies, nonrecognition is mandatory, not
elective. Thus, if a horse with a basis of $30,000 and a fair market
value of $10,000 is exchanged for a horse of like kind with a
value of only $10,000, the $20,000 loss realized by the transferor
may not be recognized. The horse acquired in the exchange takes
a $30,000 basis and the loss is recognized on the sale of the
second horse or through claiming ACRS deductions on the second
horse computed on the $30,000 basis. The loss is easily recognized,
however, by selling the first horse and then purchasing the second
horse. Section 1031 does not apply to the sale of property fol-
lowed by reinvestment of the proceeds in like kind property, even
if the reinvestment is immediate.3 37 If the sale and purchase are
interrelated, however, the IRS may be able to apply I.R.C. section
1031 to deny a loss claimed by the taxpayer where the transaction
was artificially structured to attempt to evade nonrecognition of
'1 I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c)(4) (1986).
"I See Prop. Reg. § 1.168-5(0(2) (1984).
5?1 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(a) (1956).
13 See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967) (gain recognized on
sale of property followed by immediate prearranged reinvestment of proceeds in like
kind property).
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the loss. 38 Such a restructuring of the transaction should apply,
however, only where the the first horse is sold to the same person
from whom the second horse was purchased, and where neither
transaction would have occurred in the absence of the other.3 39
2. Eligibility for Nonrecognition
Nonrecognition of gain on exchanges of like kind property is
circumscribed by a number of restrictions. Section 1031(a)(1), in
setting forth the nonrecognition rule, limits its availability to the
exchange of property "held for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment" for other like kind property "to be
held either for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment." ' 340 Subsection (a)(2) lists specific exclusions from the
scope of section 1031. Most notable among the exclusions is
"stock in trade or property held primarily for sale."' 341 Thus,
section 1031 generally is not available for the exchange of a
yearling or weanling by a breeder. If, however, the breeder can
demonstrate that the particular yearling or weanling was held for
investment or for future breeding or sporting purposes, section
1031 is available. Proving such intent, however, may be diffi-
cult. 42 If the breeder holds the horse until it is two years old or
older, facts may show an intent to hold the horse for breeding
or racing.343 In general, if the taxpayer would recognize ordinary
income, rather than section 1231 gain (or section 1245 recapture)
or capital gains if the horse were sold rather than exchanged, then
nonrecognition under section 1031 is not available.344
331 Rev. Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 C.B. 395. See Red Wing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson,
399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968) (sale of used trucks to dealer and purchase of new trucks
from same dealer under separate but mutually dependent contracts). But see Swaim v.
United States, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 1276 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (sale and purchase from buyer
were separate transactions).
319 See Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 480 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1973).
I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1).
-1 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2).
32 But see Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180 (1967) (acq.).
3' See Margolis v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1964) (dealer in real
estate allowed I.R.C. § 1031 nonrecognition on exchange of selected properties held for
rental); Wylie v. United States, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. j 9286 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (exchange of
breeding cattle); Jewel v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 109 (1955) (taxpayer in business of
selling horses allowed I.R.C. § 1231 gains on horses held for breeding and racing).
-" See text accompanying notes 108-37, 157-73 supra for a detailed discussion of
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It is worth noting that section 1031(b)(1) excludes from the
ambit of nonrecognition an exchange involving property held
"primarily for sale", in contrast to the language of I.R.C. section
1221(1) which excludes from the definition of capital asset prop-
erty held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business." The Tax Court has given express effect to this
difference by denying to a taxpayer who was not a dealer in real
estate nonrecognition on the exchange of real estate acquired for
the purpose of renovation and sale. 45 The gain recognized on the
exchange was, nevertheless, capital gain. In a similar vein, the
limiting language in subsection (a) has been interpreted by the
IRS to deny nonrecognition on a like kind exchange followed by
a contribution to a corporation in a section 351 transaction of
property received in the exchange. 346 In Magneson v. Commis-
sioner,347 however, nonrecognition was allowed when the property
received in the like kind exchange was contributed to a partnership
for a general partnership interest. A crucial factor to the result
was that the other property of the partnership was predominantly
like kind to the contributed property.
Simply because a horse is not held primarily for sale does not
mean that it is held for one of the purposes specified in section
1031(a). A horse held for use in an activity that is not conducted
for profit may not be exchanged in a like kind exchange subject
to nonrecognition under section 1031.48 These use requirements
apply separately to each taxpayer involved in the exchange, and
the other taxpayer's prior use of the horse previously owned by
him and future use of the horse to be obtained by him are
irrelevant. Only the prior use of the horse surrendered and the
future use of the horse received are considered. Both taxpayers'
uses, however, may bear on whether the horses are "like kind. '349
Nevertheless, in some instances, the prior use of a horse by one
taxpayer could exclude that taxpayer, but not the other, from
the factors used to determine whether horses are held primarily for sale, or for breeding
or sporting purposes.
' Black v. Commmissioner, 35 T.C. 90 (1960).
Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333.
147S T.C. 767 (1983), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985).
"4 See Rev. Rul. 59-229, 1959-2 C.B. 180 (exchange of real property held for
personal use not within I.R.C. § 1031).
"4, See text accompanying notes 351-77 infra.
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
nonrecognition under section 1031. For example, if a taxpayer in
the business of racing horses exchanged a three year old colt
previously raced by him with a taxpayer who was a dealer in
horses, for a three year old colt that would be held for racing by
the first taxpayer, the taxpayer engaged in racing would have a
nonrecognition transaction while the dealer would be required to
recognize gain or loss on the exchange.
Section 1031(a)(2) lists a variety of other types of property
which are excluded from nonrecognition under section 1031.3-0
Except for the exclusion of exchanges of partnership interests,
none are particularly relevant here.
B. Identifying Horses of Like Kind
1. Same Sex Requirement
Determining whether two horses are of like kind for purposes
of section 1031 is difficult because there is little authority inter-
preting the meaning of "like kind" in this or any closely analo-
gous context. One thing, however, is clear; section 1031(e) expressly
provides that livestock of different sexes are not property of like
kind. Thus, an exchange of a broodmare for a stallion or a colt
for a filly can never be a like kind exchange. Although Congress
may not have had the exchange of racehorses in mind when
enacting this section,351 this proscription of the Code is so clear
and unambiguous that there can be no doubt that a filly and a
colt, although both held for racing, are not like kind.3 52
2. Relevance of Purpose for Which Horses of the Same Sex
are Held
The Treasury Regulations provide that the term "like kind"
has "reference to the nature or character of the property and not
to its grade or quality. One kind or class of property may not
1-1 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2) excluded property includes stocks, bonds, notes, securities,
certificates of trust or beneficial interest and choses in action.
"' See text accompanying note 361 infra.
352 See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956) ("Mhis a case for
applying the cannon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history
is doubtful, go to the statute." The case involved interpretation of a criminal statute.).
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... be exchanged for property of a different kind or class. ' 353
Although this standard has been interpreted extensively relative
to real estate exchanges 54 there is sparse interpretation with
respect to any livestock.3 5 Any attempt to apply the standards
developed with respect to real estate exchanges may be hazardous.
As far as real estate is concerned, both the IRS and the courts,
based on substantial support from specific examples in the Reg-
ulations3 6 generally have taken the position that "real estate is
real estate." They have gone so far as to conclude that an
exchange of improved urban real estate and a mineral interest,
treated as real property under state law, was entitled to nonre-
cognition under section 103 1.3 7 The specific business or invest-
ment purpose for which the real property was held generally has
been considered to be irrelevant.
When personal property is involved, however, the words "like
kind" often have been construed more narrowly, and one cannot
say confidently that "a horse is a horse." The only examples of
like kind exchanges of personal property set forth in the regula-
tions are the exchange of a used automobile for a new automobile
and the exchange of a used truck for a new truck. 38 Thus it is
reasonable to conclude that a difference in the ages of the horses
alone will not prevent them from being like kind. A difference in
the ages of horses, however, sometimes results in the horses being
put to different uses. As a result, determining whether the horses
are "like kind" may be more difficult. The difficulty of deter-
Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b).
" See 2 B. BrrTKER, supra note 44, at 44.2.2 for a discussion of the principles
that have evolved for identifying like kind real estate and for citations to leading cases.
" See Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180 (1967); Wylie v. United States,
1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9286 (N.D. Tex. 1968) (exchange of steer calves for registered
Aberdeen Angus livestock in a year prior to enactment of I.R.C. § 1031(e)); Rutherford
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851 (1975) (exchange of three-quarter blooded
heifers for one-half blooded heifers).
-See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) ("The fact that any real estate involved is
improved or unimproved is not material .... ); -(I)(c)(2) (exchange of city real estate
for a ranch or farm, improved for unimproved real estate, or a fee interest for a
leasehold with more than thirty years to run are all accorded nonrecognition).
'" See Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).
151 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2). For a discussion of the cases and Revenue
Rulings determining whether exchanges of personalty constitute "like kind" exchanges,
see Goldstein & Lewis, Tax Treatment of Like Kind Exchanges of Property Used in a
Trade or Business or for Investment, 5 Ray. TAx. IND. 191, 221-23 (1981).
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mining the scope of the term "like kind" as applied to horses,
and most other personalty for that matter, is compounded by the
recently developed view of the IRS that the purpose for which
the taxpayer held the property surrendered and will hold the
property received is relevant. This approach has been applied
most notably in a series of Revenue Rulings dealing with ex-
changes of gold coins. 359 In these rulings the IRS has taken the
position that coins, the value of which is determined by bullion
content, and coins, the value of which is determined by numis-
matic considerations, are not like kind because they are held for
different purposes. According to the rulings this logic emanates
from the legislative history of section 1031(e).36
In enacting section 1031(e) Congress sought to halt the practice
of exchanging slaughter cattle (i.e., steers) for female cattle to be
held for breeding purposes.3 1 Congress was concerned that the
practice of exchanging steers for female breeding cattle would
allow the building of a breeding herd without tax consequences.
Congress sought to foreclose the avoidance of ordinary income
on the sale of steers that would occur by allowing such a trans-
action to come within section 1031. The Committee Reports state
that allowing nonrecognition for such exchanges was erroneous
under then current law: "[w]hen male calves are exchanged for
female calves, the exchange does not involve like-kind property
since the male animals are not held for breeding purposes and,
in fact are not of a 'like-kind' with females. ' '3 2
Basing the availability of nonrecognition under section 1031
on the purpose for which the taxpayer holds the property is
311 Compare Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1 C.B. 264 and Rev. Rul 82-96, 1982-1 C.B.
113 and California Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 107 (1981) (United
States double eagle gold coins and Swiss francs are not like kind) with Rev. Rul. 76-
214, 1976-1 C.B. 218 (exchange of peso bullion type coins for corona bullion type coins
was like kind exchange).
- This logic has led Boris Bittker to comment, "[the] ruling does not state which
type [of coins] is masculine and which feminine." 2 B. Brrr= R, supra note 44, at j
44.2.2, n.11 (1981).
MI See S. RP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 102 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
488-89; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B.
200, 241-42.
362 S. RP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 488-
89; H.R. RaP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200,
241-42.
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consistent with the general theory of the inclusion of nonrecog-
nition provisions in the Code. The Treasury Regulations promul-
gated under section 1002 state, with respect to the nonrecognition
provisions, that "[t]he underlying assumption of these exceptions
is that the new property is substantially a continuation of the old
investment still unliquidated .... 363
Applying this to horses, the question is whether the exchange
of a horse held for breeding purposes for a horse held for racing
purposes is more properly described as the old investment contin-
ued or as a liquidation of the old investment and a reinvestment
in the newly acquired horse. Because the risks and profit potentials
of breeding and racing differ, the transaction may be said to
more nearly resemble a liquidation and reinvestment. Therefore,
the exchange of a horse held for racing with another horse held
for breeding probably should not be treated as a like kind ex-
change.
Facially, however, it appears that exchanges of personalty
should be judged under the same criteria as are exchanges of real
estate, because the statute makes no distinction between realty
and personalty. Exchanges of real estate held for different pur-
poses and entailing substantially different risks routinely are ac-
corded like kind exchange treatment.3 64 From this perspective,
against only the statute and the broad rationale for nonrecogni-
tion, one might reasonably conclude that the error lies in the
latitude accorded to exchanges of real estate, not in restrictions
imposed on exchanges of personalty. But we are not writing on
a clean slate, and applying consistent criteria has merit. From this
perspective, the gold coin rulings may be reconciled as transactions
that were closer to sales since bullion coins are essentially a
medium of payment. This was not, however, the logic employed
in those rulings.
If this logic is accepted, the exchange of a filly held for racing
for a broodmare, and the exchange of a colt held for racing for
a stallion, would both qualify as like kind exchanges. There is,
however, some basis for believing that the IRS may take a dif-
"I Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (1960). See also Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner,
192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
'1' See Goldstein & Lewis, supra note 358, at 223-26.
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ferent view. In a 1971 private letter ruling the IRS concluded that
the exchange of two five-year-old geldings for a "one-year-old
stallion" was not a like kind exchange. The stated rationale for
this conclusion was, "[s]ince a gelded horse can never be used
for breeding purposes an exchange of such an animal for a
stallion, which is used for breeding and other purposes, does not
involve property of a like kind."3 5 On the other hand, this ruling
might be confined to geldings on the theory that there exist three
sexes of horse-male, female, and gelding. The absolute inability
to use the gelding for breeding purposes renders him not like kind
with any colt or stallion. A horse currently held for racing,
however, can be said to be held for two purposes-current racing
and future breeding.36 Because fillies and colts have breeding
potential while being held for racing, the exchange of a filly for
a broodmare and the exchange of a colt for a stallion might be
considered to be like kind without regard to the current use of
the horse. Furthermore, because of the uncertainty surrounding
when a horse will be retired from racing for breeding, adminis-
trative considerations may warrant ignoring the difference between
use in racing and breeding as long as the horses are of the same
sex.
3. Horses of Different Breeds
An exchange of horses of different breeds should not be
excluded per se from the ambit of section 1031 nonrecognition.67
Nevertheless, such an exchange might not qualify for nonrecog-
nition under other applicable standards. This especially is true if
the different uses of horses precludes their exchange without
recognition under I.R.C. section 1031. But even if that standard
did not apply, most breeds are used in activities not engaged in
for profit, and section 1031 is unavailable in any event. Probably
the most difficult question that arises if the exchange of horses
"I Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7110050290.
"1 See Gamble v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 800 (1977); McDougal v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 720 (1974).
- Wylie, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 9286 (exchange of steer calves for registered Aberdeen
Angus livestock qualified for nonrecognition in a year prior to enactment of I.R.C. §
1031(e)); Rutherford, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851, 1851-77 (exchange of three-quarter blooded
heifers for one-half blooded heifers was like kind exchange).
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held for different purposes is not sheltered from recognition by
section 1031 is whether a standardbred held for racing or breeding
is like kind with a thoroughbred held for racing or breeding. The
answer is entirely problematical, and the structure of the industry
is such that the question is not likely to be answered soon.
4. Mares in Foal
An exchange involving a mare in foal presents difficult prob-
lems. If only one of the mares is in foal, the initial question is
whether a mare in foal is like kind to a mare that is not in foal.
Although there is no authority providing any guidance, logic
appears to dictate that the mares themselves are like kind,368 and
the real issue concerns the treatment of the unborn foal. If this
is true, then the issues generally will be the same regardless of
whether one or both of the mares involved in the exchange is in
foal. If the unborn foal is treated as separate from the mare
carrying it, should the foal be treated as boot by the person
receiving the mare in foal and as additional property transferred
by the person surrendering the foal? The answer, by no means
clear under any scenario, might vary with the facts. For example,
if a mare in foal were exchanged for a broodmare not in foal,
the foal might not be boot if, when born, it was a filly that the
taxpayer planned to hold for breeding or racing. If it were a colt
or a filly that the taxpayer planned to sell, however, it would be
boot.
If the foal is treated as boot, the transferee of the mare in
foal recognizes gain, and the foal takes a basis equal to its fair
market value.36 9 The basis of the mare in foal received in the
transaction then equals the basis of the mare surrendered, plus
the gain recognized, minus the basis assigned to the foal. 370 If the
foal is not treated as boot, then no gain would be recognized and
the basis of the mare and the foal received would be determined
by prorating the basis of the mare surrendered between the two
horses received relative to their fair market values. These alloca-
" But see Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 522 (1923) (McReynolds,
J., concurring) ("Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends.").
See I.R.C. § 1031(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(c), (d).
See I.R.C. § 1031(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-1(c), (d).
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tions, of course, will have a significant impact on basis recovery
rates under ACRS, as well as on the gain to be recognized on the
subsequent sale of one of the horses before it is fully depreciated.
To the extent that the foal is boot to the recipient, it may
constitute additional property transferred by the transferor. As a
result, the transferor would recognize gain equal to the difference
between his basis in the foal and its fair market value. 37' He
would also add the fair market value of the foal to the basis of
the mare surrendered to determine the basis of the mare re-
ceived.37 2 If, however, the foal is not treated as boot, the basis
of the mare surrendered will be transferred to the mare received
in the exchange if the stud fee was capitalized, it would be added
to the basis of the new mare.
The reciprocal exchange of two broodmares in foal is even
more complicated. If both mares bear fillies, then the exchange
presumably would be entirely a like kind exchange, and the only
issue is apportionment of basis between the mare and the foal. If
one foal is a filly and one is a colt, however, the transaction
might be treated either of two ways. Simply, the transaction could
be treated as a like kind exchange of mares and a taxable exchange
of foals.3 73 Alternatively, the transaction could be treated as a
like kind exchange with boot by the person receiving the colt foal
and as a like kind exchange with an additional payment made
with appreciated property by the person receiving the filly foal.374
Although both treatments result in recognition by both transfer-
ors, the details of computations of gain recognized and the re-
sultant basis of the four horses might differ.
Whether the foals should be considered separately is not
entirely clear, and drawing analogies to the few decided cases
involving the treatment of unborn foals leads to differing conclu-
sions. On one hand, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Greer
371 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962); International Freighting Corp. v.
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(e).
37 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(e).
173 See Rev. Rul. 59-229, 1959-2 C.B. 180 (in a reciprocal exchange of farms, I.R.C.
§ 1031 applies to property other than personal residences; gain is recognized on separate
exchange of personal residences, subject to nonrecognition under I.R.C. § 1034).
374 See Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225 (exchange of land and building for farm
and farm machinery was like kind exchange as to realty; farm machinery was boot).
[VOL. 75
EQUINE TAXATION
v. United States,375 concluded that for purposes of determining
the applicability of section 1231, the holding period of a foal does
not begin until birth. This indicates that the foals should not be
considered to be separate property. On the other hand, in Gamble
v. Commissioner,376 the Tax Court concluded that it was proper
to apportion the purchase price of a mare in foal between the
mare and the foal when the foal is born. This indicates that the
separate existence of the foal should be recognized.
These two cases might be reconciled by concluding that Gam-
ble requires that independent significance be accorded to the foals,
while Greer dictates that we adopt a "wait and see" rule under
which the final determination of the tax consequences of the
exchange is suspended pending the birth of the foal.3 77 This may
result in some administrative difficulties, such as the problem of
reporting the exchange when the taxpayer's tax return for the
year in which the exchange occurs is due prior to the foal's birth.
It will, however, result in taxing the transaction in the manner
most consistent with the ultimate result. In absence of any clear
authority in this area, however, attempting a like kind exchange
of mares in foal is hazardous unless a private ruling can be
obtained. Even if a ruling is available, the ultimate tax conse-
quences would turn on a gamble on the sex of the unborn foal.
5. Partnership Interests and Syndicate Shares
a. Partnerships
Section 103 1(a)(2)(D) specifically excludes partnership interests
from the categories of property which may be exchanged without
the recognition of gain or loss. This provision was enacted in
-5 408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969).
68 T.C. 800 (1977)(acq.).
See Rutherford, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1851, in which the taxpayer was held to have
acquired half blood heifers in a I.R.C. § 1031 exchange when the heifers were received
in consideration of the subsequent transfer of their three quarter blood heifer offspring
raised by the taxpayer. At the time the taxpayer received the half blood heifers, they
were not yet in calf; they were artificially inseminated following their acquisition. Thus
the property transferred by the taxpayer was not even in existence under any standard
when the first transfer occurred. The transaction was held open pending the birth of the
three quarter blood heifers.
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1984 specifically to overrule prior court decisions holding that
section 1031(a)(1) applied to the exchange of partnership interests
if the underlying assets of the partnerships were substantially
similar in nature.378 Thus, gain or loss must be recognized on the
exchange of an interest in one equine partnership for an interest
in another equine partnership.
b. Syndicate Shares
The unavailabilty of section 1031 nonrecognition also extends
to exchanges of interests in arrangements described as syndicates
if, under the standards used to define the term partnership for
tax purposes, the syndicates are partnerships.3 79 An election under
section 761(a) not to be taxed as a partnership, even if otherwise
valid, is of no avail in this context.38 0 Thus, exchanges of interests
in racing syndicates and breeding syndicates holding broodmares
are always recognition events.
When the syndicate shares exchanged are stallion syndicate
shares, a closer examination of the organization of each syndicate
is necessary to determine whether the exchange may qualify under
section 1031. A stallion syndicate may or may not be a partner-
ship. If neither syndicate is a partnership the exchange should be
treated as a like kind exchange of undivided fractional interests
in the stallions owned by the syndicates. 381 If both syndicates are
171 See S. REP. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 242-44 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 432,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1232-34 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 866-67
(1984). The Committee Reports indicate that this rule does not apply to interests in the
same partnership, but Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972), aff'dper
curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974), to which specific reference is made in the
Committee Reports, held that an exchange of a general partnership interest for a limited
partnership interest was not a like kind exchange. Therefore only an exchange of a
general partnership interest for a general partnership interest or a limited partnership
interest for a limited partnership interest in the same partnership can qualify under
I.R.C. § 1031. Such an exchange, however, would be pointless.
119 See text accompanying notes 181-87 supra regarding the factors for determining
whether a syndicate is a partnership.
31 See Bryant v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968) (election under I.R.C.
§ 761 applies only to rules of Subchapter K; Investment Tax Credit under I.R.C. § 38
computed for partners in same manner as if subchapter K applied); Rev. Rul. 65-118,
1965-1 C.B. 30 (same).
3"1 Although it might be argued that a stallion share is a "chose in action" for
which nonrecognition is unavailabe under I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(F), under the logic of
Guggenheim v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 559 (1966), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 191-95 supra, the stallion shares should be viewed as undivided interests in the
horse owned by the syndicate if the syndicate is not a partnership.
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partnerships, however, section 1031 is applicable by virtue of
subsection (a)(2)(D). If one syndicate is a partnership and the
other is not, gain must be recognized because the exchange simply
is not one of like kind property.srt
c. Exchange of Syndicate Shares For A Horse
Another area of uncertainty is whether the gain or loss realized
on the exchange of a syndicate share for outright ownership of a
horse will be accorded nonrecognition under section 1031. Because
all syndicates other than stallion syndicates should be taxed as
partnerships, this issue arises only on the exchange of a share in
a stallion syndicate for a colt or stallion. Although a stallion share
represents an undivided ownership interest in the stallion, the
fights of the share owner with respect to the stallion are much
more restricted than are the rights of the owner of the entire
interest in a horse. 3' A share owner has neither possession nor
control nor any management authority with respect to the horse.
Furthermore, his interest generally is not freely transferable. Again,
different analogies point in different directions.
On one hand, as far as real estate is concerned, the exchange
of a fee interest for a long term leasehold interest is considered
" This would be an exchange of a partnership interest for an undivided interest
in a horse. But see Reynolds, Tax-Free Exchanges of Interests in Thoroughbred Horses,
59 TAXES 547, 553 (1981), in which it is asserted that the treatment of one of the
syndicates involved in the exchange as a partnership for federal income tax purposes
should not preclude the application of I.R.C. § 1031 if the syndicate would not be
characterized as a partnership under state law, citing Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S.
78 (1940) for the proposition that state law determines the "nature and character of the
property involved in the exchange." Id. Morgan involved estate taxation of a power of
appointment, and in that context the proposition is true. But if an organization is a
partnership for tax purposes under the standards of I.R.C. § 761, that § specifically
provides that it will be a partnership for "purposes of this subtitle," and "this subtitle"
is Subtitle A of the I.R.C., which encompases all of the Income Tax provisions, including
I.R.C. § 1031. See also I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(extending
the I.R.C. § 761 definition of partnership to the entire I.R.C.). Compare note 380 supra
with text accompanying notes 513-16 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 181-86 supra. The mere fact that an undivided
fractional interest in one horse is exchanged for sole ownership of another horse should
not present any impediment to the application of I.R.C. § 1031. See Rev. Rul. 79-44,
1979-1 C.B. 265 (reciprocal exchange of undivided one half interests in farms resulting
in each transferor holding sole ownership of one farm was a I.R.C. § 1031 exchange).
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to be a like kind exchange.3 4 This supports like kind exchange
treatment for an exchange of a stallion share for a horse. Section
1031 applies to "like kind" property, not just identical property.
If the core rights to and fundamental use of the property, which
give the property value, are essentially similar, then section 1031
arguably should apply.385 In this case, at least as far as the
exchange of a stallion share for a stallion (as contrasted to a colt
to be raced) is concerned, the core interest is the right to breed
the horse. Both properties derive their value from this right, and
the difference between the limited legal rights attached to a stallion
share and the unlimited legal rights attached to outright ownership
might be said to be differences in "quality", not kind.
On the other hand, even before the enactment of section
1031(a)(2)(D), the Tax Court held in Estate of Meyer v.
Commissioner5 6 that section 1031 nonrecognition did not extend
to the exchange of a general partnership interest in one partnership
for a limited partnership interest in another partnership. Although
both partnerships held real estate, and under the logic discussed
above one might conclude that the interests were similar, the
court found the legal interests of general partners and limited
partners to be dissimilar. Although the rights of a stallion share
owner and an outright owner of a stallion are not as dissimilar
as the rights of general partners and limited partners, they may
be dissimilar enough to cause an exchange of such properties to
fall outside of section 1031 by analogy to Estate of Meyer.
C. Receipt of Boot
1. Cash Boot
The broad nonrecognition directive of section 1031(a) is sub-
ject to a number of statutory qualifications. Although section
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-I(c); Century Elec. Co., 192 F.2d 155.
3S See Koch v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 54, 65 (1978). In determining that the
exchange of a golf course owned and operated by the taxpayer for land subject to a 99
year ground lease qualified for nonrecognition, the Tax Court stated, "section 1031(a)
requires a comparison of the exchanged properties to ascertain whether the nature of
the transferred rights in and to the respective properties are substantially alike."
3- 58 T.C. 311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
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1031(a) appears to limit nonrecognition to transactions in which
only like kind property is received, section 1031(b) relaxes the
stricture of the "solely" qualification, by providing that if both
qualified like kind property and "boot" are received in an ex-
change, gain is recognized, but only to the extent of the money
received plus the fair market value of the other property re-
ceived.3 s7 If gain is recognized, the computation of the basis of
the property received is complicated. If only cash boot is received,
then the basis of the horse received in the transaction equals the
basis of the horse surrendered plus the gain recognized minus the
cash received. 31s Thus, if a horse with a basis of $10,000 is
exchanged for a horse of like kind worth $40,000 plus $10,000 in
cash, a $10,000 gain is recognized and the basis of the horse
received in the transaction is zero. If the transferor received only
$4,000 of cash, he recognizes that amount as gain on the exchange
of the horse surrendered and the basis of the horse received is
reduced from $10,000 to $6,000. On the other hand, if a horse
with a basis of $40,000 is exchanged for a horse with a fair
market value of $35,000 and boot of $15,000 of cash, a gain of
only $10,000 is recognized and the horse received in the exchange
takes a basis of $35,000.
If gain is recognized on a like kind exchange because boot is
received, the gain is subject to treatment as ordinary income under
section 1245 to the extent of the depreciation recapture inherent
in the property surrendered in the exchange.3 s 9
2. Exchanges of Encumbered Property
When encumbered property is surrendered in a like kind
exchange, the transferor is treated as receiving cash boot equal to
the amount of the debt.390 If the property received is also subject
to an encumbrance, then only the net debt relief inuring to the
1'7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b)-l. No loss may be recognized if boot is received.
The only effect of boot in an exchange in which a loss is realized is that the basis of
the like kind property received will be equal to the basis of the property surrendered
minus the sum of the cash and the fair market value of other property received. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(d).
I.R.C. § 1031(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-1(b).
I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c)(4).
I.R.C. § 1031(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2.
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transferor is treated as boot. Similar treatment results if the
transferor of the encumbered property pays cash along with the
surrendered property. For example, suppose a taxpayer exchanges
a horse with a basis of $15,000, subject to a lien of $12,000, for
a horse of like kind with a fair market value of $30,000, subject
to a lien of $10,000. The transferor is deemed to receive cash
boot of $2,000. Because the transferor's gain exceeds the boot
received, the entire $2,000 is recognized as gain, and the basis of
the horse received is $15,000. The same result obtains if the horse
received in the exchange is unencumbered, but the transferor paid
$10,000 cash in addition to the horse surrendered.
From the preceding examples, it should be readily apparent
that section 1031 does not shelter from recognition the gain
realized on the transfer of property subject to an encumbrance in
excess of basis, unless the property received is subject to an
encumbrance at least equal to the amount by which the lien on
the property surrendered exceeds the basis of the property surren-
dered or the taxpayer also pays cash equal to that amount. This
problem may be encountered frequently due to the rapid depre-
ciation allowances under the ACRS cost recovery system.39' Be-
cause payment of boot is determined by the economics of the
transaction, not tax considerations, recognizing gain may be un-
avoidable. For example, if a taxpayer exchanges a horse with a
basis of $21,000 and a fair market value of $100,000, subject to
a lien of $40,000, for a horse of like kind with a fair market
value of $60,000, the exchange is equal and the taxpayer must
recognize a gain of $19,000. This gain cannot be eliminated by a
boot payment because to do so would render the economics of
the exchange nonsensical. As a consequence of the recognition of
the gain, however, the basis of the horse received is increased
from $21,000 to $40,000. Although net debt relief is treated as
boot for purposes of gain recognition, it is not boot for purposes
of computing the basis of the property received in the transaction.
If a like kind exchange results in a net increase in the lien
indebtedness of the transferor, rather than a decrease, the net
increase is treated as additional cash paid for the horse received
39I See Comment, Thoroughbred Horse Racing and Breeding as a Tax Sheltered
Investment: Recent Tax Law Developments, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 399 (1983).
[VOL. 75
EQUINE TAXATION
in the exchange. As a result, the basis of the horse received equals
the basis of the horse surrendered plus the net increase in indebt-
edness. This rule applies both when the horse received is subject
to a greater lien than the horse surrendered and when only the
horse received is encumbered.
3. Receipt of Both Qualified and Nonqualified Property in an
Exchange
If both like kind property and other property are received in
an exchange, the other property is treated as boot to the extent
of its fair market value, and its basis is equal to its fair market
value. 1 Any remaining basis is allocated to the like kind property
received in the exchange. This may be illustrated as follows.
Assume that the taxpayer exchanges a six year old stallion with
a basis of $50,000 for a six year old stallion with a fair market
value of $40,000 and a six year old broodmare with a fair market
value of $60,000. Only the stallions qualify as like kind property.
The transferor realizes a gain of $50,000 on the transaction.
Because he received boot of $60,000, the entire gain is recognized.
The broodmare has a basis of $60,000, and the stallion received
in the exchange has a basis of $40,000. If the relative fair market
values of the broodmare and stallion received in the exchange
were reversed, only $40,000 of the gain would be recognized, and
the broodmare's basis will be $40,000. Using the formula for
computing the basis of the like kind property received in the
exchange-(1) basis of property surrendered ($50,000), plus (2)
gain recognized ($40,000), minus (3) cash and fair market value
of boot received ($40,000)-the basis of the stallion received in
the exchange will be $50,000.
4. Coordination With Installment Reporting of Gain
Section 453(0(6) provides that, for the purpose of computing
the profit ratio for reporting gain recognized under the installment
method, the fair market value of property received subject to the
nonrecognition rules of section 1031 is disregarded. Consonantly,
the receipt of like kind property is not considered to be a payment.
1, I.R.C. § 1031(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-l(c).
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Section 453(f)(6) generally applies to like kind exchanges in which
boot is received in the form of an installment obligation. In its
application, the gross profit on the "sale" is the amount of gain
that would be recognized if the installment obligation were satis-
fied in full. The contract price is the sum of the cash and fair
market value of other property received, plus the face amount of
the installment note.
The following example illustrates the operation of this provi-
sion. Assume that the taxpayer exchanges a horse with a basis of
$40,000 for a horse of like kind worth $20,000 plus an installment
obligation (bearing adequate interest) for $80,000, of which $10,000
is payable in the year of the sale and the balance payable the
next year. The contract price is $80,000, and the gross profit is
$60,000, resulting in a profit ratio of 75%. Assuming that none
of the gain is recapture income, in year 1 the taxpayer must
recognize $7,500 of gain and in year 2, he must recognize $52,500
of gain. His basis in the horse received is $20,000.
D. Multiparty Exchanges
A horse owner seeking a like kind exchange does not need to
engage in a direct exchange with the owner of the horse that he
wishes to acquire. If that were required, the utility of the nonre-
cognition provisions of section 1031 would be greatly diminished.
Like kind exchanges can be, and frequently are, effected through
the use of middlemen in so called three comer exchanges. 3 In a
typical three corner exchange the taxpayer locates the property he
wants to acquire and then finds a middleman to purchase the
target property. After the middleman has purchased the target
property, the taxpayer engages in a like kind exchange with the
middleman, transferring to the middleman the property that he
desires to dispose of and receiving the target property. The mid-
dleman then sells the property received from the taxpayer.
I'l See, e.g., Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th
Cir. 1980); Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304. The actual structuring of a three cornered
exchange is complex and has numerous variables and possible pitfalls. A thorough
discussion of the mechanics of such exchanges is beyond the scope of this Article. For
further discussion of multiparty exchanges, see Goldstein & Lewis, supra note 358, at
252-68; Guerin, A Proposed Test For Evaluating Multiparty Like Kind Exchanges, 35
TAx L. REv. 547 (1980); Levine & McCormick, Taxfree Exchanges Under Section 1031,
61-4th T.M. A-15-A-21 (1982).
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A three corner exchange must be structured so that the mid-
dleman is not considered to be the transferor's agent. If he is the
transferor's agent, then section 1031 will not apply and the gain
must be recognized. 94 An examination of the cases involving three
cornered exchanges, however, indicates that it is easy to avoid
having the middleman treated as the transferor's agent. The tax-
payer apparently may control all details of the transaction, ad-
vance the middleman funds as a loan to purchase the target
property, and pay the middleman a fee as compensation for his
services.395 If, however, the transferor has the right to receive cash
from the middleman at any time, then section 1031 does not
apply.396 All of the transactions that are part of the three corner
exchange may occur simultaneously or there may be time delays.
The taxpayer seeking the exchange may locate the buyer in ad-
vance, and the obligation to perform any one of the contracts
may be conditioned on performance of all other contracts. On
the other hand, the sale by the middleman might be delayed for
as long as the middleman is willing. If that sale is not contem-
poraneous with the acquisition and exchange of the target prop-
erty, however, the middleman probably will seek increased
compensation for the increased risk that he incurs.
E. Special Rules for Deferred Exchanges
The situation may arise in which a taxpayer locates a potential
buyer for a horse, and although the seller is seeking to defer
recognition of the gain through a like kind exchange, he has not
located the horse that he wishes to purchase. In that case, the
transferor might transfer his horse to the buyer in exchange for
- See Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 (1969)(acq.), in which the Commis-
sioner unsuccessfully argued that the role of the transferor's attorney as the middleman
precluded the applicablility of I.R.C. § 1031 because the attorney received cash from
the sale of the property as the taxpayer's agent. The court agreed that if the attorney
was the taxpayer's agent, I.R.C. § 1031 would not apply, but found on the facts that
the attorney was not acting as the taxpayer's agent.
' ' See Biggs, 69 T.C. 905; Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980); Rutland
v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 40 (1977).
'' See Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (right to receive
cash from escrow if no property transferred within six months precluded nonrecognition).
See also Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967) (receipt of cash, even if
promptly reinvested in like kind property, precludes nonrecognition).
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the buyer's promise to acquire and transfer to the seller another
horse to be selected by the seller at some future time. The ex-
change contract will specify the maximum price to be paid for
the horse to be selected and call for the payment of cash boot if
the price is less than a specified minimum (which might be equal
to the maximum price). The contract may permit the seller to
select a more expensive horse if he agrees to make an additional
cash payment.
The transaction can be effected through a middleman if the
buyer is unwilling to be involved in anything other than a straight
purchase transaction. The taxpayer would then transfer to the
middleman the horse to be sold in exchange for the middleman's
promise to subsequently transfer to the taxpayer a horse to be
selected by the taxpayer. The middleman would then immediately
close the sale and hold the proceeds pending the selection of a
horse by the taxpayer.
Regardless of whether such a deferred exchange is made di-
rectly or through a middleman, the Code restricts the period for
which the final exchange may be delayed if section 1031 is to
apply to the transaction. 397 First, the property to be received by
the taxpayer seeking section 1031 nonrecognition must be identi-
fied no more than forty-five days after the day that the taxpayer
transfers his surrendered property. 398 Second, even if the property
has been identified within the requisite time limit, the second half
of the exchange must be completed on or before the earlier of
(1) one hundred eighty days after the date on which the initial
transfer occurred, or (2) the due date for the tax return for the
year in which the taxpayer transferred the surrendered property. 399
Thus, if on November 17 of Year 1, taxpayer surrenders a horse
in exchange for a horse to be designated at a later time, the horse
to be received must be designated before January 1 of Year 2
and must be received on or before April 15 of Year 2. If the first
3- I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3). This provision, enacted in 1984, was intended to limit the
scope of Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). See S. Rm. No. 169,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 241-44 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1231-34
(1984).
39 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A).
3- I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B). Extensions of the due date are taken into account, and
extend the time for completing the transfer.
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horse is transferred on November 15, the horse to be received
must be designated before December 30 of Year 1 and received
on or before April 15 of Year 2. If, however, the first horse is
transferred on June 30, the horse to be received must be desig-
nated prior to August 14 of Year 1, and it must be received on
or before December 27 of Year 1.
The unstated interest rules do not apply to deferred like kind
exchanges meeting the requirements for nonrecognition because a
deferred like kind exchange must be completed within 180 days
to qualify for nonrecognition. The unstated interest rules do not
apply unless a payment is due more than six months from the
date of sale." If, however, a deferred like kind exchange fails to
qualify for nonrecognition and the property to be received by the
taxpayer is not received within six months of the transfer of the
property surrendered, the unstated interest rules are applicable if
the deferred obligation does not bear interest, and a portion of
the amount realized upon receipt of the like kind property may
be recharacterized as interest. 401
F. Determining the Desirability of a Like Kind Exchange
Prior to the repeal of the capital gains preference, disposing of
a horse in a like kind exchange generally was not desirable. An
exception was when almost all of the gain that would have been
recognized on the sale of a horse would have been ordinary income,
either because the twenty four month holding period for section
1231 was not met or the gain would have been subject to recapture.
The tax price for nonrecognition exacted by section 1031 is a
transferred basis. This reduces, or if the cost of the horse surren-
dered has been recovered entirely, eliminates ACRS deductions on
the horse acquired. By selling the first horse and purchasing the
", See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
"" See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1356 (9th Cir. 1979), in which the
portion of the property received in the deferred exchange transaction that was attributable
to a 60,a per year "growth factor" in the value of the property that the taxpayer was
to receive was re-characterized as interest and recognized as ordinary income outside of
the nonrecognition accorded by I.R.C. § 1031.
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second horse, the taxpayer obtains a cost basis for depreciation and
his subsequent ACRS deductions are increased greatly. If a sub-
stantial portion of the gain realized on the sale of the first horse
would have been section 1231 gain, the combination of capital gains
and ordinary deductions dictated that it was more profitable after
taxes to sell the first horse and buy the new one rather than engage
in a like kind exchange.
Under prior law it was necessary to evaluate separately each
potential transaction to determine which route was best. A number
of factors had to be considered, including the amount of net section
1231 gain and section 1245 gain that would be realized on a sale,
the taxpayer's marginal tax rate at which income would be included
and deductions claimed, the recovery period for the horse to be
obtained, and the after tax discount rate to be used by the taxpayer
in valuing cash flows.
Assume, for example, that the taxpayer owned a seven year old
stallion held for stud purposes that has been fully depreciated. The
original cost of the stallion was $100,000 and its fair market value
was $200,000. If the taxpayer was in the fifty percent tax bracket,
he would have owed taxes of $70,000 on the $200,000 gain that
would have been realized on the sale of the horse.4 However, if
he had purchased another stallion to be held for stud purposes for
a price of $200,000, he would have had an ACRS deduction in the
same year of $30,000. As a result he would have saved $15,000 of
taxes and the net tax increase for the year would have been $55,000.
In the next year he would have had an ACRS deduction of $44,000,
saving $22,000 in taxes. In each of the next three years he would
have had a deduction of $42,000, saving $21,000 of taxes in each
year.4m
Looking at the taxes paid and taxes saved, this can be viewed,
entirely apart from profits generated from stud fees, as an invest-
ment of $55,000 in the first year that yields $22,000 in the second
year and $21,000 in each of the next three years. Assuming the
402 The recomputed basis of the property under I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2) is $i00,000.
Therefore $100,000 of the gain is taxed as ordinary income at the fifty percent rate.
The remaining $100,000 of gain is net I.R.C. § 1231 gain, of which $60,000 is
deducted under I.R.C. § 1202(b). The tax on the remaining $40,000 is $20,000, and
the total tax is $70,000.
-3 See I.R.C. § 168(b)(1).
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taxpayer could have invested cash in a portfolio investment at ten
percent per year, before tax, his after tax discount rate is five
percent. Using a five percent after tax discount rate, the net present
value of the tax detriments and benefits associated with the sale is
$20,417. That sum is an additional after tax profit generated by the
tax system that would not be obtained if the taxpayer utilized a like
kind exchange for the disposition and acquisition."
If the original cost of the first horse were $180,000, however,
only $20,000 of the gain on the sale would have been section 1231
gain, and the taxes on the gain recognized on a sale would have
been $94,000.401 The same ACRS benefits could have been obtained
on the new horse, and net taxes due in the year of the sale would
have been $77,000. The hypothetical transaction would be an in-
vestment of $77,000 that generated a return of $22,000 the next
year and $21,000 in each of the succeeding three years. Using a five
percent after tax discount rate, the net present value of the after
tax cash flow is negative $1,583. The taxpayer would be poorer by
this amount because he sold the first horse and bought the new one
rather than acquiring the new horse through a like kind exchange.
Varying any of the factors can change the result. For example,
if the taxpayer used an after tax discount rate of only four percent,
the net present value of the cash flows would be $189, and it would
be slightly more profitable to sell the first horse and purchase the
second instead of engaging in a like kind exchange.
As long as there was a capital gains preference, there was no
neat, generalized rule for determining the more desirable alternative.
Each fact pattern must have been specifically analyzed. There were,
however, a few guidelines that held true. All other things being
equal, it was more likely that a sale and reinvestment was more
desirable if the horse to be acquired was three year ACRS property4°6
as opposed to five year ACRS property.4 This is because in present
- For an explanation of the use of time value of money analysis of after tax
cash flows generated by a potential investment, see McMahon, Applied Tax Finance
Analysis of Real Estate Tax Investments, 27 B.C.L. Rv. 721 (1986). The method-
ology used in that article can be applied to any type of investment.
"I The recomputed basis of the property is $180,000, which results in $90,000
of tax under I.R.C. § 1245(a). Only $20,000 of the gain is I.R.C. § 1231 gain, on
which the tax is $4,000.
4', See I.R.C. § 168(h)(1).
4,7 For years after 1986, horses that are not 3 year ACRS property are 7 year
ACRS property. I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(c)(iii).
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value terms, the ACRS deductions for three year property are more
valuable than are the deductions for five year property. 0 3 Further-
more, although at first blush it is counterintuitive, the higher the
marginal tax bracket faced by the taxpayer, the more likely it was
that a sale and reinvestment would have been more profitable than
a like kind exchange. For taxpayers in higher tax brackets, the
capital gains preference and the ACRS deductions were more val-
uable. Conversely, as the discount rate increased, the desirability of
a sale and purchase decreased. The higher discount rate reduced
the value of the ACRS deductions, while the tax burden in the year
of the sale was unchanged. This also pointed to relatively greater
desirability for taxpayers in higher tax brackets because they face
lower after tax discount rates than lower bracket taxpayers facing
the same before tax discount rate.
After the repeal of the preferential treatment of long term
capital gains by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, it will always be more
advantageous to engage in a like kind exchange than it will be to
sell an appreciated horse and purchase a new horse. The gain on
the sale of the horse will be taxed at the same rate as the ACRS
deductions on the new horse will be allowed. Thus, absent extraor-
dinary circumstances, the net present value of the taxes saved in
future years through ACRS deductions will never exceed the taxes
paid in the year of the sale.
A sale may be more desirable, however, if the taxpayer has
capital losses to offset the capital gain or net operating carryfor-
wards that could not otherwise be used, which can shelter both
capital gain and recapture income. In either of these cases the taxes
on the gain otherwise payable in the year of the sale will be reduced.
Future taxes saved through the increased ACRS deductions may
have a net present value greater than the taxes due in the year of
the sale. To be completely accurate, however, the analysis must
take into account future tax increases attributable to the loss of the
capital loss or net operating loss carryforwards used to shelter the
gain on the sale of the horse.
"I See McMahon, Reforming Cost Recovery Allowances For Debt Financed
Depreciable Property, 29 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 1029, 1048-49 n.99, 1051-52 n.107 (1985).
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III. INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS
A. Introduction
1. Elective Nonrecognition of Gain and Basis Rules
Section 1033 allows a taxpayer realizing a gain on the "invol-
untary conversion" of property to defer recognition to the extent
that the amount realized is used to purchase replacement "property
similar or related in service or use to the property so converted. '"409
The amount realized on a involuntary conversion most frequently
is the proceeds of an insurance policy, although damage awards,
settlements and, occasionally, sales proceeds may be included in the
amount realized. Insurance proceeds or other amounts paid to
lienholders are included in the amount realized. 410
Unlike section 1031, section 1033 is elective and applies only to
gains .4 1 To benefit from section 1033, a taxpayer must replace the
involuntarily converted property before the end of the second tax-
able year following the taxable year in which gain is first realized
on the involuntary conversion. 4 2 The replacement property must
be "purchased" for nonrecognition to apply.413 Furthermore, it
must be purchased for the specific purpose of replacing the con-
verted property. A purchase that would have occurred in any event
does not qualify the gain for nonrecognition. 41 4
10 I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1986). See Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-i, -2 (1986).
,t0 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(11) (payment by government of portion of
condemnation award); Commissioner v. Fortee Properties, Inc., 211 F.2d 915 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 826 (1954).
4" I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c). The election may be
made simply by failing to report the gain. For a discussion of the collateral rules
attending the making of the election, see Edwards, Involuntary Conversions 33-7th
T.M. A-13-A-15 (1984).
I.R.C. § 1033 does not apply to losses because Congress considered recognition
of losses to be "more equitable." See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942),
reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 595.
,,2 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(2), (3).
'" I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(4). "Purchase" means
that the replacement property would otherwise take a cost basis under I.R.C. § 1012.
41 See Rev. Rul. 59-8, 1959-1 C.B. 202, amplified by Rev. Rul. 62-161, 1962-2
C.B 175.
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As is true with respect to section 1031, the price of nonrecog-
nition of gain is the loss of actual cost as basis. Rather than cost,
the basis of the replacement property is its cost minus the amount
of unrecognized gain.4 -5 If the cost of the replacement property is
the same as the amount realized, this is approximately equal to the
basis of the property converted. Due to the manner in which the
basis of the replacement property is computed, the holding period
of the converted property is tacked onto the holding period of the
replacement property. 416 Because section 1245 recapture is subor-
dinated to nonrecognition under section 1033, any depreciation
recapture inherent in the converted property carries over to the
replacement property. The recomputed basis of the replacement
property is the basis, as computed above, plus the ACRS deductions
claimed with respect to the converted property.4 17
If the cost of the replacement property is less than the amount
realized on the involuntary conversion, then gain is recognized to
the extent of the proceeds that were not reinvested in the replace-
ment property.4 18 The basis of the replacement property, computed
as described above, again equals roughly the basis used to compute
gain on the disposition of the original property. On the other hand,
if the cost of the replacement property is more than the amount
realized on the conversion, the basis of the replacement property is
greater than the basis of the converted property by an amount equal
to such excess. 419
The "reinvestment" of the proceeds from the involuntary con-
version need not be literal; there is no tracing of funds. 420 If, for
example, the taxpayer received $100,000 of insurance proceeds on
the involuntary conversion of a horse and purchased a replacement
horse for $100,000, using only $20,000 of the actual proceeds and
borrowing the remaining $80,000 of the purchase price, the entire
gain is entitled to nonrecognition. 42 The use to which the taxpayer
415 I.R.C. § 1033(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(b)-i (1986).
416 I.R.C. § 1223(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.1223-1(a) (1986).
417 I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2); (b)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1245-2(c)(4); -4(d) (1986).
418 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(1) (1986).
411 See Rev. Rul. 73-18, 1973-1 C.B. 368 (infusion of new funds to purchase
replacement land and buildings increased basis).
420 See 2 B. BITTKER, supra note 44, at 44.3.6.
"I See Harsh Inv. Corp. v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 409 (D. Or. 1970).
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puts the remaining $80,000 of cash proceeds is irrelevant.
2. Characterization of Recognized Gain
If gain is recognized as a result of an involuntary conversion of
a horse, either because the owner chose not to elect nonrecognition
or because the entire amount realized as a result of the involuntary
conversion was not reinvested, the character of the gain is deter-
mined with reference to the purpose for which the horse was held,
just as it would be if the horse was sold. Unlike section 1031,
deferred recognition is available under section 1033 for gains real-
ized on the involuntary conversion of property held for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. 422 Thus, the proceeds
realized on an involuntary conversion of a weanling or yearling
owned by a dealer in horses may be entitled to nonrecognition if
the dealer reinvests the proceeds in qualified property. For purposes
of qualifying the gain as section 1231 gain, the twenty four month
holding period applies to horses held for breeding or sporting
purposes. 42 As long as the holding period requirement is met, gains
from the involuntary conversion of horses held for use in the
taxpayer's trade or business are accorded section 1231 treatment,
and ultimately long term capital gains treatment if section 1231
gains exceed section 1231 losses, even though there was no sale or
exchange. 24
The interrelationship of involuntary gains and losses and section
1231 gains and losses recognized on sales and exchanges is complex,
and a discussion of the operation of the section 1231 hotchpot that
ultimately determines characterization is beyond the scope of this
Article. 425 The most important limitation on the availability of
section 1231, as always, is the potential for depreciation recapture
under section 1245. If gain is recognized on an involuntary conver-
412 See Westchester Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 198 (1974) (land held
for sale replaced by land held for sale); Rev. Rul 59-8, 1959-1 C.B. 202, modified
by Rev. Rul. 81-279, 1981-2 C.B. 163 (farmer may replace standing crop with
standing or harvested crop).
,21 See text accompanying notes 138-48 supra.
424 I.R.C. § 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii).
411 See 2 B. BIrrKER, supra note 44, at 54.1 (1981); Edwards, supra note 411,
at A-3-A-4 for a discussion of the interaction of involuntary conversions, casualty
losses, and the I.R.C. § 1231 main hotchpot.
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sion, the gain is ordinary income to the extent of prior ACRS
deductions claimed with respect to the converted property.426 Any
potential depreciation recapture not recognized at that time carries
over to the replacement horse because the recomputed basis of the
replacement horse includes ACRS deductions claimed with respect
to the converted horse to the extent that they were not recaptured
at the time the gain on the conversion was realized. 427
3. Meaning of Involuntary Conversion
Strictly speaking, an involuntary conversion is not the event
that deprives the taxpayer of his property, but is the sequence of
events by which the old property is lost and the new property
acquired. 42 Colloquially speaking, however, the phrase generally is
applied to the event that deprives the owner of the enjoyment of
the old property. Within that usage, section 1033 applies to destruc-
tion, in whole or in part, theft, seizure, and requisition or condem-
nation (or threat or imminence thereof) of the property. Among
these, destruction is the most likely to apply to a horse. Occasion-
ally, a horse owner may experience a theft loss. While a horse might
be condemned, this is far more likely to occur with respect to
livestock raised for food, such as cattle, and the seizure or requi-
sitioning of a horse by the government would indeed be surprising.
Destruction by any event that constitutes a casualty within the
meaning of section 165, fire, shipwreck, hail, lightning or other
accident, clearly is an involuntary conversion. 429 Also included in
the meaning of involuntary conversion, however, are certain other
causes of destruction that are not sudden and, therefore, not cas-
ualties under section 165. 410 In addition, under section 1033(e),
livestock destroyed or sold on account of disease are deemed to
have been involuntarily converted. 4 1 Thus, gain realized upon the
426 Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-4(d).
4- I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c)(4).
411 See 2 B. BITTKER, supra note 44, at J 44.3 (1981).
411 See S. REP No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part
2) C.B. 181; H.R. REP. 486, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (Part
2) C.B. 206.
430 See Rev. Rul. 66-334, 1966-2 C.B. 302 ( salt water pollution of well); Rev.
Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 C.B. 200 (livestock converted by drought), superceded by I.R.C.
§ 1033(e).
411 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(d)-I.
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collection of insurance proceeds on the life of a horse that prema-
turely dies from sickness or disease, as well as one killed in a barn
fire or struck by lightning, 43 2 is eligible for nonrecognition under
section 1033. Normal mortality, however, does not constitute an
involuntary conversion. Furthermore, despite the facial applicability
of section 1033(e), if a horse is sold as a result of disease it is
unclear whether nonrecognition extends to the gain realized on the
sale.
433
Although the gain recognized on the receipt of mortality insur-
ance on the premature death of a horse clearly qualifies for non-
recognition, insurance may be payable for a number of other events
not so easily categorized. There is absolutely no authority construing
the possible application of section 1033 to many of these events,
which are discussed in Part III.B.
4. Property Similar or Related in Service or Use
Nonrecognition under I.R.C. section 1033 is available only to
the extent that the proceeds from the involuntary conversion are
reinvested in "other property similar or related in service or use to
the property so converted." 4 4 Neither the Code nor the Treasury
Regulations provide any helpful definition of this phrase. Delinea-
tion of the scope of the phrase "similar or related in service or use"
has been left to the courts and, through Revenue Rulings, to the
IRS. An examination of the cases does not disclose any easily
applicable definition, but rather a series of factual inquiries. 43 5 The
replacement property need not be identical,43 6 and the standard is
432 See Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-1 C.B. 200 (livestock poisoned by contaminated
feed); Rev. Rul. 195, 1953-2 C.B. 169 (livestock struck by lightning).
," See text accompanying notes 459-63 infra.
4 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1). The replacement may be made indirectly by purchasing
control of the stock of a corporation owning property that is similar or related in
service or use to the converted property. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A), (E)(i); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1033(a)-2(c). For this provision to apply, however, the assets of the replacement
corporation must be "principally" similar property. Templeton v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 518 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 573 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1978).
43 For a compilation of examples of decisions determing what type of replace-
ment meets the statutory standard, see Edwards, supra note 411, at A-19-A-21.
411 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7903064 (Oct. 18, 1978) (breeding cattle replaced breeding
buffalo of same sex). But see Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(e)-1(d) (breeding or dairy livestock
is not qualified replacement for draft livestock); Rev. Rul. 76-319, 1976-2 C.B. 242'
(replacement of bowling alley with billiards center was not qualified).
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
different than the "like kind" standard for nonrecognition under
section 1031.437 The best available general definition is that property
is not "similar or related in service or use" if the taxpayer has
"change[d] the character of his investment." Section 1033 "requires
a reasonable degree of continuity in the nature of the assets as well
as in the general character of the business." 438
No purpose would be served by a general exposition of the
application of these principles in the context of other businesses.
Some analogies may be drawn between decided issues and potential
issues in the horse industry, however, and a few answers are rela-
tively clear. As far as livestock are concerned, the Regulations
provide that "the new livestock must be functionally the same as
the livestock involuntarily converted. This means that the new
livestock must be held for the same useful purpose as the old was
held. ' 439 Thus, for example, the replacement of a broodmare with
a broodmare, a stallion with a stallion, or a yearling held for resale
with a yearling held for resale, all clearly would qualify, as would
the replacement of a colt held for racing with a colt held for racing
or a filly held for racing with a filly held for racing. There also is
no doubt that several horses could be replaced by one horse or that
one horse could replace several horses.440 The consequences attached
to numerous other potential replacements are less clear. For ex-
ample, may a gelding held for racing be replaced by a colt held for
racing? May a broodmare be replaced by a stallion? May a foal be
replaced by paying stud fees with the proceeds of foal insurance?
These are all difficult questions, with no clear answers. Possible
resolutions to some of these questions are discussed in Part III.C.
B. Identifying Involuntary Conversions
As noted above, a horse is most frequently involuntarily con-
verted due to accident, disease or sickness. If the horse dies or is
4"3 See text accompanying notes 351-76 supra regarding the meaning of "like
kind" under I.R.C. § 1031.
411 Maloof v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 263, 269-71 (1975).
431 Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(e)-l(d) (replacement of breeding, draft, or dairy live-
stock with breeding, draft, or dairy livestock, respectively, qualifies).
"0 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(b)-l(b) (providing rules for allocating basis
among multiple replacement properties); Cotton Concentration Co. v. Commissioner,
4 B.T.A. 121 (1926) (Acq.) (two buildings may be replaced by one).
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humanely destroyed as a result of accident, disease or sickness, the
gain realized upon receipt of mortality insurance proceeds generally
may be deferred under section 1033. A number of situations, how-
ever, present particular problems.
1. Collection of Foal Insurance
The owner of a broodmare may obtain foal insurance to com-
pensate him in the event that a foal is born dead or dies soon after
birth. In large part, foal insurance protects the owner against the
loss of a stud fee if the fee was not refundable, and compensates
him for depreciation on the mare for the year. 41 The tax benefit
rule has been applied in the past to deny nonrecognition under
section 1033 to gain attributable to a basis reduction resulting from
the prior deduction of a loss. 442 It has been suggested that the tax
benefit rule might also preclude the applicability of section 1033 to
foal insurance to the extent that the owner previously deducted the
stud fees attributable to the foal.443 This issue has been mooted for
future years by the enactment of section 263A, requiring the capi-
talization of stud fees. It remains relevant, however, for tax years
prior to 1987 not closed by the statute of limitations and during
years subsequent to 1986 for replacements of involuntarily con-
verted foals the stud fee for which was paid and properly deducted
prior to 1987.
Since the Supreme Court decision in Hillsboro National Bank
v. Commissioner,444 the touchstone for applying the tax benefit rule
is that the later "recovery" of the previously deducted item is
"fundamentally inconsistent" with the earlier deduction. Applying
this standard, one might reasonably conclude that to the extent that
the proceeds are used to pay another stud fee there is no funda-
mental inconsistency. No deduction should be allowed for the
second stud fee for years prior to 1987 (except to the extent that it
exceeds the portion of the insurance proceeds attributable to the
" See Reynolds, Applying Section 1033 to Involuntary Conversions of Thor-
oughbred Horses, 70 Ky. L.J. 987, 991-92 (1981-82).
"2 See Mager v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 37 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 636 F.2d
1209 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Buffalo Wire Works Co., Inc v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 1775 (1978).
4 Reynolds, supra note 441, at 991-92.
' 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
1986-87]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
first stud fee).445 For purposes of section 1033, the payment of a
nondeductible stud fee is analogous to the payment of the purchase
price of replacement property that is denied a cost basis. For years
after 1986, in which stud fees must be capitalized under section
263A, the payment of a stud fee would be treated in the same
manner as the purchase price for any other replacement property.
The stud fee would enter into the basis of the replacement foal, but
the foal's basis would be reduced by the unrecognized gain realized
on the involuntary conversion.
The purchase of a horse to replace the foal, however, would
appear to be fundamentally inconsistent with the earlier proper
deduction of a stud fee in a year prior to 1987, because even prior
to the enactment of section 263A a cash basis farmer was required
to capitalize the cost of purchased livestock, including horses held
for resale." 6 In this context it is important to recall that the term
"conversion" technically does not refer to the event that caused
the disposition of the first horse, but to the entire sequence of events
that result in the acquisition of the second horse. In a Revenue
Ruling issued prior to the decision in Hillsborough National Bank,
however, the IRS ruled that section 1033 was available when a
farmer reinvested crop insurance proceeds, received upon the de-
struction of a standing crop, in a harvested crop. 447 Although the
cost of planting the destroyed crop was deducted previously, the
IRS did not attempt to apply the tax benefit rule to deny nonre-
cognition. To the extent that this Ruling retains vitality, the tax
benefit rule should not stand in the way of nonrecognition upon
replacement with another foal. Acquisition of an older horse, how-
ever, might fail the "similar or related in service or use" require-
ment.44
To the extent this issue survives the enactment of section 263A,
it is mooted in any event if the stud fee is paid with the insurance
' See Rev. Rul. 59-8, 1959-1 C.B. 202, modified by Rev. Rul. 81-279, 1981-2
C.B. 163.
"6 See note 30 supra.
" See Rev. Rul. 81-279, 1981-2 C.B. 163 (replacement of destroyed standing
crop by using crop insurance proceeds to plant new crop qualifies to extent proceeds
are used to bring new crop to same level of maturity as destroyed crop).
"I See Manocchio v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'g, 78
T.C. 989 (1982) (disallowing deduction for educational expenses reimbursed by tax
exempt payments received from Veterans Administration). But see Baker v. United
States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984).
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proceeds in the same year that the proceeds are received. The
inclusion and the deduction cancel each other out. But if the stud
fee is not paid until the next year (or the one following that) then
the inapplicability of section 1033 effects an acceleration of income.
Inclusion of the gain attributable to the insurance proceeds in the
year of receipt is not cancelled out until a future year.
To the extent that the foal insurance exceeds the previously
deducted stud fee, the tax benefit rule does not present a problem,
but the corollary of gain exclusion is denial of the deduction for
the second stud fee. Again, if the stud fee is paid in the same year
that the insurance is received, the issue is moot. If the stud fee is
not payable until a later year, however, then the potential availa-
bility of section 1033 benefits the taxpayer because in present value
terms the tax detriment of income in an earlier year is not entirely
offset by the tax benefit of a deduction in a later year. 449
2. Accident, Disease or Sickness Rendering a Horse Unfit for
Racing or Breeding
Insurance sometimes is obtained to compensate a horse owner
for the premature retirement of a horse from racing or breeding
due to an accident or sickness that does not result in the death or
destruction of the horse. The potential application of section 1033
to the receipt of such insurance proceeds and the purchase of a
replacement horse is complicated by the fact that the owner may
retain ownership of the horse. Accidents are treated somewhat
differently than disease, therefore the two are discussed separately.
a. Accident
If a horse is so injured by an accident to require retirement
from racing or breeding, the reinvestment of the accident insurance
proceeds might qualify as an involuntary conversion arising from
"destruction... in part ' 450 of the horse. Reinvestment of insurance
proceeds attributable to the partial destruction of real estate or
equipment qualifies for nonrecognition as an involuntary conver-
"I See McMahon, supra note 404.
4fO I.R.C. § 1033(a).
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sion. 451 In the usual situation, however, the insurance proceeds are
used to repair the partially destroyed property. In the case of a
horse retired from racing or breeding, however, not only may the
partially destroyed property be retained, but the insurance proceeds
are used to purchase additional property. Nevertheless, if insurance
proceeds are to compensate an owner for lost value, section 1033
should apply if a horse is no longer useful in the purpose for which
it was held, even though it is retained. Furthermore, the availability
of section 1033 with respect to the gain attributable to the insurance
proceeds should be unaffected by the taxpayer's decision to sell the
horse.452 Nonrecognition should not extend, however, to the gains
from the sale of the horse. 4 3
A potentially serious problem, possibly negating this analysis,
is that policies insuring against the risks discussed above generally
are written to insure against the loss of use of the horse, not the
loss of the horse itself. The Treasury Regulations provide that the
proceeds of "a use and occupancy insurance contract, which by its
terms insured against actual loss sustained of net profits in the
business, are not proceeds of an involuntary conversion," but are
ordinary income.4 4 Case law appears to establish that the proceeds
of insurance for loss of use of real estate may be reinvested without
recognition under section 1033 as long as the policy insures against
loss of use rather than loss of profits.45  Determining Whether a
policy insures against loss of use or lost profits requires an exami-
nation of all of the facts and circumstances, and where horses are
concerned, the relevant factors may differ from those in real estate
cases. The inquiry is not limited to the face of the policy, but
41 See, e.g., Marcal Pulp and Paper v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 739 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959); Rev. Rul. 67-254, 1967-2 C.B. 269.
4 2 See Reynolds, supra note 441, at 993-95.
"I See C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 468 (1964) (gain on sale of
partially destroyed ship was not entitled to nonrecognition under I.R.C. § 1033, even
though sinking was an involuntary conversion by partial destruction).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(8) (1959).
411 Compare Shakertown Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1960);
Williams Furniture Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 928 (1941)(acq.); Rev. Rul.
74-447, 1974-2 C.B. 302, with Marshall Foods, Inc. v. United States, 393 F. Supp.
1097 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 75-2 U.S.T.C. '1 9536 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975).
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includes the underwriting and actuarial criteria used in writing the
policy.4s6
A substance over form analysis of the risk against which the
owner is protected by such insurance might point to the proceeds
being treated as a substitute for lost profits. Mortality insurance
protects against the loss of the horse itself. Loss of use is therefore
largely a euphemism for loss of profits-racing purses and stud
fees. The policies are payable with reference to the activity, or lack
of activity, of the horse, not its condition. This suggests that the
risk insured is loss of profits.
This analysis, however, may be more accurate with respect to
insurance against termination of a racing career than with respect
to a breeding career. Permanent loss of use for breeding funda-
mentally represents destruction of the business value of the animal,
and although the policy may in form be a loss of use policy, the
proceeds represent substantially all of the value that will be realized
from the horse. The same would hold true with respect to insurance
against the premature termination of the racing career of a gelding.
As far as colts and fillies held for racing are concerned, however,
unless the insurance is substantially in excess of reasonably expected
purses that might be earned and therefore actually represents po-
tential loss of value as a broodmare or stallion that might result
from premature termination of a racing career, the proceeds resem-
ble lost profits. If that is so, they should be taxable as ordinary
income and not eligible for nonrecognition under section 1033.
Given the dearth of authority, however, generalization is dangerous,
and each case should be examined against the factors applied in the
relevant cases and Revenue Rulings.
If the obstacles to the application of section 1033 discussed
above can be overcome, the general rules discussed at the beginning
of this section would apply as follows. Assume, for example, that
the taxpayer owned a fully depreciated filly held for racing, for
which he had originally paid $25,000. Due to an injury, the owner
retired her from racing and collected insurance proceeds of $50,000.
Because the owner was not engaged in breeding and the filly had
potential as a broodmare despite her injury, he sold her for $40,000.
4 , See Marshall Foods, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1097; Rev. Rul. 86-12, 1986-5 I.R.B.
32. See also Reynolds, supra note 441, at 997-1002.
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The gain realized on the collection of the $50,000 insurance proceeds
could go unrecognized if the taxpayer replaced the filly with another
filly held for racing; however, the $40,000 gain realized on the sale
would be recognized.
Another difficult question involves characterization of the gain
that is recognized. Should the $25,000 of ACRS deductions be
recaptured on the sale of the filly and the replacement filly be
purged of any recapture taint, or should the recapture taint carry
over to the replacement filly and all of the gain be accorded section
1231 treatment, as would be the case if the converted filly was
totally destroyed? A strict reading of the Treasury Regulations
appear to require transfering all of the recapture potential to the
replacement property, leaving the entire gain on the sale as section
1231 gain. 45 7 This result is unsettling, however, and the regulations
do not appear to have been written with this scenario in mind.
The alternative solution of characterizing the gain on the sale
as section 1245 recapture gives rise to another issue. If all of the
recapture inherent in the horse at the time of its conversion by
partial destruction is not recaptured on the sale because the recom-
puted basis exceeds the amount realized, it seems that the remaining
recapture potential should be transferred to the replacement horse.
How would recapture be computed if the replacement horse was
sold before the converted horse was sold? Perhaps the best solution
is to give each horse a recomputed basis that includes all ACRS
deductions claimed with respect to the converted horse, then sub-
sequently reduce the recomputed basis of either by the amount of
recapture income recognized on the prior sale of the other.
Another difficult question is presented in determining the re-
spective bases of the retained partially destroyed horse and the
replacement horse, if the converted horse was not fully depreciated.
Section 1033(c) contemplates that the basis of destroyed property
will be transferred to the replacement property. While the applica-
tion of this rule may seem incongruous if the converted property is
not totally destroyed and is retained or sold at a profit, it is actually
entirely consistent with the theory of section 1033. Nonrecognition
is permitted under section 1033 on the theory that the taxpayer's
investment continues in a different form. Transferring the entire
417 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-2(c)(4).
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basis of the converted property to the replacement property reflects
that continuation of the taxpayer's original investment. The con-
verted property no longer reflects any investment, and all the pro-
ceeds of its sale reflect gain because the original investment continues
in the replacement property. The basis will be recovered through
ACRS deductions on the replacement property over the remaining
cost recovery period of the converted property, to the extent that
the basis of the replacement property does not exceed the basis of
the converted property. Any additional basis is considered separate
property for purposes of computing ACRS deductions, and it has
an independent cost recovery period. 43
b. Sickness or Disease
If a horse is retired from or cannot commence a racing or
breeding career due to sickness or disease rather than accident, the
gain attributable to any insurance proceeds received on account of
the sickness or disease and any proceeds from the sale of the horse
may be eligible for nonrecognition. 4 9 Section 1033(d) treats the
destruction or sale of any livestock due to sickness or disease as an
involuntary conversion. Sickness or disease, not resulting in death,
however, does not appear to be an involuntary conversion in the
absence of the forced sale contemplated by section 1033(d). 460 There-
fore, unless the horse is sold, any gain realized on the collection of
insurance proceeds exceeding basis probably cannot be deferred
under section 1033.
The proper application of this provision to horses is unclear.
For gain from a sale to be eligible for nonrecognition the taxpayer
must show that the livestock were sold "because of the disease,"
and that it "would not otherwise have been sold or exchanged at
that particular time . . . . "4, Although the legislative history is
totally silent as to the intended scope of section 1033(d),4 2 it appears
41 Prop. Reg. § 1.168-5(f)(1) (1984).
" I.R.C. § 1033(d) applies regardless of whether the disease is of epidemic
proportions or is isolated. Rev. Rul. 61-216, 1961-2 C.B. 134. See generally Rey-
nolds, supra note 389, at 995-97.
41 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(d)-I.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(d)-l(a).
See H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5280.
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that it contemplates a sale for slaughter, not a sale for continued
use for a different purpose.463 Under this standard it may be diffi-
cult, for example, to prove that a horse retired from racing and
sold for breeding would not have been sold at that time even if the
disease had not occurred. If, however, a horse previously used for
breeding was sold to a purchaser for use outside the breeding and
racing industry, the standard would probably be met more easily.
Not all physical inf'rmities qualify as sickness or disease under
section 1033(d). In Revenue Ruling 59-174,4 the IRS ruled that
genetic dwarfism in cattle was not a disease. Presumably this applies
to any congenital infimity, whenever manifested. There might be
some argument, however, that an involuntary conversion has oc-
cured if the congenital infirmity arose from sickness or disease of
the dam. When livestock illness arises from external sources, "dis-
ease" will probably be broadly construed, and should include chem-
ical causes, such as contaminated feed,465 as well as infectious
biological causes.
Injury to a horse from chemical causes might qualify as partial
destruction by accident as well as sickness.'6 If so, nonrecognition
of gain attributable to insurance proceeds might be available even
though it cannot be proven that the horse was sold because of the
sickness. Claiming nonrecognition under this standard, however,
precludes sheltering any gain realized on the sale under section
1033.467
c. Fertility Insurance Proceeds
Eligibility for nonrecognition under section 1033 of gain realized
on the collection of fertility insurance on a stallion should be
463 See Reynolds, supra note 441, at 996-97.
464 1959-1 C.B. 203.
465 Rev. Rul. 54-395, 1954-2 C.B. 143, modified by Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-2
C.B. 200. See also Rev. Rul. 75-381, 1975-2 C.B. 25 (honeybees killed by pesticides).
"1 See Rev. Rul. 75-381, 1975-2 C.B. 25 (honeybees killed by pesticides); Rev.
Rul. 54-395, 1954-2 C.B. 143 (cattle killed by disease, caused by consumption of
contaminated food, were involuntarily converted through destruction for year prior
to enactment of I.R.C. § 1033(e)), modified by Rev. Rul. 59-102, 1959-2 C.B. 200.
,67 See Rev. Rul. 78-337, 1978-2 C.B. 208 (nonrecognition does not extend to
proceeds of sale of shopping center partially destroyed by fire, but gain realized on
insurance proceeds qualified for nonrecognition to the extent reinvested in qualified
property).
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determined under the standards discussed in the preceding sec-
tions. 46s The cause of the infertility should determine the proper
treatment of the gain attributable to the insurance proceeds. If an
accident can be established as the cause of the infertility, this should
pose no problem. Infertility from another cause, however, presents
problems. First, the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the
infertility was caused by sickness or disease. If the infertility is
genetic, section 1033 does not apply. Even if the infertility was
caused by disease, the stallion must be sold. This problem cures
itself if the insurance underwriter takes title to the stallion, as most
fertility insurance policies provide for, but if the underwriter does
not take title, this may present a problem.
C. Identifying Horses Similar or Related in Service or Use to the
Converted Horses
As previously noted, there is no single easily applied meaning
of the phrase "property similar or related in service or use.'" 4 9 The
most frequently cited criteria are drawn from Maloof v. Commis-
sioner,4 70 in which the court set out the following four general
principles: (1) the replacement property must be "substantially
similar" to the converted property; (2) the replacement property
must represent a "continuation of the prior commitment of capital
and not a departure from it;" (3) the replacement property need
not exactly duplicate the converted property; and (4) the purpose
of section 1033 is to provide "a means by which a taxpayer whose
enjoyment of his property is interrupted without his consent may
arrange to have that interruption ignored for tax purposes, by
returning as closely as possible to his original position." Actual
determinations have been made on a case by case basis, taking all
of the facts and circumstances into account.
Two broad tests have evolved. The first, the so-called "func-
tional use test", looks to the physical characteristics and the tax-
payer's end use of the property. 47' Because this test proved difficult
to apply to passive investors, a second test, the so-called "similar
See Reynolds, supra note 441, at 1002-03.
See text accompanying notes 434-40 supra.
65 T.C. 263, 269-70 (1975)(acq.).
411 See Rev. Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319.
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economic relationship" test has developed and is applied to passive
investors. 472 This test, primarily applicable only to real estate and
equipment lessors, examines the extent and type of the owner-
lessor's management activity, the services rendered by him to the
users (tenants), and the nature of the business risks. The similar
economic relationship test generally does not apply to horses, which
usually are owned by the user. If a horse is leased either for breeding
or racing purposes, however, the similar economic relationship test
probably will apply to determine whether the replacement property
purchased by the owner-lessor of the converted horse is qualified.
1. Owner-Users and the "Functional Use" Test
Application of the functional use test in the context of invol-
untary conversions of horses presents a number of certainties and
uncertainties, and its exact scope remains unclear.
a. Replacement With Animals of Different Sex
As far as breeding stock is concerned, a stallion may be replaced
with a stallion and a broodmare with a broodmare. But in a private
letter ruling the IRS has taken the position that the the replacement
of breeding cattle of one sex with breeding cattle of the opposite
sex is not replacement with property that is similar or related in
service or use.473 This ruling was based on the different roles played
in the overall breeding process by animals of different sexes. A
male animal services numerous female animals and has no contin-
uing connection with the gestating calf. Females, on the other hand,
play a role in the gestation of a single calf. A cattle breeding herd
requires many cows, but only a few bulls.
Although there may be some differences in industry operations,
the fundamental roles in the breeding process of bulls and stallions
and cows and broodmares, respectively, are analogous. Therefore,
472 This test compares "the services or uses of the original and replacement
properties to the taxpayer-ovmer." Liant Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d
326, 329 (2d Cir. 1962); Johnson v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 736 (1965)(acq.); Rev.
Rul. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319.
4 Priv. Ltr. Ruling 7903064 (Oct. 18, 1978). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(e)-
1(c) (livestock replacing livestock sold because of drought must "be functionally the
same as the livestock involuntarily converted").
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the same principles used with cattle should apply to horses held for
breeding. The risks associated with deriving profits from owning a
stallion differ from the risks from owning a broodmare, and the
replacement of one with the other can hardly be called a contin-
uation of the original investment.
If the converted horse was held for racing, however, there is
some basis for arguing that the horse's sex should be irrelevant.
Although larger purses generally are earned by colts than by fillies,
and races in which they may be entered might differ slightly, they
are trained and raced in the same manner, and certainly seem to
qualify under the Maloof criteria as "substantially similar" property
representing a continuation of the original investment. Nevertheless,
a problem is presented by the potential dual purpose for which any
racehorse capable of breeding might be held. If the taxpayer engages
solely in the business of racing horses, consistently selling all horses,
male or female, when retired from racing, perhaps this dual purpose
problem can be overcome. For the owner who both races and
breeds horses, however, it is an unsolved problem.474
b. Replacement With a Horse Held For a Different Purpose
According to the IRS, horses held for different purposes are
not "similar or related in service or use. '475 Therefore, the replace-
ment of a converted racehorse with breeding stock or the replace-
ment of breeding stock with a racehorse, even if of the same sex,
will not qualify for nonrecognition under section 1033. Analyzed
against the criteria that have been applied to determine whether
replacement property meets the "similar or related in service or
use" standard, this conclusion is logical. Different business risks,
potential profits and management skills are associated with breeding
and racing. Replacing a horse used for one purpose with one used
for the other can hardly be said to return the taxpayer to his original
position. This is, nevertheless, a difficult rule to apply to horses.
In determining whether the replacement property is similar or
related in service or use, courts have looked to the taxpayer's
474 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(e)-1(c) (I.R.C. § 1033(e) extending involuntary
conversion treatment to livestock sold because of drought extends only to sales of
livestock in excess of the number of sales that would occur in any event).
411 I.R.S. Field Release No. 121. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(e)-l(d).
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ultimate use of the replacement property.476 A transitory unrelated
use is ignored. Although this test may be applied without inordinate
difficulty in examining real estate, which may or may not be con-
verted to a different use as the taxpayer chooses, it is not easily
applied to horses. Except for geldings, all racehorses are held not
only for racing, but also for future breeding use or for sale to
another person for breeding use.477 This different use, breeding, is
preordained for racehorses. Furthermore, the exact time at which
a horse will be retired from racing for breeding is unpredictable.
Any workout or race might result in an injury forcing retirement. 478
Thus, if a long run perspective is adopted, it is difficult to determine,
particularly for a horse nearing the end of an expected racing career,
whether the horse is held primarily for racing or primarily for
breeding.
In practice, consideration of the dual purposes for which horses
are held may produce different results depending on the "direction"
of the replacement. The replacement of a stallion with a colt (or of
a broodmare with a filly) might be argued to be qualified on the
theory that the colt was acquired primarily for breeding purposes,
and that he was being raced only to enhance his value as a stallion. 479
Evidence indicating this would be that the colt was an older colt,
and, using hindsight, that he indeed was retired to stud within some
reasonable period. Sale or syndication of the horse upon retirement
from racing, however, indicates that the horse was acquired for
racing, not breeding, unless other evidence indicates that the sale
became more desirable due to a change of circumstances arising
after the replacement.
On the other hand, the replacement of a racehorse, other than
a gelding, with a stallion or broodmare should be much more
416 See, e.g., S.H. Kress and Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 142 (1963) (interim
use of real estate for parking lot pending construction of building); Scheuber v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 559 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 371 F.2d 996
(7th Cir. 1967) (improvements on replacement for unimproved land had no value
and were held for transitory rental).
477 See McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974); Fowler v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 1124 (1962); Reynolds, supra note 441, at 1009.
471 See McDougal, 62 T.C. 720; Fowler, 37 T.C. 1124.
479 See Jewell v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 109 (1955) (commissioner unsuccesfully
argued that gain on sale of horse held for racing was not I.R.C. § 1231 gain on
theory that the only purpose for racing was to enhance value on subsequent sale to
customers of horse breeder and dealer); Fowler, 37 T.C. 1124 (same).
[VOL. 75
EQUINE TAXATION
difficult to qualify. A taxpayer engaged in both breeding and racing
might argue that the converted horse was at or close to the end of
its racing career and that most of its value was derived from
breeding potential, rather than from expected future purses. This
might support treatment of the stallion or broodmare as qualified
replacement property. If the converted racehorse is young, however,
this argument loses much of its weight.
For the taxpayer engaged only in racing, replacement would
seem to be limited to horses used for racing. Furthermore, if the
preceding argument has any validity, the replacement racehorse's
value may need to be derived primarily from its value as a racehorse,
rather than its value as potential breeding stock. This often might
be difficult to show given the relationship of prices of thorough-
breds with good bloodlines to the size of purses available. Most
horses cannot recoup their cost in purses won. Full recovery of cost
is available, if at all, only through breeding following their racing
careers. In this light, perhaps it should be sufficient if the replace-
ment horse merely has significant value as a racehorse.480 In any
event, replacement with an older racehorse that will soon be sold
or syndicated for breeding may less likely qualify than would re-
placement with a younger horse with a longer expected racing
career.
Despite the possibly sound theoretical basis for allowing some
leeway in the distinction between horses held for breeding and
horses held for racing, however, there is little basis for treating the
replacement of yearlings, weanlings or foals held by a dealer with
horses held for racing or breeding as a qualified replacement. This
should not, of course, preclude a dealer from proving that a par-
ticular yearling (or younger horse) would not have been sold in the
ordinary course of business, but would have been held for breeding
411 Compare Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 79
(1950)(acq.) (court rejected IRS argument that on replacement of going business the
amount realized must be allocated among classes of converted property and cost
allocated among classes of replacement property to determine whether entire amount
realized was reinvested in qualified property) with Maloof, 65 T.C. 263 (replacement
of business, substantially all of the property of which was inventory, with manufac-
turing business represented too great a shift of investment from current to fixed
assets, and only inventory replacement qualified under I.R.C. § 1033).
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or racing.48 If the taxpayer can meet this difficult burden, then
replacement with a horse used for the purpose for which the yearling
would have been used should be accorded nonrecognition.
c. Replacements Involving Mares in Foal
The application of I.R.C. section 1033 to mares in foal is far
more complex and uncertain than in the contexts already consid-
ered. Most of the uncertainty emanates from the question of whether
the unborn foal should be considered property separate from the
mare. 412 If it is separate property, then on the mare's death two
involuntary conversions may occur, and the replacement of each
must be tested separately. 413 If the foal is not separate, then there
is only one involuntary conversion, and identifying "property sim-
ilar or related in service or use" becomes more difficult.
If the foal is not separate from the mare, the crucial question
is whether a replacement mare must be in foal in order to be
considered "similar or related in service or use." Viewed from a
long term perspective, one might reasonably conclude that replace-
ment with another broodmare, in foal or not, would be sufficient
to return the taxpayer as nearly as possible to his position before
the conversion. If the foal is separately insured, however, the foal
insurance cannot be sheltered from recognition under section 1033
by the purchase of a mare not in foal. 484 Indeed, the foal insurance
411 This determination would be the same as the test employed to determine if
a dealer in horses is entitled to I.R.C. § 1231 treatment with respect to the sale of a
particular horse. See text accompanying notes 108-37 supra for a discussion of this
issue.
432 See Reynolds, supra note 441, at 1014-18.
"I See Rev. Rul. 77-192, 1977-1 C.B. 249 (replacemment of seafood processing
building and equipment with seagoing seafood process plant and equipment was
qualified only as to equipment); Rev. Rul. 70-501, 1970-2 C.B. 163 (replacement of
factory building and equipment separately tested, based on insurance proceeds at-
tributable to building and equipment and respective replacement costs). But see Rev.
Rul. 73-18, 1973-1 C.B. 368 (replacement of land and building with land and building
does not require apportionment of proceeds between converted land and building
and separate test against apportioned cost of replacement land and building); Rev.
Rul. 70-465, 1970-2 C.B. 162 (same).
41, See International Boiler Works Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 283
(1926)(acq.) (proceeds of settlement of single fire insurance policy separately settled
as to building and equipment between insured and insurance company required
reinvestment be separately tested for building and equipment); Rev. Rul. 70-501,
1970-2 C.B. 163 (same). See note 483 supra.
[VOL. 75
EQUITE TAXATION
possibly may be reinvested only in another foal or stud fees. 48s A
similar conclusion may be indicated if, for example, the mare was
purchased in foal and a substantial portion of the purchase price is
actually attributable to the foal, but there is a single insurance
policy. This fact pattern, however, makes a good case for treating
the mare and the foal as separate property. Whether an unborn
foal and the mare are separate property has been discussed already
in the context of allocation of purchase price and like kind ex-
changes, concluding that the foal generally should be recognized as
separate property for those purposes. 486 In that analysis, however,
the foal was always presumed to be born alive, while in this context
the foal is presumed never born. Therefore, as far as the application
of section 1033 is concerned, the decision in Greer v. United States487
that the holding period of a foal does not begin until its birth
presents a significant impediment to treating the unborn foal as
separate property. In the context of apportionment of basis it was
suggested previously that Greer might be interpreted as requiring
that the tax consequences of the transaction be held open pending
the birth of the foal rather than as an absolute prohibition on
treating the unborn foal as separate property. Only if the foal is
born alive could it be considered separate property to which basis
and amount realized on the sale might be allocated. 88 This inter-
pretation of Greer is not so easily applied if the foal is not born
alive.
Treating a foal that is not born alive as property separate from
the mare carrying it opens up difficult questions which cannot be
fully answered here. For example, if a mare purchased in foal
aborts, may the purchaser claim a loss deduction under I.R.C.
section 165(a) for the portion of the purchase price allocable to the
foal if it is not insured? If the foal is property separate from the
mare for purposes of section 1033, the logical corollary is that it is
also separate property for purposes of section 165. Initially, allow-
ing a deduction upon the abortion may appear to be incorrect, but
closer examination indicates that such a deduction may be proper.
' See text accompanying notes 441-49 supra for a discussion of the replacement
of a dead foal with stud fees or a live foal.
4': See text accompanying notes 174-80, 368-77 supra.
07 408 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1969), aff'g, 269 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
"+1 Id. at 636.
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Treating the foal as separate property may find support in
Revenue Ruling 86-24,49 in which the IRS determined that purebred
calf embryos, implanted in mixed breed cows, were separate prop-
erty from the cows for purposes of apportioning basis. Relying on
Gamble v. Commissioner,490 the IRS required the purchase price of
each cow to be allocated between the cow and the embryo on the
basis of the fair market value of each to determine the gain realized
on the sale of the cows following the birth of the purebred calves.
The acquisition of the purebred embryos was treated as a separate
transaction for tax purposes, and the taxpayer was required to
capitalize as the basis of the embryos the portion of the acquisition
costs allocable to them.
It may be significant that the Ruling, while relying on Gamble,
at all times discussed cows and "embryos", never mentioning
"calves" or giving any consideration to the possibility that the basis
allocated to the cow would depend on whether the embryonic calf
was born alive. This may indicate that livestock embryos should be
treated as separate property from the carrying animal when the
embryo has independent economic value. Although the embryonic
animals in the Ruling were surgically implanted in surrogate cows,
the Ruling does not appear to treat this as a significant fact that
would distinguish this case from one in which embryonic calves
were the natural offspring of the cows. Thus, treating an embryonic
foal and the broodmare carrying it as separate property for purposes
of section 1033 appears to be correct.
This conclusion is reinforced by analogizing the unborn foal to
standing crops. In several Revenue Rulings, the IRS has acknowl-
edged that standing crops are property for which insurance received
on their destruction may be reinvested in similar property and the
gain is entitled to nonrecognition under section 1033. 491 The analogy
is best seen by comparing a mare in foal, when the owner elected
to capitalize rather than deduct the stud fees, with crops grown by
a farmer using the crop method of accounting. In the case of the
419 1986-1 C.B. 80.
,- 68 T.C. 800 (1977)(acq.). Gamble is discussed in detail in the text accompa-
nying notes 157-73 supra.
49, Rev. Rul. 62-161, 1962-2 C.B. 175, amplified by Rev. Rul. 81-279, 1981-2
C.B. 163; Rev. Rul. 59-8, 1959-1 C.B. 202, modified by Rev. Rul. 81-279, 1981-2
C.B. 163.
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mare in foal, the capitalized stud fees become the basis of the foal
when born; they are not added to the basis of the mare.492 If the
foal is stillborn or the mare aborts, the stud fees, if not refunded,
clearly constitute an section 165 loss.
For a farmer using the crop method of accounting, the costs of
planting a crop are not deducted, but are capitalized as the basis
of the crop. 493 If the crop is destroyed, the insurance proceeds may
be reinvested in either a standing or harvested crop or through the
expense of planting a new crop without recognition pursuant to
section 1033. A foal, therefore, should be treated as separate prop-
erty upon the death of the mare in foal. Furthermore, it should not
matter that the stud fees were deducted previously. If the proceeds
of crop insurance received by a cash basis taxpayer are reinvested
in planting a new crop or purchasing a standing or harvested crop,
nonrecognition under section 1033 is available. Stud fees are de-
ducted by a cash basis taxpayer under the same provisions that
authorize the deduction of the expenses of planting crops, so the
same treatment should be available.
Treating the foal as separate property is the better result when
the foal was insured separately, for there would be two distinct
involuntary conversions, and the proceeds of insurance received
with respect to each conversion should be separately tested for
nonrecognition through reinvestment in similar property. Section
1033 might apply to one, but not to the other. The proceeds from
the mare could be reinvested in another mare, and the proceeds of
the foal insurance could be reinvested in another foal or in stud
fees.
With respect to the conversion of the foal, however, if the
owner had deducted the stud fees, a reinvestment in stud fees for
another mare could be neither deducted nor capitalized. 494 In ad-
dition, the taxpayer might be required to show that the "reinvest-
ment" stud fees would not have been incurred but for the involuntary
conversion. Thus, stud fees incurred in the next year for a mare
already owned by the taxpayer might not qualify. Apparently the
42 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
4' See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 (1986). The crop method of accounting is not
widely used but provides a useful analogy. See J. O'BYR & C. DAVENPORT, supra
note 141, at § 114.
'1 See text accompanying note 445 supra.
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only unquestionably qualified replacement stud fees would be those
incurred with respect to a replacement mare. Finally, if the stud
fees were deducted previously, replacement for the foal might be
limited to stud fees. The purchase of a foal may be "fundamentally
inconsistent" with the prior deduction, and the tax benefit rule may
override section 1033. 495
When the foal is not insured separately, allocating to the foal
any portion of the insurance proceeds on the mare may be difficult.
If no such allocation can be made, the entire reinvestment presum-
ably must be in another mare to avoid recognition totally. The
terms of the insurance policy, however, should not be controlling.4 9
If, for example, the owner purchased the mare in foal, insured her
for the full purchase price or more, and was able to prove the
portion of the purchase price attributable to the foal, the insurance
proceeds should be apportioned between the mare and the foal. A
ratable apportionment would make the most sense. In that case,
separate reinvestment would be appropriate.
If the foal is separate property, may the reinvestment be in the
form of another mare in foal? If so, to obtain total nonrecognition,
must the purchase prices attributable to the replacement mare and
foal, respectively, equal or exceed the insurance proceeds attribut-
able to the converted mare and foal, or is it sufficient that their
aggregate cost exceed the insurance proceeds, even if the portion
attributable to either the mare or the foal is less than the insurance
attributable to it? Logic would indicate that if the mare and foal
are separate for one purpose, they must be separate for all purposes,
and that the purchase price of the new mare must be allocated
between the mare and the foal. To the extent that the purchase
price of either is less than the amount realized on the conversion
of the original counterpart, gain must be recognized. This presents
no more administrative difficulty than permitting the reinvestment
to qualify on an aggregate basis, because the basis of the converted
mare and foal would have to be apportioned between the replace-
ment mare and foal under such a rule.49 On the other hand, some
4" See text accompanying notes 441-47 supra.
416 See text accompanying note 456 supra.
4- See Maloof, 65 T.C. 263 (replacement of business substantially all of the
property of which was inventory with manufacturing business represented too great
a shift of investment from current to fixed assets, and only inventory replacement
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authority suggests that reinvestment on an aggregate basis would
be adequate to support nonrecognition and that separate compu-
tations should not be required.4
98
2. Investors and the "Similar Economic Relationship" Test
Although the IRS originally applied the functional use test to
replacements of property by lessors by looking to the use to which
the lessee put the leased property, this analysis was rejected by a
number of appellate courts419 and the IRS finally acceded to the
application of the similar economic relationship test to lessors.: °
This test has been developed primarily in the context of rental real
estate owned by taxpayers who did not actively manage the
property 1o and may be difficult to apply in the equine context. In
an abstract sense, however, the test is no different than the test
applied to owner-users. The IRS and the courts will examine the
taxpayer's relationship to the property in terms of the services or
management activities required of the taxpayer and the risks asso-
ciated with the ownership of the respective properties502 Generally,
qualified under I.R.C. § 1033); Rev. Rut. 77-192, 1977-1 C.B. 249 (replacement of
seafood processing building and equipment with seagoing seafood process plant and
equipment was qualified only as to equipment); Rev. Rul. 70-501, 1970-2 C.B. 163.
"1 See Afassillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co., 15 T.C. 79 (court rejected IRS
argument that, on replacement of going business, the amount realized must be
allocated among classes of converted property and cost allocated among classes of
replacement property to determine whether entire amount realized was reinvested in
qualified property); Rev. Rul. 73-18, 1973-1 C.B. 368 (replacement of land and
building with land and building does not require apportionment of proceeds between
converted land and building and separate test against apportioned cost of replace-
ment land and building); Rev. Rul. 70-465, 1970-2 C.B. 162 (same). But see Rev.
Rul. 70-501, 1970-2 C.B. 163 (replacement of factory building and equipment sepa-
rately tested based on insurance proceeds attributable to building and equipment and
respective replacement costs).
See, e.g., Liant Record, Inc., 303 F.2d 326.
'Johnson, 43 T.C. 736; Rev. Rut. 64-237, 1964-2 C.B. 319.
See generally 2 B. BrrKER, supra note 44, at 44.3.3; Edwards, supra note
411, at 33-7th T.M. A-19-A-21.
2 See Liant Record, Inc., 303 F.2d at 328-29:
There is, therefore, a single test to be applied to both users and
investors, i.e., a comparison of the services or uses of the original and
replacement properties to the taxpayer-owner. In applying such a test
to a lessor, a court must compare, inter alia, the extent and type of a
lessor's management activity, the amount and kind of services rendered
by him to the tenants, and the nature of the business risks connected
with the properties.
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this requires that the taxpayer not replace rental property with
respect to which his role is passive management with property that
requires active management.503 It might also preclude replacement
of property leased for a fixed rental with property leased for rentals
that vary with the lessee's profits or vice versa.
Applying these standards, one can conclude, for example, that
a broodmare net-leased for a fixed rental could be replaced with
another broodmare similarly leased, but that it could not be replaced
with a filly leased for a percentage share of racing purses. Whether
this test would permit the replacement of a filly leased for a share
of racing purses with a mare leased for a share of the sales proceeds
of her foals is unclear. Although the relative risks of leasing differ-
ent types of real estate for a percentage of the lessee's profits might
not differ dramatically, the same cannot be said so easily for the
lease of horses for different purposes. As far as equine leases are
concerned, the similar economic relationship test possibly may pro-
duce results identical to the functional use test applied to owner-
users.
The similar economic relationship test may apply to the replace-
ment by a share owner of his interest in an involuntarily converted
horse owned by a syndicate if the shareholder regularly sold the
seasons to which he was entitled rather than using them himself:?0
This problem, however, arises only with respect to stallion syndi-
cates, because all other syndicates should be taxed as partnerships5°5
and the application of section 1033 to such syndicates is determined
at the partnership level, not the investor-partner level.5 6 In either
case, the share owner has no management responsibilities, but the
risks incurred in using a season to breed the stallion to a mare
owned by the share owner are significantly different from the risks
incurred in regularly selling the right to the season. The risk differ-
ential probably should be sufficient to treat the passive share owner
as an investor and limit his replacement property to another stallion
share held for the purpose of selling seasons or, possibly, a stallion
503 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-399, 1970-2 C.B. 164 (replacement of hotel leased to
operator by taxpayer with hotel operated by taxpayer did not qualify).
- See Reynolds, supra note 411, at 1006.
101 See text accompanying note 182 supra.
106 See text accompanying notes 508-17 infra.
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leased to a user.
D. Special Problems of Syndicates
The proper application of section 1033 to the involuntary con-
version of a syndicated horse depends upon whether the syndicate
is characterized as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.
t 7
Similar considerations govern an attempt to reinvest the proceeds
of an involuntarily converted horse in a syndicate share.
1. Syndicate Treated as a Partnership
If a horse held by a syndicate that is a partnership for federal
income tax purposes is involuntarily converted, section 1033 applies
only at the partnership level.505 The horse must be replaced by the
partnership, and the election not to recognize gain must be made
by the partnership. All partners are bound by the partnership
choice. Thus, if the partnership replaces the horse, but elects to
recognize gain, all partners must recognize gain;509 individual non-
recognition elections are not permitted. If the partnership does not
replace the horse, all partners must recognize their share of the
gain. Individual replacement with another horse is not permitted.
If the partnership replaces the converted horse, it must be with a
horse that is similar or related in service or use.
This analysis would not differ if, as is the frequent practice, the
individual shareholders separately insure their interests in the horse
held by the syndicate. If the syndicate is a partnership, the horse is
partnership property and must be replaced by the partnership for
the gain to escape recognition under section 1033. It is not necessary,
"I See text accompanying notes 181-87 supra for a discussion of the factors
governing the characterization of a syndicate as a partnership.
I.R.C. § 703(b) (all elections must be made by the partnership). E.g., De-
mirjian v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1691 (1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972)
(proceeds from condemned real estate owned by partnership reinvested by partner
acting in individual capacity did not qualify for nonrecognition because both election
and reinvestment must be made by partnership); Rev. Rul. 66-191, 1966-2 C.B. 300
(cattle owned by partnership and sold because of drought must be replaced by
partnership, not individual partners, for I.R.C. § 1033(f) to apply).
"I Each partner recognizes gain according to his distributive share of partner-
ship gain determined under I.R.C. § 704. In most syndicates this is a simple
proportionate part of the gain, but gains sometimes may be allocated other than on
a simple percentage basis.
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however, that the replacement be with funds traceable to the insur-
ance proceeds, but that is a likely source.
Properly characterizing the receipt of the insurance proceeds by
the share owners and the contribution of those proceeds back to
the syndicate to purchase the replacement horse presents a formi-
dable challenge in the application of Subchapter K of the I.R.C.
Thorough analysis of this problem is beyond the scope of this
paper. Note, however, that even if the gain on the horse escapes
taxation under section 1033, the receipt of the insurance proceeds
by the share owners might be characterized as a partnership distri-
bution that could trigger the recognition of gain under section 731.510
Whether the prompt contribution of the insurance proceeds to the
partnership results in ignoring the transitory possession by the share
owners, thereby avoiding the recognition of gain under section 731,
is a difficult question. 511 As long as each share owner has the choice
of contributing or not contributing, however, there is significant
risk that a distribution would be deemed to have occurred, even
with respect to those shareholders who contribute the insurance
proceeds to the syndicate to purchase a replacement horse.51 2
These problems involving the constructive distribution might be
avoided by a valid election under section 761 not to be taxed as a
partnership 5 13 and such an election should also permit the share
owners to elect nonrecongnition and reinvest as individuals rather
110 See Rev. Rul. 81-242, 1981-2 C.B. 147 (involuntary conversion of mortgaged
property effected a deemed cash distribution under I.R.C. § 752(b) resulting in
recognition of gain under I.R.C. § 731, notwithstanding valid I.R.C. § 1033 election
and reinvestment of amount equal to proceeds of conversion).
11 This question should be answered by applying the familiar "step transaction
doctrine." Discussion of this doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
discussion of the step transaction doctrine, see, e.g., Bittker, Pervasive Judicial
Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693, 717-
23 (1978); McMahon, Defining the "Acquisition" in B Reorganizations Through the
Step Transaction Doctrine, 67 IowA L. REv. 31, 67-84 (1981).
512 Application of either the "binding commitment" or "mutual interdepend-
ence" forms of the step transaction doctrine would clearly result in recognizing the
constructive distribution as a separate transaction. Only the "intention of the par-
ties" variant of the step transaction doctrine would integrate the distribution and
the recontribution to treat the distribution as never having occurred. Although
generalizations are hazardous in this area, this test usually is applied at the request
of the IRS to prevent taxpayers from disguising the true form of a transaction.
513 See text accompanying note 380 supra regarding elections not to be taxed as
a partnership in the context of I.R.C. § 1031 exchanges.
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than through the partnership. Although a section 761 election af-
fects only the application of Subchapter K to the partnership and
not the application of other provisions51 4 the rationale for requiring
the partnership to make a section 1033 election rather than the
individual partners is that section 703(b), which is part of Subchap-
ter K, requires that all elections, with certain exceptions, be made
by the partnership and not the partners individually.- 5 A valid
election under section 761 negates the application of section 703(b),
however, and the partners are presumably free to make individual
elections under section 1033 because that section, on which an
section 761 election has no effect, does not address partners. 6
Therefore, for purposes of section 1033, the partners will be co-
owners.
A word of caution is in order, however. In the context of equine
syndications and partnerships, the discussion in the preceding par-
agraph may be more theoretical than practical. Because of the strict
limitations on the availability of section 761 elections, it is doubtful
that a syndicate that crosses the line from co-ownership to partner-
ship generally could make a valid section 761 election not to be
taxed as a partnership. In those cases in which a valid section 761
election could be made, it will not be necessary because the syndicate
"I See Bryant v. Commissioner, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968) (Investment Tax
Credit computed without regard to election not to be taxed as partnership); Rev.
Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30 (same).
" See Rev. Rul. 66-191, 1966-2 C.B. 300.
516 Compare Rev. Rul. 83-129, 1983-2 C.B. 105 (partners in mining partnership
that made valid I.R.C. § 761 election were allowed separate elections under I.R.C.
§ 616 dealing with capitalization and amortization of mine development expenses
because I.R.C. § 761 election negates requirement of I.R.C. § 703(b) that all elections
be made by partnership) with Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30 (valid I.R.C. § 761
election does not affect computation of Investment Tax Credit on partnership level
because I.R.C. § 48 specifically refers to partnerships independently of Subchapter
K). See also Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1979), aff'd,
633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980). The Tax Court in dicta suggested that a valid I.R.C.
§ 761 election negates partnership status for all provisions of the Code, outside of
Subehapter K, that do not specifically refer to partnerships. Madison Gas & Elec.
Co., 72 T.C. at 559 n.9. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on the other hand,
noted that I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) defines partnerships for all sections of the Code in
the same manner as I.R.C. § 761, and that the effect of an I.R.C. § 761 election is
limited to Subchapter K, possibly implying a more restrictive view of the effect of
an election. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 515-16 n.2.
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will not be a partnership anyway.517
2. Syndicate That is Co-Ownership of Undivided Shares
If the syndicate is not a partnership, a share owner in a syndicate
owning a horse that has been involuntarily converted may avail
himself of nonrecognition under section 1033 by investing in another
syndicate that is not a partnership. The horse held by the syndicate
in which the reinvestment is made must, of course, be similar or
related in service or use to the horse held by the first syndicate.
Reinvestment in a syndicate that is a partnership, however, does
not qualify even if the horse held by the partnership syndicate is
similar or related in service or use to the horse held by the non-
partnership syndicate . 18 The syndicate share that was not a part-
nership was an undivided interest in the horse-tangible personalty.
A share in a syndicate that is a partnership is an intangible part-
nership interest, and it is not similar or related in service or use to
an undivided interest in a horse. Therefore, the share owner seeking
the shelter of section 1033 must be certain that neither the syndicate
that held the converted horse nor the syndicate that holds the
replacement horse is a partnership.519
Another question to which the answer is unclear is whether a
share owner in a syndicate that held an involuntarily converted
horse may replace his undivided interest in the syndicated horse
with outright ownership of another horse, otherwise meeting the
similar or related in service or use standard. The IRS has ruled that
,I? See Reynolds, supra note 441, at 1012-13.
S's See M.H.S. Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 733 (1976), aff'd,
575 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1978) (replacement of real estate with interest in joint
venture owning real estate does not qualify under I.R.C. § 1033(g)); Rev. Rul. 57-
154, 1957-1 C.B. 262 (purchase of replacement property as undivided tenant in
common with other owner is qualified replacement); Rev. Rul. 55-351, 1955-1 C.B.
343 (purchase of partnership interest in partnership holding property similar to
converted property is not a qualified replacement). But see Rev. Rul. 70-144, 1970-
1 C.B. 170 (purchase by 50 percent partner of other 50 percent interest in partnership
holding property similar to partner's individually converted property was a qualified
replacement because purchase effected liqudation of partnership, making taxpayer
the sole owner of the replacement property).
119 In determining whether the syndicate is a partnership for these purposes, the
standards developed under I.R.C. §§ 761 and 7701(a)(2) should be determinative,
not the state law determination of whether the syndicate is a partnership. See note
182 supra.
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a fractional undivided interest in a farm is a qualified replacement
for fee ownership of a farm, 20 and the converse should also hold
true. Thus, the replacement of a fractional interest in a horse with
a wholly owned horse should not fail per se the similar or related
in service or use test. But a syndicate share is not a simple fractional
undivided interest in a horse. A share owner's rights with respect
to the horse are much more limited than the rights of a simple co-
owner. The share holder has no rights of possession or management,
while a co-owner or outright owner does. This difference very well
may result in any investment other than an investment in another
syndicate share being treated as the purchase of property not similar
or related in service or use. Once again, the question is whether the
taxpayer is returning to his original position or is changing the form
of his investment. Moving from an investment without active man-
agement responsibilities to one which carries management respon-
sibilities appears to be a disqualifying change.52
Similar considerations may prevent the outright owner of a
horse that has been involuntarily converted from using section 1033
to avoid recognition if his reinvestment is in the form of a syndicate
share rather than another horse. In this case the taxpayer is moving
from an investment requiring active management to one that is
relatively passive.52
E. Determining the Desirability of a Section 1033 Election
The primary criteria governing the desirability of an election to
defer gain under section 1033 are the same as the criteria used to
determine if a like kind exchange is desirable. If all of the gain to
be recognized will be ordinary income, it almost always is desirable
to elect nonrecognition. Thus, to the extent that it is available,
section 1033 may be very useful for a dealer in horses who suffers
- Rev. Rul. 57-154, 1957-1 T.C. 262.
2 See Clifton Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 719 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 921 (1963) (replacement of bank office building operated for tenants
by two employees with hotel requiring 130-140 employees was not qualified); Rev.
Rul. 79-261, 1979-2 C.B. 295 (replacement of tenant-occupied office building with
building partially tenant-occupied and partially owner-occupied qualified only to
extent of tenant occupied portion).
.'2 See Rev. Rul. 70-399, 1970-2 C.B. 164 (replacement of hotel leased to
operator by taxpayer with hotel operated by taxpayer did not qualify).
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an involuntary conversion of a horse held for sale to customers.
An election to defer gain under section 1033 also is desirable
whenever a horse, held for breeding or racing for less than the
twenty four month holding period requisite for obtaining section
1231 treatment, is involuntarily converted. In both cases, all of the
gain is ordinary income. For the dealer, there is no benefit gained
by a step up in basis. For the owner of a horse held for breeding
or racing, the step up in basis increases ACRS deductions, but in
the absence of a section 1033 election, the replacement horse has
its own recovery period.
Using a time value of money analysis, the present value of the
tax benefit of the future ACRS deductions can never equal the tax
detriment of current taxation of the gains as ordinary income, unless
the taxpayer has other current deductions to offset the gain or is in
a low tax bracket in the current year but expects to be in a much
higher bracket in the years when the ACRS deductions are claimed.
If a significant portion of the gain is taxed as capital gain, however,
then for years prior to 1987 it more often was desirable to currrently
recognize the gain, step up the basis of the replacement horse to its
full cost, and claim ACRS deductions on the cost basis. When the
gain on the sale was section 1231 gain, taxed as capital gain, the
discounted value of the future ACRS deductions on the increased
basis was greater than the current tax detriment.52 Thus, for years
in which the capital gains preference was in effect, section 1033
nonrecognition frequently was not desirable with respect to horses
held for breeding or racing for more than twenty four months. For
years after 1986, however, when section 1231 gains that are treated
as capital gains are nevertheless taxed at the same rates as ordinary
income, making a section 1033 election will be advisable for most
involuntary conversions.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to provide an encyclopedic exposition
of the taxation of sales and exchanges of horses, focusing primarily
on the thoroughbred breeding and racing business. Even after
lengthy discourse, however, the answers to many questions remain
121 See text at Part II.F. supra.
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clouded, and more definite answers are unlikely to be forthcoming
soon. This stems not so much from ambiguity of the statutory
provisions governing sales and exchanges of horses, as from diffi-
culty in applying to horses principles that may be relatively clear
when applied to other types of property.
Taxation of sales and exchanges of horses is, with a few excep-
tions, governed by the same statutory provisions that control tax-
ation of the sale of property generally. When applied to horses,
however, otherwise relatively clear rules may be ambiguous because
of the nature of horses and the industry. Because horses are living
organisms, capable of reproducing, numerous questions unique to
transactions involving animals arise in applying those rules. Thus,
we must grapple with difficult issues such as whether any portion
of the purchase price paid or the sales proceeds received for a mare
in foal should be attributed to the foal, and if so, how much, or
whether for purposes of section 1033 a two year old filly is "sub-
stantially similar in service or use" to a two year old colt. The
embryonic foal can be an ephemeral asset; it has value, but that
value is contingent on a live birth. Both a filly and a colt may have
the same use-racing-for a few years, but ultimately they fill
different roles in the breeding function, and the maximum potential
value of a colt far exceeds the maximum potential value of a filly.
The relative dearth of answers to the types of questions that
arise in sophisticated tax planning transactions should serve as a
yellow caution flag to anyone attempting to structure a complicated
exchange of horses or an aquisition of a horse to replace one that
has been involuntarily converted. While certain straightforward
exchanges and replacements present few problems, even a signifi-
cant age difference between the horses in the transaction may
preclude nonrecognition. One might say that the rules of law are
clear, but the facts, which are the uses for which the horses are
held, are all too often ambiguous. Thus, the key to planning
transactions involving the sale and exchange of horses, before at-
tempting to apply any rule or law, is to understand that a "horse
is not a horse." A horse is a horse held for a particular use, and
horses held for different uses are quite different.
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